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 This thesis examines the agrarian economics beliefs of Rexford G. Tugwell 
prior to entering public service in order to understand the impetus for establishing the 
Resettlement Administration under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
program.  
 The work beings with an examination of the historical themes and 
developments of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
-centuries that influenced Tugwell and the 
Roosevelt Administration, followed by Tugwell’s pre-administration writings.  Four 
influential themes from this professional period would later guide his policies as 
leader of the Resettlement Administration. The thesis concludes with a discussion of 
the agency’s goals, obstacles, and policies between 1935 and 1936, and how they 
related to two of its flagship programs, Greenbelt, MD and the Chopawamsic 
Recreation Demonstration Project. 
 This work seeks to expose the history of an important, but relatively obscure, 
New Deal agency, and interpret Rexford Tugwell’s role in its creation, and contribute 
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The most lasting visual documentation of the devastation of the Great 
Depression in rural communities throughout the United States was the work of the 
Information Division of the little-known Resettlement Administration.  Photographers 
such as Dorothy Lange and Walker Evans became household names, owners of the 
eyes that saw and captured the destitution, despair, and even hope of impoverished 
Americans. Established by executive order in 1935, the Resettlement Administration 
and its successor, the Farm Security Administration (FSA) created approximately 
77,000 black and white photos between 1935 and 1942, silent witnesses to the 
consequences of national economic collapse.1  
The degree of devastation in the early 1930s eclipsed all previous periods of 
hardship. The golden industrial era of the 1920s came to a grinding halt, and financial 
panic expanded in waves across the nation. In 1930, 1,352 banks and 26,355 
businesses failed, and $853 million in deposits vanished from the pockets of their 
clients.  Closings in 1931 surpassed the preceding year. The value of farm properties 
continued to decline precipitously, from a record high of $78.3 billion in 1920, to 
$57.7 billion in 1929, to $51.8 billion in 1931.  By the time of the 1932 presidential 
election, approximately 12 million Americans were unemployed.2  In comparison, 
                                                
1 Library of Congress, “America from the Great Depression to World War II: Black-
and-White Photographs from the FSA-OWI, 1935-1945.” 
<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fsahtml/fsainfo.html> (accessed 29 January 2009). In 
1942, the project was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the 
Department of War, where it lasted only until the following year.  
 
2 T. H. Watkins, The Great Depression: America in the 1930s (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1993), 55.  
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New York, the most populous state in the nation, had just over 12.5 million residents 
in the 1930 census.3  
In November 1932, Americans overwhelmingly chose President Franklin 
Roosevelt to solve the escalating economic catastrophe.  The massive scale of the 
calamity and the shear force of the devastation gave his administration a mandate to 
take bold, creative leaps. While many of the New Deal programs of the early 1930s---
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the 
Work Progress Administration (WPA), and the Public Works Administration (PWA)--
-- became staples in American political history, the agency responsible for the photo 
documentation project has been largely forgotten.   
As head of the Information Division, Roy Styker made it the program’s 
mission to “introduce America to Americans.”4  Indeed, it might be more accurate to 
say that the project introduced transient rural Americans to their urban American 
brethren.  The plight of the poor—primarily the rural poor—became visually 
accessible in a profound way.  Photos of filthy mothers and children, broken men, 
desolated fields and substandard housing bespoke the need for a change.  (See 
Illustration I.1 and Illustration I.2) Rexford Tugwell believed he could provide a 
solution.  
                                                
3 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933 no. 55 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933), 9.  
 
4 Roy Stryker, “The FSA Collection of Photographs,” Photography in Print, edited by 
Vicky Goldberg (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 353. 
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Illustration I.1. Old farmhouse on property of woman who operated a chicken farm 
near Haymarket, VA, 1941. From the Farm Security Administration – Office of War 
Information Photograph Collection. 
 
 
Illustration 1.2. Interior showing family of nine, 1930-1934. From the Farm Security 
Administration – Office of War Information Photograph Collection. 
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Born in 1891 in Sinclairville, an upstate New York village, to Charles Tugwell 
and Denise Rexford, Rexford Guy Tugwell experienced the first-hand benefits and 
disadvantages of rural life.  When his family relocated to Wilson, NY to start a 
canning factory, Tugwell served as his father’s field man.  Coming of age during the 
era of Progressive politics and industrialization, he credited this work experience with 
providing him with an early distaste of laissez-faire economics, believing it to be an 
antiquated model for agriculture in the modern era.5 
In 1911, Tugwell enrolled in the Wharton School at the University of 
Pennsylvania, becoming a devotee of economic professors Scott Nearing, a liberal 
crusader, and Simon Nelson Patten, an advocate of institutional economics.  Patten 
would influence Tugwell throughout his life, especially his experimental outlook and 
belief that economic theory should be directed towards institutional reform.  
Completing his Bachelor of Science in 1915 and his Master of Arts in 1916, both in 
economics, Tugwell served as an assistant professor of economics at the University of 
Washington, a manager at the American University Union in Paris, and at his father’s 
canning factory before returning to the Wharton School to complete his doctorate.  
After graduating in 1922, his served as an assistant profession, and associate professor, 
and finally a full professor at Columbia University between 1922 and 1933.6 
An agrarian economist, Tugwell was one of several Columbia University 
professors, collective nicknamed the ‘Brain Trust,’ recruited to advise Governor 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1932 presidential campaign.  After Roosevelt’s landslide 
victory, he asked Tugwell to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Agricultural, 
promoting him to Under Secretary in 1934.  Widely considered to be one of the most 
                                                
5 Michael V. Namorato, Rexford G. Tugwell: A Biography (New York: Praeger, 1988), 
11-17.  
 
6 Ibid, 21-54. 
  5 
liberal members of the administration, Tugwell was frequently frustrated by 
bureaucratic red tape and his hard-line personality exasperated many of his colleagues 
within the Department of Agriculture (USDA).  In 1935, he was appointed the 
Administrator of the newly formed Resettlement Administration, and although he 
retained his position as Under Secretary, he effectively ceased working in the 
department.  Often considered one of the most influential forces in crafting the New 
Deal initiative, Tugwell resigned in November 1936, effectively ending the era of the 
Brain Trust.7 
Statement of Purpose 
This thesis is an historical study of Rexford Tugwell’s ideological and 
economic beliefs prior to entering public service, followed by an examination of the 
formation and policies of the Resettlement Agency under his guidance.  Two flagship 
programs are included in order to analyze the practical implications of the 
Resettlement Administration initiatives.  Federal photographic documentation of the 
United States in the 1930s, towns such as Greenbelt, Maryland, and the Prince 
William National Forest, among many other public projects, all owe their existence to 
the efforts of the Resettlement Administration.  The history of the agency, however, 
and the ideological underpinnings of its founder, Rexford Tugwell, remains largely 
absent from the historical record.  The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
origins, motivations, and goals of the short-lived Resettlement Administration, and the 
political, social, and economic implications of the policies for the creation of suburban 
communities and the destruction of pre-existing rural communities. The brief time 
period offers an opportunity to understand the tension between urban and rural needs 
in the period, and the goals, costs, and consequences of the social consolidation 
                                                
7 Ibid, 115-117.  
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policies of the Roosevelt administration, and their impact on two American 
communities, one suburban and one rural.  
An understanding of the Resettlement Administration—its leaders, its goals, its 
successes, its failures, and its critics—provides the necessary background to 
understanding future American land-use patterns, namely the rise of suburbanization 
and the intensified commercialization of farm land.  The largely ignored story of the 
agency reveals the overwhelming complexity of redesigning, both administratively 
and ideologically, the way in which Americans engaged with the land in the mid-
1930s.  The long-term consequences of the policies and practices of this agency do not 
fall within the scope of this thesis.  However, there is a noticeable gap in scholarship 
regarding the contributions of the Resettlement Administration, if only for the ideas 
and questions raised by Tugwell.  Along the way, we will examine his ideological 
similarities to urban planner Clarence Stein, and the educational focus of two divisions 
within the agency.  
Methodology 
 Several publicly accessible archives were utilized in the research component of 
this thesis.  The records of the Resettlement Administration are stored at the U.S. 
National Archives II in College Park, MD.  The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Library in Hyde Park, NY is the repository of Rexford Tugwell’s personal papers, 
including communications with President Roosevelt, administrative reports, and his 
private journal.  Clarence S. Stein’s papers are housed at Cornell University’s Carl K. 
Krock Library, and provided insight into design and policy standards implemented at 
Greenbelt, Maryland.   
Additional primary information was collected through academic databases 
made accessible through the Cornell University Library system.  Tugwell was widely 
published in influential academic journals throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.  The 
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Washington Post, Washington Star, and the New York Times newspaper, also accessed 
through the Cornell University Library, contributed to establishing a timeline of the 
Resettlement Administration’s activities.   
Secondary source research was also conducted through the Cornell University 
Library system.  T.H. Watkin’s The Great Depression: America in the 1930s (1993) 
was formative for my understanding the conditions of life in the United States in the 
years preceding and during the lifecycle of the Resettlement Administration.  Michael 
V. Namorato’s Rexford G. Tugwell: A Biography (1988) was invaluable for providing 
an overview of Tugwell’s life and a bibliography of his writings.  Poverty and 
Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration (1968), by Sidney 
Baldwin, The Simple Life: Plain Living and High Thinking in American Culture 
(1985) by David Shi, and Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (1964) by Bernard 
Sternsher were influential in narrowing the scope of my project, and supplying 
background information on the political, social, and economic factors and influences 
that impacted Rexford Tugwell, President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, and the 
Resettlement Administration.  
Chapter Overview 
 The following paper is organized into four distinct sections.  Chapter One 
investigates the historical themes and developments of the post-Civil War era that 
influenced the Roosevelt administration’s decision to establish the Resettlement 
Administration.  It analyzes the impetus behind and implications in the 1930s of the 
Agrarian Crusade and the political mobilization of farmers, increased federal interest 
and participation in land-use and rural living standards, the establishment of rural 
sociology as an academic discipline, and rural nostalgia as a response to 
industrialization.  The purpose of the chapter is to lay the economic, political, and 
sociological framework to accurately contextualize the Resettlement Administration.  
  8 
 The rational for many of Tugwell’s decisions as the head of the Resettlement 
Administration can be found in his academic writings prior to joining Roosevelt’s 
political team, and speeches and journal entries from 1933 and 1934.  Chapter Two 
traces the four themes that ultimately influenced many of his policies during 1935 and 
1936.  First, Tugwell asserted that the traditional American agricultural system had 
failed to independently develop a means by which to achieve price stability.  His 
second theme emphasized the necessity for the agricultural community to accept the 
technological consequences of industrialization.  Third, according to Tugwell, it was 
the duty of the federal government to intervene in the system and impose policies and 
standards directed at preventing significant price fluctuations.  Finally, he argued that 
the acceptance of the second and third themes would result in the massive reduction of 
subsistence-level farmers in favor of the commercial farmer, and that such a 
transformation of American agriculture would be a natural, healthy development.  
During Tugwell’s time in the Department of Agriculture and the Resettlement 
Administration, the volume of his publications decreased, likely the result of more 
pressing administrative demands.  His journal entries between 1932 and 1935 are also 
extensively utilized in this chapter, but unfortunately his last entry before his 
November 1936 resignation was dated September 15, 1935.  In the absence of his 
personal perspectives during the life of the Resettlement Administration, his earlier 
writings offer the clearest insight into the ideological underpinnings of his decisions.   
  Although the United States experienced periods of great prosperity throughout 
the 1920s, few farmers benefited economically because of crop price instability.  
Political mobilization initiated during the Agrarian Crusade built up sufficiently by the 
early 1930s to inflict significant political pressure on the new administration.  Tugwell 
convinced Roosevelt that agricultural land-use policies and programs were too widely 
dispersed among multiple departments and agencies, and that the severity of the 
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economic situation demanded that the federal government consolidate all the programs 
under the umbrella of a single organization.  Chapter Three traces the goals, policy 
objectives, administrative features, and political obstacles of the Resettlement 
Administration from the weeks prior to its official creation by executive order in May 
1935 until its absorption into the Department of Agriculture in January 1937.  Largely 
due to the political context of the 1936 presidential election, and a concurrent, 
sustained attempt by Congress to diminish the power of the executive branch, many 
New Deal opponents charged that the Resettlement Administration was a worthless, 
ineffective, expensive agency.  It faced considerable challenges throughout its short 
lifetime, influenced by animosity personally directed at Tugwell. 
 The final chapter focuses on two examples of Resettlement Administration 
activities, Greenbelt, Maryland and the Chopawamsic Recreational Demonstration 
Project, which were created by the Suburban Division and Submarginal Land Division 
of the Resettlement Administration respectively.  Although two other Greenbelt 
Towns were built in the Midwest, and over 200 demonstration programs were 
established in 43 states, both of the aforementioned projects were identified by the 
Resettlement Administration as their flagship endeavors. Analyzing their contributions 
and implications helps illuminate the difficulties faced by Tugwell and his aides in 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 FROM THE AGRARIAN REVOLT TO PROGRESSIVE SUBURBANISM – 
PROVIDING A CONTEXT FOR THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
 
Introduction 
The clamor of the bone-chilling crash of the New York Stock Exchange on 
October 24, 1929 is often identified as the beginning of the Great Depression.  Such an 
opinion, however, inadvertently implies that the instability of the American 
agricultural system in the same period was a consequence, and not a contributing 
factor, of the profound economic crisis.  In contrast, the huge investment by the 
Roosevelt administration in emergency relief for farmers—in the form of the National 
Recovery Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and, finally, 
the Resettlement Administration—underscores the vital role that agricultural 
instability played in the breakdown of the national economic system.   
In order to appreciate the values, goals, and challenges of the Resettlement 
Administration, it is first necessary to locate its development from within a thematic 
framework that extends back into the previous century, especially the decades 
immediately after the American Civil War.  Four parallel movements, with 
overlapping interests and attributes, intersected in the early 1930s to inform and 
encourage the actions of Rexford Tugwell’s Resettlement Administration.  They were 
the Agrarian Crusade and the organizing efforts of farm labor, growing federal 
intervention in national land-use patterns and rural life conditions, the development of 
the academic study of rural sociology, and rural nostalgia.   These movements and 
their aims would have been meaningless, however, without a corresponding economic 
crisis, and the willingness of the voting public to centralize power within the executive 
branch.   
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19
th
 and Early 20th-Century Thematic Developments - The ‘Agrarian Crusade’ and 
its Successors 
Between the conclusion of the Civil War and October 1929, intense economic 
fluctuations were common in the United States.  Prior to that period, American 
agriculture and its influence on the domestic economy was clear and direct, and the 
nascent tensions between the rise of industrialization and traditional agriculture 
contributed to the Civil War.8  However, it was during the aftermath of the conflict 
that farmers organized as a special interest group in order to respond to significant 
domestic and international economics. This ‘Agrarian Crusade’ was a prolonged effort 
to shift agricultural production from the predominately self-sufficient/regional model, 
to a business-oriented approach that could meet the demands of developing population 
centers through the establishment of tariffs and formal production control 
mechanisms.9 
It is dangerous to generalize about the condition of American agriculture in 
any era because of the incredible degree to which regional factors—from the types of 
crops being produced, to market demands, to the quality of the soil, to environmental 
hazards—influenced productivity.  However, some broad agricultural trends 
developed in the aftermath of the Civil War.  These, in turn, contributed to a nation-
wide farm experience that farmers encountered whether they grew tobacco in North 
Carolina, hops in New York, or wheat in Kansas.  First, farming underwent 
widespread commercialization, involving the specialization of crops, increase in 
agricultural technology, and farms run as economic enterprises.  Although all farmers 
                                                
8 David E. Shi, The Simple Life: Plain Living and High Thinking in American Culture 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 154. 
 
9 Thomas H. Greer. American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865 
(Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1965), 61-63. 
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were traditionally subservient to limiting factors imposed by nature—such as storms, 
droughts, and insects—the commercialization process increased the importance of 
market forces.  Concurrently, agricultural markets expanded; instead of simply selling 
his products in a local or regional market, the commercial farmer could take advantage 
of transportation innovations and place his crops in a national marketplace. 10  World 
War I was responsible for creating an international consumer, as instability in Europe 
resulted in the fighting forces increasing their dependency on American crops.  
Enterprising American farmers, in turn, boosted their production levels by farming 
new lands and investing in new technology to raise productivity.11   
The direct consequences of a farmer participating in a widening agricultural 
market, however, included heightened economic risk combined with a near-total 
absence of individual control.  By placing his crops in a national marketplace, the 
farmer became subservient to the whims of the marketplace itself.  Agricultural 
discontent and unrest were a natural evolution from this unbalanced system.  Farmers 
organized and turned to political forums to express their frustrations.  The Agrarian 
Crusade became an initiative geared towards re-balancing the economic system.12  The 
mobilization and vocalization of America’s rural inhabitants in the latter decades of 
the 19th-century resulted in the gradual creation of a powerful voting block, but one 
that would not be on par with the industrial unions until the establishment of the Non-
partisan League in North Dakota in 1916.13  By the 1920s, the Farm Bloc, a group 
                                                
10 Robert A. McGuire, “Economic Causes of Late-Nineteenth Century Agrarian 
Unrest: New Evidence,” The Journal of Economic History 41, no 4 (December 1981): 
837.  Shi, 154-155.  
 
11 Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security 
Administration (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 34.  
 
12 Ibid, 837-838. 
 
13 Greer, 214. 
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largely comprised of Midwestern Republicans and Southern Democrats who 
represented the interests of the indebted post-war farmer, was a significant and 
powerful lobbyist.  Designed to limit agricultural sales within the United States 
through the creation of a federal agency to oversea cooperation among farmers, the 
McNary-Haugen Farm Relief Bill was pushed through Congress by the Farm Bloc in 
both 1927 and 1928, but twice vetoed by President Calvin Coolidge.14 Rexford 
Tugwell was a staunch supporter of the bill, and his developing ideas about 
cooperation among farmers regarding production and the establishment of a federal 
agency to address such concerns were evident within it.15  
It is important to note, however, that the political discussion of agriculture was 
centered on a specific type of farmer, namely one who was capable of producing a 
significant surplus.  The Farm Bloc gave voice to the concerns of farmers who had 
overextended themselves during World War I, and who suffered the consequences of 
price instability in the 1920s.  A subsistence farmer who was barely producing enough 
to feed his family was inherently excluded.  His voice remained silent in the political 
mobilization effort because he did not fall within its constituency.  During this period, 
therefore, it is possible to trace a distinct spit in the definition of American farming, 
between the traditional subsistence model and a modern, commercial endeavor.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
14 Gertrude Almy Slichter, “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Farm Policy as Governor of New 
York State, 1928-1932,” Agricultural History 33, no. 4 (October 1959): 167.   
Incidentally, Coolridge’s Secretary of Agriculture, Henry C. Wallace, was supportive 
of the bill.  His son, Henry A. Wallace, would serve as both FDR’s Secretary of 
Agriculture and Vice President, the latter during his second term in office. 
 
15 Rexford G. Tugwell, “Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 142, (Mar. 1929): 271-2. 
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19
th
 and Early 20th-Century Thematic Developments - Federal Involvement 
Evolving land-use trends in the federal government in the late 19th-century 
contributed was a thematic influence for Resettlement Administration policies.  By 
signing the Act of Dedication on March 1, 1872, President Ulysses S. Grant 
established the first wilderness preserve around the Yellowstone River, today known 
as Yellowstone National Park.  Although the principle motivation to protect the land 
was to two million acres out of private, industrial hands, it was an important incident 
because it established the precedent for the government to assert its right to decide 
how land should be used.16  This moment signaled an increased federal, particularly 
presidential, interest in considering land as a national resource, a concept that was 
subsequently embodied in both Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt’s presidencies.  
Many of the first national parks were actually designated as national 
monuments under the stipulations of the Antiquities Act of 1906.17  President 
Theodore Roosevelt, however, did not confine his interest in American land and the 
people who used it to federal land preserves.  In 1908, his final full year in office, he 
appointed a commission “to gather information on the present condition of country 
life, to recommend means of supplying such deficiencies as are found, and, finally, to 
suggest methods of organized permanent effort in further investigation and actual 
work, which will result in making life on the farm more attractive and profitable.”18  
The commission, presided over by Professor Liberty Hyde Bailey, dean of the College 
                                                
16 Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the Great American Mind 4th ed. (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 108.  
 
17 Robert W. Righter, “National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the 
Antiquities Act of 1906,” The Western Historical Quarterly 20, no. 3 (August 1989): 
281-282. 
 
18 “Farm Board Soon to Act,” Washington Post (14 September 1908), sec A.   
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of Agriculture at Cornell University,19 completed their report in less than six months, 
the product of thirty public hearings and 120,000 responses to printed questionnaires 
mailed by the Department of Agriculture to farmers and rural inhabitants around the 
country.  The final report asserted that the American farmer must continue to evolve 
from an independent, self-sustaining individual into a fledgling businessman in order 
to raise rural standards of living and increase the vibrancy of rural life.  In his message 
accompanying the deliverance of the commission’s report to Congress, President 
Roosevelt declared, “Farmers as a class do not magnify their calling….Where farmers 
are organized co-operatively they not only avail themselves much more readily of 
business opportunities and improved methods, but it is found that the organizations 
which bring them together in the work of their lives are used also for social and 
intellectual advancement.”20  
The Country Life Commission report was the product of national concern 
regarding the perceived emptying of the rural lands and the migration of rural 
populations to the cities.  The bulk of the report focused on the ways in which to 
improve rural life and the business interests of farmers in order to insure that the 
nation maintained a rural population level capable of feeding the burgeoning cities.21  
Additionally, the report identified the roles federal and local governments should play 
in sustaining agricultural production and advancing the efficiency of farms.  As 
Roosevelt noted in his accompanying message to Congress, “the most important help 
that the Government, whether national or state, can give is to show the people how to 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
 
20 “Country Life the Subject of Roosevelt’s Special Message,” Wall Street Journal (10 
February 1909), sec. A.  
 
21 Report of the Commission on Country Life. Senate Document No. 705, 60th 
Congress, 2d Session, (New York: Sturgis and Walton, Co., 1911). 
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go about these tasks of organization, education, and communication with the best and 
quickest results.”22  The report’s emphasis on education was two-fold: the 
establishment of secondary and collegiate schools for rural youth was critical in order 
to circumvent a ‘brain drain,’ and it was imperative that farmers be educated in the 
latest and best production methods.23  As with the Agrarian Crusade of the previous 
decades, the Country Life Commission engaged a specific type of rural inhabitant in 
their study: the independent, presumably white, male, family farm owner, capable of 
contributing to a national agricultural market.  Most particularly, the tenant, 
subsistence farmers who rented farm land from others, were denied a role in this 
federal discussion.  
19
th
 and Early 20th-Century Thematic Developments - Sociology and Rural Life 
Conditions 
Poverty was a well-established and accepted condition in 19th-century 
America, and further exacerbated in the urban context by post-Civil War 
industrialization.24  In this era, poor relief typically came in the form of private, often 
religious, philanthropic activities, such as the establishment of Jane Addams’ Hull 
House in Chicago in 188925 and others who spearheaded reform in New York 
                                                
22 “Country Life the Subject of Roosevelt’s Special Message,” Wall Street Journal (10 
February 1909), page 2. 
 
23 Report of the Commission on Country Life. Nearly 25 years later, a Hoover 
Commission reflects on the disparity of education standards between white and negro 
school-age children. (T.J. Woofter, Jr. “The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” 
Recent Social Trends 1, (York, PA: The Maple Press Company, 1933): 585-590.) 
Although this is not a focus of the paper, it is worth noting that the Country Life 
Commission focused on a specific type of rural inhabitants, and did not engage in a 
discussion of standards and conditions of the migrant workers and/or ethnic farmers.  
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tenement districts.26  These charitable activities developed largely within the American 
context as a response to the horrific conditions of the poor in inner-cities.  Scott 
Nearing’s Poverty and Riches: A Study of the Industrial Regime, is typical of a branch 
of early 20th-century texts.  The book was a reaction to the elitist idea that poverty 
bred character, particularly the quintessentially American notion that man has the 
ability to pull himself out of squalor by the aid of his own bootstraps.  Instead, 
Nearing characterizes the poor as victims of the modern age.27  
Poverty treatises prior to the Great Depression showed the difficulty by which 
non-academic authors grappled with defining poverty and addressing it in both urban 
centers and rural communities.  Robert W. Kelso’s Poverty shows of the general 
struggles of the private, philanthropic sector to broadly engage the idea of a standard 
of living as a means by which to define poverty itself.  Kelso described poverty as, 
“that condition of living in which the individual…consistently fails to maintain 
himself…at a plane of living high enough to insure continuous bodily and mental 
fitness….and which allows him and them to live and function in their community with 
decency and self-respect.”28  The nebulous quality of this definition underscored the 
complexity of the situation.  This was a primarily community-assessed approach to 
poverty.  The rural individual may have considerably fewer resources than his urban 
counter-part, but if he was able to maintain a decent quality of life in comparison to 
his neighbors, he was considered to be outside of poverty.29 
                                                                                                                                       
 
26 Tenement House Reform in New York, 1834-1900, (New York: Evening Post Job 
Printing House, 1900).  
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In the same period that Kelso and Nearing attempted classify poverty, formal 
academic interest in American rural life issued gradually developed.  This trend 
became manifest with the establishment of rural sociology, a subcategory within the 
larger field of sociology, and a development that was fundamentally tied to the 
passage of the Agrarian Crusade, the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, and the Country 
Life Commission.30  John M. Gillette, a professor of sociology at the University of 
North Dakota, was one of the first academics to engage in the creation of a rural 
sociology textbook, Constructive Rural Sociology.31  He credited his interest in the 
material to a course he took in 1900 at the University of Chicago with Professor 
Charles R. Henderson, titled, “Rural Communities.” The existence of such a course, 
but without specific designation as a subfield within the sociology department, showed 
slowly burgeoning academic interest in rural life and rural conditions at the turn of the 
century.32  Analyzing the root of the ‘rural problem,’ Gillette noted that it was a “ in 
reality a product of the intellectual faculties.  There was no rural problem recognized a 
few years ago.  Conditions in the country have not grown worse since then. Country 
life was regarded as satisfactory and as well suited to the needs of the farming 
                                                                                                                                       
 
30 Nash, 133.  Nash discusses the significance of the relatively unnoticed passage of 
the Forest Reserve Act because it fundamentally altered national land usage, and was 
precursor legislation to the establishment of the National Parks Service in 1916.  
 
31 Both Gillete and Liberty Hyde Bailey are both popularly credited with being the 
“Father of Rural Sociology.”  If their contemporaries viewed them in this manner or if 
a legitimate academic source cited either of them in such a manner remains unknown 
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well-established academics and were among the first to produce numerous tracts on 
the ideas of the developing rural sociology movement, and, therefore, are worthy for 
inclusion in this discussion.   
 
32 John M. Gillette, Constructive Rural Sociology, 3rd ed, (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1921), vii.  
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classes.”33  National political fluctuations in the early 20th-century, namely the rise of 
positivist, reformist theories such as Progressivism, attributed for the identification of 
the ‘rural problem.’34   
Constructive Rural Sociology was Gillette’s response to this trend, and his 
mission was three-fold.  First, he used it as a response to an increased academic 
interest in the subject matter.  Second, he frequently credited Theodore Roosevelt for 
sparking a national discussion of the conditions of rural life,35 but contended that a 
significant portion of the problems and issues associated with it should be addressed 
through social avenues, and not simply political or economic ones.  Finally, he argued 
that the social health of rural inhabitants was of vital importance to the overall well-
being of both the nation broadly and the individual agricultural states.36  Unlike the 
authors of the Country Life Commission report, Gillette challenged the hypothesis that 
rural depopulation was occurring with such rapidity as to threaten the national food 
supply.  He did acknowledge, however, that the fear of this perceived phenomenon 
functioned was an important motivator for rising academic and popular interest in 
rural life issues.37   
Gillette’s text, although not in keeping with present-day methodological rigors, 
offers an opportunity to examine commonly held perceptions of the period regarding 
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the status of rural inhabitants.38  Constructive Rural Sociology attempted to start a 
conversation, albeit brief, on the status of rural inhabitants outside model of the 
Country Life Commission and the Farm Bloc, namely of the Caucasian, business-
minded, independent farm owner.39  In the chapter titled “Types of Communities,” he 
engaged in a short discussion of “backward communities.”  Common features of such 
societies include geographical isolation, one-crop economies, and low education and 
economic standards.  Although he uses the “Mountain Whites” in Appalachia as his 
key example, he recognizes that these types of groups exist throughout the rural 
portions of the nation.40  For the purposes of this study, it is worth noting the moral 
contempt with which Gillette characterizes these communities, a trend that will be 
evident in New Deal population displacement policies during the 1930s.  While 
actions regarding rural conditions that were taken by President Franklin Roosevelt 
were implemented through political and economic means, they fundamentally 
reflected a desire to reshape social norms. Although the specific reasons for and means 
by which this is accomplished will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section, it is 
worth noting that an inkling of the trend is evident in the 1910s.  
The American perception and tolerance of poverty shifted during the early 
20th-century. Gillette provides an excellent lens through which to evaluate the 
evolution of the perception of the permanence rural life standards in the early 20th-
century, and to recognize the significant role that academics played in directing this 
                                                
38 Although Gillette’s methodology---specifically his means of acquiring information 
through mail polling----is contentious, it does not adversely affect the purpose of this 
ideological investigation.  Although his methods might be faulty, it does not change 
the fact that he engages in discussions of applicable material, and is reflective of 
broader themes as they relate to studies of farm life in the period. 
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discussion.  As Gillette noted,  “The origins of the [rural] problem lay in the discovery 
that conditions in the country might be improved, that they were not as good as the 
people living there deserve…and that there is no inherent reason why the farming 
classes may not and should not live as well as people of equal financial ability who 
dwell in the cities.”41   This observation, which developed concurrently with the rise in 
rural life studies, and the creation of the concept of the ‘rural problem,’ embodied the 
notion that rural deficiencies could be identified and assessed.  Coupled with increased 
discussion about urban and rural living standards and fear over, this idea provoked 
Progressives to seek out measures to improve the quality of life through political and 
social reform.  By the New Deal era, however, the idea that a relative standard of 
living should exist throughout the nation achieved maturity, which will help explain 
the impetus for political agencies such as the Resettlement Administration.  
19
th
 and Early 20th-Century Thematic Developments - Rural Life: An Industrial 
Salve 
 The idea of reinvigorating rural life was not exclusive to the early 20th-century 
America, nor was the nostalgia for ‘simpler times’ limited to advocacy for population 
shifts from the city to the countryside.  Within the American context, the embrace of a 
“simple life,” either through the reduction of material consumption within an urban 
environment or a physical return to the land, had its roots among some of the first 
American settlers, and was a reoccurring theme in the post-Civil War period.  It was a 
reactionary trend and a response to anxiety induced by industrialization, with 
accompanying regional and national consequences.42 
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42 Shi does an excellent job of tracing the search for the “simple life” in America, 
starting with the Puritans and ending in the post-WWII era.  This theme was by no 
means confined to the United States; indeed, responding in such a manner to industrial 
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After the declaration of peace between the Union and Confederate forces in 
1865, scores of immigrants began disembarking at Ellis Island.  They joined their 
fellow Americans in migrating westwards, facilitated by the spread of the railroads.  
Manufacturing was reinvigorated through new technology, and production ventures—
from textile factories to commercial farms—became larger and more complex.43  Such 
production efficiency generated great wealth, and, even more importantly, the ‘success 
myth’ and wide-scale material consumption.  Many anti-industrialists responded to 
this trend by advocating for a simpler way of life in this Gilded Age, a philosophy that 
gradually regained momentum in the latter part of the 19th-century among the 
Brahmin intellectuals, the patrician inheritors of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s pre-Civil 
War Transcendentalist movement, and the romantic ideals of European thinkers such 
as Henry Thoreau and John Ruskin, among others.  Initially reinvigorated among elite 
sectors of society by philanthropists, by the early 20th-century the themes of rejection 
of material excess and renewed human interaction with nature were adopted and 
popularized by positivists, such as the Progressives and their middle-class audience.44  
Under the direction of editor Edward Bok, who was captivated by the romantic 
myth of moral purity, the Ladies’ Home Journal became the highest-selling periodical 
in the world, reaching 1,950,000 readers by 1910, and the bully pulpit for a two-
pronged approach to simple living.  The first phase, the easiest for a housewife to 
implement, consisted of avoiding unnecessary purchases, reducing consumption, and 
                                                                                                                                       
action first occurred in England, as the Industrial Revolution was well underway in the 
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valuing utility and simplicity.  The second phase involved the rejection decorative 
excess associated with the Victorian era, and the embrace of clean lines and practical, 
natural materials.  This was thematically connected with the developing Arts and 
Crafts architectural and interior design movement, and its “crusade on behalf of good 
taste.”45   
At the same time that Bok strove to revolutionize the American household, the 
rise of “romantic agrarianism.”  As discussed by David B. Danborn, the term 
embodied the notion that individuals engaged in rural livelihoods are morally superior 
to their urban counterparts because of the benefits derived from working with and in 
nature.  This, in turn, influenced the development of a ‘back to the land’ movement.46  
Proponents of ‘back to the land’ based their arguments on the horrors of city life.47  
Authors such as Bolton Hall published how-to manuals for homesteading, including 
Three Acres and Liberty (1907) and A Little Land and A Living (1908), emphasizing 
the benefits of rejecting modern life.48 
In 1911, Liberty Hyde Bailey published The Country-Life Movement in the 
United States, a variation on the ‘back to the land’ movement advocated by Bolton 
Hall.  Bailey wrote, “The present revival of rural interest is immediately an effort to 
improve farming; but at the bottom it is a desire to stimulate new activity in a more or 
less stationary phase of civilization.”49  Bailey was critical of the oversimplification of 
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the romantic agrarians, suggesting that townspeople without the necessary skills to 
make a success of country life might be at a larger disadvantage in a rural situation 
than an urban one.  Appropriately, he cautions his audience to distinguish between 
rural and suburban life.50  Louis Mumford, who joined Clarence Stein and others in 
establishing the Regional Planning Association of America in 1923 to tackle urban 
reform, approached suburban living in a manner consistent with Bailey.  He advocated 
combining the most superior attributes of both urban and rural life, and hybridizing 
them in a new form of living: the suburban planned community.51  In developing the 
goals and objectives of the Resettlement Administration, Tugwell engaged in ideas 
similar to those of Bailey and Mumford.  Like them, he rejected the notion that the 
reinvigoration of a solely rural life was a reasonable or feasible solution to the 
unfortunate consequences of urban industrialization.  Instead, he embraced the notion 
that the technological advantages of modern life could be harnessed to create synergy 
between urban and rural lifestyles, incorporating the best features of both worlds.  
Conclusion 
The Agrarian Crusade and the developing notion of a farmer as a businessman 
and lobbyist, increased federal interest in American land-use habits, the establishment 
of rural sociology and its investigation into the standards of living of country dwellers, 
the socialist rejection of laissez-faire economics, and rural nostalgia were formative 
for establishing a thematic foundation for the development of Tugwell’s opinions.  
Each of these influential movements were reactions to the trauma induced by rapid 
modernization.  The Agrarian Crusade resulted in the increased involvement of 
farmers in the political process, and emphasized the growing professional divide 
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between subsistence farmers and commercial farmers.  With the establishment of the 
Yellowstone preserve, the federal government asserted its right to actively participate 
in land-use decisions.  The development of rural sociology and the activities of the 
Country Life Commission began to expose the existence of  poverty on the farms, 
which coincided with a rejection of modern life and the idealization for a simpler, 
agrarian lifestyle.  The inheritor of these legacies, Tugwell used the platform of the 
Resettlement Administration to react, respond, and in some instances rebel, against 
them. Tugwell picked up Mumford’s mantle, and advocated for society to embrace 
industrialization and overcome its negative attributes through the hybridization of 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE WRITINGS OF REXFORD G. TUGWELL 
 
“I refuse to vote for another crucifixion. I refuse to participate in compelling 
one of the President's most useful friends to drink a bowl of hemlock. I refuse to help 
bind a Columbus of the New Deal with chains. I shall vote against the crucifixion, 
against the hemlock and the chains. . . . My act in so doing will be to me in future 
years— A rainbow to the storms of life: The evening beam that smiles the clouds 
away, and tints tomorrow with prophetic ray.”   
    
~ Senator Matthew Neely (WV), in defense of Rexford Tugwell’s appointment 
to Under Secretary of Agriculture.52 
 
Introduction 
Before he became the “Columbus of the New Deal” and one of the most 
controversial members of Franklin Roosevelt’s first administration, Rexford Tugwell 
revealed his ideas and opinions regarding the state of American agriculture through 
numerous scholarly publications.  These works delineate the development and 
evolution of his deep suspicion of laissez-faire economics, and the dangers he 
perceived in indulging in nostalgia for life in earlier, supposedly simpler times.  Such 
an analysis is beneficial because much of Tugwell’s personal opinions during his later 
years in the Administration are inaccessible.  Although he maintained a diary 
throughout much of his professional life, his numerous responsibilities appeared to 
have made daily reflection impossible.  His actions between 1933 and 1936 are largely 
visible though department letters, but those frequently reflect third-party 
interpretation.  In examining the basis of his opinions regarding the state of American 
agriculture before he became the head of the Resettlement Administration, one is able 
to better understand his rationale for the organization and goals of the agency under 
his leadership.   
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Four influential themes manifested themselves throughout his agricultural 
writings.  These underpinned his actions even when he switched from academia to 
public service.  First, Tugwell argued that prevailing American agriculture policies 
failed, for a variety of reasons, to secure either supply or price stability in the early 
20th-century.  Second, he asserted that agriculture was not exempt from the 
technological innovations produced through industrialization, and that failing to accept 
this as the future doomed the industry and the nation to a perpetual boom-bust 
production cycle.  Third, Tugwell promoted the notion of establishing a permanent 
agricultural system, one that was organized and regulated by the federal government to 
ensure price stability and prevent over- and under-production.  Finally, he 
acknowledged that the acceptance of such a system would result in a significant 
percentage of subsistence-level farmers being incapable of participating, effectively 
shutting themselves out of the system and eliminating their means of employment.  
Tugwell made suggestions for ways to mitigate these consequences, but believed that 
this employment evolution was a natural and acceptable byproduct of increased 
agricultural efficiency.  
Tugwell’s published writings, transmitted through scholarly journals, speeches, 
periodicals, and books, extended from 1917 to 1978.  Between 1921 and 1933, 
Tugwell authored nearly fifty articles and reviews, primarily focused on agrarian 
economics and the decline of laissez-faire capitalism.  For the purposes of this 
investigation, the seven articles examined were selected as a sampling of his most 
influential academic work, and they highlight the reoccurring themes that permeate his 
writing at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Washington, and 
Columbia University.  Although the chronologically last article, “Design for 
Government,” was published in Political Science Quarterly several months after 
Tugwell began serving as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, it was likely written just 
  28 
before or soon after he entered the Administration, and is thematically connected to 
his earlier work.53  As speeches and journal entries from 1933 and 1934 indicate, he 
never truly lost his ideological purity, but as Tugwell would soon learn in the months 
and years following the publication of “Design for Government,” implementing such 
ideas was not without its difficulties.  Indeed, the bureaucratic quagmire of executive 
branch politics eventually contributed to his resignation in November 1936.54   
It is important to remember that Tugwell was strongly influenced by the 
economic context of the 1920s and early 1930s, as well as by the developing notions 
of standards of living that were discussed in the previous chapter.  As an economist, he 
tackled contemporary problems, and accepted the idea of a linear model of social and 
commercial progress.  In 1928, Tugwell describes his rather grandiose perspective on 
the nature of his profession in “Economics as the Science of Experience,” stating, 
“The economist’s heroic task is that of comprehending and, in so far as he can, of 
aiding in the subjection of nature to man’s will.  His range is the whole range of the 
modern world.”55  Tugwell perceived that as an economist, he was in a fortuitous 
professional position to contribute to the betterment of American life through the 
rational application of economic theory.  By examining his academic writings prior to 
his immersion in the Roosevelt administration and public speeches and journal entries 
                                                
53 Rexford G. Tugwell, “Design for Government,” Political Science Quarterly 48, no. 
3 (Sept. 1933): 321-332.  Although no primary documentation indicates the date of the 
authorship of this article, it is reasonable to conclude that it was likely written in either 
the spring or early summer of 1933, as it was published in the journal’s September 
edition.  
 
54 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Letter to Rexford G. Tugwell, 17 November 1936,” FDR 
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. Rexford G. Tugwell Papers, Container 23, Box 
Tugwell Papers, Ro-Sa, Folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1934-1946.    
 
55 Rexford G. Tugwell, “Economics as the Science of Experience,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 25, no. 2 (Jan. 1928): 37. 
  29 
from 1933 and 1934, one is able to understand his goals and objectives, and the truly 
experimental nature of his implementation strategies.  
Pre-Administration Writings - The Decline of American Agriculture 
 In examining the status of agricultural overproduction, and the subsequent shift 
in prices and profits in years following World War I, Tugwell gave his support to 
reform movements, challenging the notion that laissez-faire economics could be 
legitimately applied to such an industry.  In his 1921 article “The Economic Basis for 
Business Regulation,” he articulated the differences between “ supplying necessities” 
and non-necessities.56  The latter, Tugwell asserted, had the potential to function in the 
marketplace under conditions of perfect competition and self-regulation because the 
consumer had the option to choose one version over another, or, alternatively, 
purchase neither.  In comparison, necessities must be purchased, which subverted the 
notion of free competition, a core tenant of the laissez-faire model.  Instead, such 
goods “with a tendency to increasing returns or decreasing costs coupled with an 
inelastic demand for the production, combination of competing units is in the long run 
inevitable…simply because of the economics to be gained by operations of a large 
scale and the loss of plant duplication.”57  Conveniently, “combination,” essentially 
the process of amalgamating separate businesses with the same products into a single 
unit, also had the additional advantage of stabilizing production and enabling the 
establishment of price controls.  This idea differed from that of a monopoly because 
the amalgamation occurred through the association of producers, and not by 
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consolidating production under a single owner.58  The article is a general discussion of 
the role of regulation and oversight, and only subtly addresses agricultural interests.  
However, the implication of such opinions was clear.   In Tugwell’s view, the 
production of necessity goods naturally progressed towards the notion of combination, 
because it lacked the elasticity of free market competition.  In the absence of 
substitutions and consumer flexibility, Tugwell saw no reasonable means to maintain 
price and production stability without oversight, regulation, and cooperation.59  
Ultimately, he argued, the consumer bore the brunt of such a situation. “…Even the 
most orthodox laissez-faire believer…has come to accept the real logic of the saying 
that, when competition is not free and when supply is limited in the interest of total net 
profit, there is a harm to the consumers.”60 
 Tugwell’s opinions on the consequences of the absence of such control 
mechanisms as cooperation and regulation within agriculture was prominent 
throughout several articles over the following decade.  In “The Problem of 
Agriculture,” he discussed the seemingly endless cycle of boom-bust periods within 
the industry, and the toll it took on both producers and consumers.61  As war raged in 
Europe between 1915 and 1919, American farmers had an overseas market for their 
goods, which, in turn, raised overall prices for the American consumer.  However, 
with the conclusion of the conflict, production levels remained high while a price 
deflation began in 1920.  This combination of events contributed to a considerable dip 
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in the purchasing power of the farmer.  Agriculturalists quickly went from being 
overpaid for their goods, to being significantly underpaid because of surplus 
conditions.62  
The triggers of such an unstable system were two-fold—one micro and one 
macro—with disastrous consequences for the American economy.  First, in order to 
makes ends meet, farmers frequently faced having to sell their goods below the 
production price. This was not a situation that occurred only in agriculture, but one 
that was exacerbated by the fact that it was far simpler to undervalue labor costs on a 
family farm than in a factory.  For instance, non-agricultural commercial enterprises, 
such as Tugwell’s father’s canning business, traditionally paid their employees in 
wages.  On a family farm, outside help would likely be paid in cash, but family labor 
might easily not, regardless of vibrancy the economic climate.  Labor input, therefore, 
could easily become a hidden agricultural cost.  In short, the farmer, by failing to 
adequately calculate the value of his production investments, had more flexibility in 
undercutting the price of his goods than an industrialist, because the real costs of labor 
production were not accurately tabulated.   Additionally, this situation was adversely 
impacted by crops having a relatively short shelf-life.  In surplus situation, rivalry 
among sellers meant that a small number of farmers in the same region undercutting 
their prices would have vast implications for their competitors.  Thus, even when 
prices were higher, the buying power of the farmer could be considerably less than an 
industrialist.63   
According to Tugwell, agricultural price undercutting was also more feasible 
because of the vast disparities of standards of living between the agriculturalist and the 
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industrialist.  “In presenting figures showing that the purchasing power of the farmer 
has shrunk…it must be kept in mind that comparisons have been made really between 
two standards of living.”64  The standard of living of the agriculturalist was a “human 
tragedy…beyond the economist’s estimate,” characterized by hunger, extreme weather 
complications, and inadequate tools.65 The article’s implication was that the status quo 
operating mechanisms of agriculture created a two-tiered social system, with the 
average farmer constantly struggling and falling behind his industrial peers.66  
The second contributing force existed on the macro level of the agricultural 
profession, namely the natural difficulties that prevented agriculturalists from 
effectively self-regulating to avoid overproduction and under-reporting of production 
costs.  Tugwell criticized the notion that farmers were inherently individualistic by 
noting the extensive number of farmers’ associations and technological advances that 
enhanced communication.67  Instead, he attributed the disorganization to broad 
physical and market reasons.  Tugwell noted that the distinctive nature of agriculture, 
in comparison to other industries, was that, “...Organization in industry has been most 
conspicuously built up on a basis of the joint and cooperative production and 
marketing of one commodity, not half a dozen. There is evidently a distinct handicap 
to agriculture here.”68  It was not simply enough for one farmer to be able to 
communicate with another; instead, agriculture encompassed a multiplicity of 
products.  Even with communication networks in place, the system still reflected the 
                                                
64 Ibid, 562. 
 
65 Ibid, 557.  
 
66 Ibid, 557, 562.  
 




  33 
long-standing tradition of each farmer selling their goods independently, and needing 
to do so in a timely fashion.69  For instance, a wheat farmer would raise and sell his 
crops year after year, most likely without coordinating his production with other wheat 
farmers.  The widespread use of the railroads meant that the wheat farmer was not 
simply competing within a regional cohort to achieve the best price, but on a national 
scale.  Small variations in growth patterns, weather fluctuations, plant diseases, and 
other influencing factors meant price spikes when production levels failed to meet 
consumption demand, and price deflation in periods of surplus.  In such a scenario, a 
farmer only knew the value of his crops after they were produced.  
Although it was not specifically discussed in Tugwell’s work, one might easily 
see the parallels between the two production models—agriculture and industry—and 
their relationship to transportation technology.  The former pre-dated the development 
of the railroad, and the system, therefore, had to readjust to accommodate it.  In 
comparison, the American Industrial Revolution occurred in conjunction with the 
building of the rail network.  As such, new businesses were created to fill new niches, 
and those that survived filled gaps in the market.  Manufacturing, in theory, was more 
naturally prone to communication among producers; the new businesses were forced 
to self-regulate production from the start.  In comparison, the pre-existing, traditional 
agricultural system was turned upside down by the expansion of markets, and the 
boom-bust price cycle indicated its struggle to adjust to the new conditions. 
In “The Problem of Agriculture,” Tugwell never suggested that agriculturalists 
were entirely incapable of establishing a system of effective self-regulation.  However, 
four years later he wrote in “Reflections on Farm Relief” that while self-regulated 
coordination was possible in other industries, “the nature of agriculture is such that so 
similar coordination is not possible for farmers. The use of governmental machinery 
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for such a purpose is not usual with us, but there would seem to be a quite reasonable 
excuse for it on these grounds.”70 Therefore, an external regulating group was the only 
logical means of ensuring price stability for farmers and ensure the sufficient, but not 
excessive, production of crops. 
Pre-Administration Writings - Rejecting Nostalgia  
After reflecting on the ways in which agriculture failed in the 1920s to provide 
stable prices and reasonable production levels, Tugwell argued that this experience 
would only be further exacerbated by the failure of farmers and agricultural consumers 
to accept the industrialization process.  Progress, in his opinion, was inevitable, and 
went hand-in-hand with technological endeavors.71  Increasing the efficiency of 
farming should not be simply a matter of concern to the farmers themselves, but, in 
Tugwell’s opinion, also considered a public issue.  In 1928, he wrote, “The long-run 
problem is that of reorganizing the industry, raising its technical efficiency, reducing 
its cost, conserving the social interest in the land—generally enabling the industry to 
stand on its own feet among our other more typical ones.”72  Left to their own devices, 
farmers, in Tugwell’s opinion, would only consider improving their efficiency through 
broad investment in technology in period of high prices, such as occurred during 
World War I.  In more lean periods, these same farmers were reluctant to increase 
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their financial output because of economic insecurity.  It was at these times, however, 
that Tugwell believed it was most critical to make such alterations..73 
Combating the reluctance of agriculturalists to invest in new forms of 
technology was, in Tugwell’s opinion, a reflection of a partial backlash in public 
opinion to American industrialization.  In 1924 he wrote in “Our Philosophy of 
Despair,” “It is no accident but the same old incorrigible despair, that causes our 
prophets, our artists, our thinkers either to turn their eyes backward to the medieval 
side of European life…to select the worst in American life as typical of the whole.”74  
Tugwell called upon his readers to embrace a new world of technology and 
industry, and to reject pointless nostalgia because it is an impediment to success.  His 
comments were based on contemporary conditions; they coincided with a general 
social anxiety about increase in farm abandonment and the development of the 
romantic agrarian movement of the 1920s, as was discussed in the previous chapter.  
He acknowledged that many lamented the industrialization process for contributing to 
the deterioration of rural communities,75 but unlike romantic agrarians, Tugwell 
embraced that transition as the inevitable and positive.76  In  “The Theory of 
Occupational Obsolescence,” he wrote that the “problem is not to stop and to restore 
an old stage of industrial technique; it is to bring up to date our social devices.  
Industrial progress is a cause we cannot attack in order to cure an incident of that 
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progress.”77  Industrialization did not signal the end of agriculture because it did not 
eliminate man’s need for the products of the fields.  However, it did imply the general 
demise of traditional rural life, at least as it historically existed in the United States.  
Tugwell argued that this transformation would result in the rise of a new type of 
farmer and a new type of agricultural life.78 
Pre-Administration Writings - A New, Permanent Agricultural System 
In order to address price stability and over-production issues, as well as 
provide a means by which farmers could see the value of investing in technological 
improvements, Tugwell ultimately embraced the notion of a permanent agricultural 
system.  Published in 1929, “Farm Relief and a Permanent Agricultural” advanced a 
linear notion of agricultural progress.79  Agricultural regions and their practices, 
Tugwell asserted, can be categorized as either backwards, middle, or advanced.  
Backwards practices included planting haphazardly and frequently allowing the land 
to revert to nature.  In the middle version, farming involved a single, consistent crop, 
and the raising of animals.  Finally, the advanced consisted of specialized crop 
plantings and a strong emphasis on revenue-producing animals.  All three variations, 
Tugwell argued, were evident in the United States at the end of the 1920s, although 
the backwards version was evident in much higher numbers than the advanced one.80  
This notion that backwards methods of agriculture were prevalent throughout the 
country, and that they could and should be eliminated because they do not reflect the 
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most efficient use of the land, would be critical during Tugwell’s tenure in the 
Resettlement Administration.  
One need not explore at length the details of Tugwell’s agricultural 
management programs in order to understand his staunch belief that agriculturalists 
were incapable of self-regulation, and that it was in the best interest of the nation, and 
ultimately the farmer, to insure reasonable, stable prices for agricultural products 
through federal intervention.  Tugwell argued in support of the McNary-Haugen Bills 
because he endorsed their mechanisms to “make certain specified kinds of farming 
profitable….by dumping these surpluses abroad while the domestic prices were held 
firm through the tariff mechanisms which might prevent the entry to our markets of 
similar commodities from other countries.”81 
 The thematic notion of federal management of farm production and 
agricultural product prices was clearly evident in “Design for Government,” which 
was written in support of the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act.82  “Shall we continue to believe that panics, deflation and bankruptcy are our only 
remedies for overproductivity in industry? Or shall we, by similar ingenuity, control 
overcapacity and reconstruct the purchasing power of our people?”83  Comparing the 
implications of these two acts to governmental intervention through such means as 
anti-trust policies and “free-competitive exploitation,”84 Tugwell justified such actions 
as being the responsibility of the government because the status quo system had failed 
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to provide an effective or consistent solutions.  He clearly articulated his rational for 
an active, assertive federal government to oversee the agricultural activities:  
The jig is up. The cat is out of the bag. There is no invisible hand. There never 
was. If the depression has not taught us that, we are incapable of education.  
Time was when the anarchy of the competitive struggle was not too 
costly….We must now supply a real and visible guiding hand to do the task 
which that mythical, not-existent invisible agency was supposed to perform, 
but never did.85  
Essentially, in Tugwell’s opinion, supervision of agriculture by the historically 
accepted laissez-faire system was, in fact, a figment of everyone’s imagination.  In the 
absence of a rational, cooperative system, therefore, chaos reigned.   
Pre-Administration Writings - Necessary Obsolescence 
 Tugwell’s criticism of the status quo in American agriculture at the end of 
1920s instigated his own investigation into possible ways to alleviate the situation.  As 
a critic of both laissez-faire economics and the marginal status of the federal 
government in agricultural decisions, he proposed a two-part solution.  First, he called 
for the strengthening of the executive branch, a centralization of power and decision-
making.86 Second, he advocated for the elimination of the laissez-faire system of 
agricultural production, replacing it with a broad federal oversight intended to regulate 
cooperation among farmers and production levels.87  Historical precedent contributed 
to the formation of these policies.  During periods of American economic and social 
crisis, it is possible to trace the influx of power from the legislative branch to the 
executive branch.88  Additionally, the intervention of government in industry was not 
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unprecedented; anti-trust initiatives to destroy monopolies, for example, were 
spearheaded by President Theodore Roosevelt.89  While Tugwell approved of such 
actions, his conception of how agricultural production should be managed, and the 
necessary steps to achieve such a system of efficiency, required a significant extension 
of America’s historical position regarding land-use and regulation.  
 Tugwell’s believed that American agricultural salvation lay in federal 
acceptance of technological innovation, and the reworking of old social and economic 
systems to reflect the new world order. 90  “There is no prearranged field of 
government which is set apart from the circumstances of those who are governed.  
Relations here are always interdependent. As the circumstances of the people change, 
functions of government change.”91  Ultimately, as his career in the first FDR 
administration proved, Tugwell was not a details-oriented policy wonk, but a big-
picture ideologue.  In his early academic writings, his vision for the future is bold, but 
the specific details on the implementation of such a system, and their possible 
consequences, are largely absent.  The one area he did address was the notion that the 
reorganization of American agriculture would result in the decline of traditional rural 
life, and the unemployment of large numbers of farmers.92  
 “The Theory of Occupational Obsolescence,” published in 1931, broadly 
addressed the idea that one of the unfortunate, but nevertheless necessary, 
consequences of industrialization was the displacement and unemployment of 
significant portions of some sectors of workers.  Tugwell was a product of his era, and 
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the economic revelations of earlier generations.  He recognized that many of his 
contemporaries responded to the same challenges in an opposite manner, stating, 
“There came….a romantic movement in literature; and there came one also in 
economics.  The plea that poverty damned the economic system and that men had 
rights in their occupations was a dominant motif in their dissent.”93  Instead of believe 
in the existence and character of poverty in the United States and the notion that the 
individual must be protected against the forces of industrialization, Tugwell argued 
that industrialization must be encouraged and assisted.  “Our real complaint on this 
point is that we have not gone far enough, that the process has been too slow and 
indirect.”94  
Tugwell asserted that the critics of industrialization were, in fact, endangering 
the very people they sought to protect by failing to recognize and accept that change 
through technology was inevitable.  “Occupational obsolescence” was simply a natural 
consequence of industrialization.  As new, more efficient methods develop to produce 
goods and products, it was inevitable that machines would replace men.  Lamenting 
this process was not a sufficient justification for preventing national progress.   
It seems at first somewhat heartless to say that unemployment is an incident.  
But this does not imply that we lack sympathy for the unemployed; and it does 
not imply that no measures of relief ought to be undertaken to mitigate the 
personal disaster of loss of income.  It simply recognizes that unemployment is 
a result of causes we can not lightly discard, and that it is not the only test we 
can make of these causes….Industrial progress is a cause we cannot attack in 
order to cure an incident of that progress.95 
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Tugwell acknowledged both that workers trained in specific, outmoded fields would 
have difficulty finding new employment,96 and that the government had a 
responsibility to find ways to alleviate the consequences, ideally through educational 
programs.97  The intricacies of such efforts are not, however, the focus of his writings.  
Instead, “The Theory of Occupational Obsolescence” is ultimately an appeal to the 
learned and employed classes to accept the fact that industrialization required the 
elimination of certain working-class professions, and that it was necessary, for the 
betterment of the entire nation, to embrace this change and work to hasten its 
development.   
On the Eve of Public Service 
 Prior to his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in 1933, 
Tugwell’s views regarding the reasons for the instability of the American agricultural 
system and some of the steps he believed to be necessary to rectify the situation were 
widely disseminated.  Trained as a theorist, Tugwell was challenged by the Roosevelt 
administration post to put his broad ideas into practice.  Through his writings about the 
rights of the federal government to designate land as misused, acquire it, and 
repurpose it, one can easily garner a sense of the underpinnings of his opinions.  It is 
not a far stretch to assume that someone who bluntly acknowledged that 
unemployment was the necessary cost of industrialization would feel similarly 
towards the acquisition of misused lands in association with the pursuit of greater 
agricultural efficiency.  The themes that extend throughout his writings on agriculture 
and the industrialization process revealed his own acceptance that the willingness of 
society to embrace change was pivotal to the ability of the nation to progress towards 
increased economic security and stability.  The practicality of these ideas and goals 
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were challenged during his tenure as a public administrator, and the tensions between 
such grandiose opinions and the feasibility of implementation were clearly evident in 
the organization and operation of the Resettlement Administration.  
Department of Agriculture 
Appointed as the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture after a position as the 
Under Secretary of Commerce failed to materialize,98 Tugwell quickly became 
involved in the day-to-day oversight responsibilities of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA).99  Tugwell believed this to be a reasonable position based on 
his positive relationship with Harry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, and the fact 
that he had written extensively on the allocation and reorganization of agricultural 
production during his academic career. Wallace, who served Roosevelt as his 
Secretary of Agriculture from 1933 to 1940 and his second Vice President, was 
initially an important ally of Tugwell.100   
Over the course of Tugwell’s service in the Department of Agriculture prior to 
his appointment as the administrator of the Resettlement Administration in 1935, two 
speeches clearly delineated the evolution of his land-use policies.  Additionally, they 
show how Tugwell was called upon to defend specific practices, which forced him to 
engage in political spin control.   Backlash by some public and Congressional sectors 
against the efforts by the Department of Agriculture to curtail production and control 
surplus is indicated by Tugwell’s slightly defensive tone, especially in the 1934 
speech.  
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 The two speeches were given eleven months apart and disseminated over the 
radio.  As the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Tugwell presented “Our Lands in 
Order” over the National Broadcast Communications (NBC) Network on August 4, 
1933.  In his first national address, Tugwell announced that the government secured a 
“regulated harvest of cotton and cigar tobacco for this year, and is moving to procure a 
regulated harvest of wheat,” with similar plans for hogs and corn also underway.101  
The speech emphasized the severity of the situation, and the desperate need for the 
administration to alleviate the agricultural price crisis through bold, decisive, and 
novel action.  Lands ‘out of order’ received implicit blame for instigating the crisis, 
and the federal government was required to rectify the situation by establishing 
equilibrium between the buying power of industry and agriculture.102  The idea was 
that the individual farmer, and, by extension the individual property owner, was 
incapable of independently understanding how his land functioned as part of a larger 
national resource.  Therefore, it fell to the federal government to coordinate activities 
in a manner that essentially produced the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people.  Tugwell proclaimed this as an “educational effort,” claiming,  
One thing seems certain: we must study and classify American soil, taking out 
of production not just one part of a field or farm, but whole farms, whole 
ridges, perhaps whole regions.  We must determine which lands are best suited 
for the commercial production of the staple crops, which had best be put back 
into trees, and which should not be used for agriculture at all, but simply 
provide places of recreation and residence.103  
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He indirectly referenced the notion of backwards farming that he elaborated on in his 
1929 article, “Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture,”104 and stated the 
unacceptability of allowing “poverty-stricken families, wearing out their lives to no 
good purpose, trying to get blood out of a stone.”105  Given the public nature of this 
speech, it is clear that Tugwell had emerged by the late summer of 1933 as an 
agricultural spokesman for the Department of Agriculture specifically, and the FDR 
Administration. 
 In the summer of 1934 Tugwell expanded his spokesman role.  His July 31st 
address over the Columbia Broadcasting System opened with, “We who are 
responsible for the execution of the great farm policies of the Roosevelt 
Administration find ourselves far out on the New Deal firing-line.”106  He continued 
on to explain that the decision to federally manipulate production schedules for key 
crops was geared towards reducing excess surplus and establishing stable, consistent 
prices.  In a break from his academic work, Tugwell claimed that “it was only with the 
greatest reluctance that we temporarily called a halt to the unchecked, gigantic and 
uneconomic abundance which is the late product of science.”107 Most significantly, his 
characterization of these activities as “temporary” is quite noteworthy.  In comparison 
to his earlier writings that emphasize the necessity of addressing the inelasticity of 
agriculture through permanent large-scale federal management, such as the previously 
discussed “Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture” and “Design for Government,” 
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Tugwell suggested here that such measures were merely short-term solutions. This 
fluctuation in his policy statements likely indicated a desire on the part of the 
Administration to mitigate criticism and to put a positive spin on the situation, and not 
a true change Tugwell’s beliefs.  
By mid-July 1934, Tugwell, the newly appointed Under Secretary of 
Agriculture, was under considerable pressure to reassure the listening public that the 
agricultural readjustment measures would not entirely disrupt the historical 
agricultural business model.  He claimed to know “that the American people have 
given no mandate for the final abandonment of our traditional business system.”108  
Yet despite such assurances to the contrary, buried within his conclusion was a 
reassertion of his personal beliefs in the wisdom of a centralization of agricultural 
decision-making.  “From these drastic and emergency measures we are moving ahead 
towards a better use of our land, a better balance of agricultural production, and a 
storage system which will provide an ever-normal warehouse as a safeguard against 
future catastrophes.”109  As in his academic work, Tugwell was evasive about the 
specifics of implementing such a statement.  Regardless of his claims to the contrary, 
his diaries indicate the degree to which he remained steadfast to the idea that massive 
reorganization and resettlement of the land was critical to the long-term success of the 
United States.  
Tugwell’s frustration with the political infighting and power struggles within 
the administration was evident soon after his first appointment.  He quickly recognized 
that the ideological purity that he greatly prized as an academic was impossible to 
maintain while in a government job.  In February 1933, a month before Franklin 
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Roosevelt assumed the presidency, Tugwell ominously confessed, “The more I think 
of it the less I enjoy the prospect of an official job.  Integrity is an elusive thing; but 
there is no greater satisfaction than the feeling that it is protected. I am afraid of the 
eternal compromises I may be asked to make.”110   
Although Tugwell did not remain consistent in updating his journal throughout 
the period between 1932-1936, the reader is aware of the pressure on him to 
reorganize the Department of Agriculture, and to prove his capacity as an 
administrator.111  He appeared to chafe within the confines of this position, and 
genuinely more interested in producing new ideas than implementing those of his 
superiors.  In December 1932, while still an advisor to President-Elect Roosevelt and a 
professor with Columbia University, Tugwell reflected on his own strengths.  “Any 
contributions to scholarship and literature [or public service] I am likely to make will 
consist in the development of alternative suggestions---something strange and new---
which I shall probably leave as mere suggestions rather than as finished tasks.”112  
Unfortunately for Tugwell, this was not the role he is destined to have in the 
administration. Instead, he became caught up in internal power-struggles and absorbed 
in attempting to fix organizational issues within the USDA.113 
Tugwell’s discussion of land-use throughout 1933 and 1934 was consistently 
geared towards a desire to progress towards a unified national approach.  He 
eventually concluded that a single agency should be responsible for decisive policies.  
One of his strongest beliefs, and the means by which he justified land acquisition in 
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the name of national interest, was expressed in February 1933, approximately a month 
before Roosevelt took the oath of office.   
“There is needed a new view of Commerce and Agriculture...as 
representatives, in special fields of the public, rather than representatives to the 
public of special fields. Given such a reversal of view, it would be possible to 
proceed toward entirely new policies in which a larger conception could be 
dominant. The interest of the public is in an agriculture suited to national 
needs; agriculture exists for the country; the country does not exist to support 
farmers.”114   
 As early as April 1933, Tugwell admitted his reluctance to work within the 
Department of Agriculture, disappointed that he would not be able to accompany Jesse 
Strause, FDR’s new Ambassador to France, as his economic advisor,115 a position for 
which he might have been infinitely more suited.  Throughout the following year, 
notes cropped up throughout his entries that expressed his growing frustration in the 
USDA.116  Ultimately, he appeared to negotiate for the establishment of the 
Resettlement Agency as a means by which to placate his own irritations with 
bureaucratic inefficiency, believing that he could design a more harmonious system. 
First, however, he set about trying to work out a functional plan within the pre-
existing departments.  
 A journal entry from November 1934 suggested that Tugwell had previously 
engaged in discussions with the President and his colleagues in Agriculture and 
Interior about land-use practices and policies, but these conversations did not warrant 
attention in earlier notes.  Tugwell wrote that he “must talk with [FDR] about the 
coordination of land policy again. There are many – perhaps 20 agencies of 
government which have something to do with it.  My scheme of trading between 
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Interior and Agriculture of last June was agreed to well enough by everyone but 
apparently F.D.R. got about equal pressures from all sides.”  He continued on to 
mention the escalating difficulties of attempting to create any sense of cohesiveness 
between the different groups responsible for land-use policies, and his personal desire 
to set up a Department of Conservation to absorb all of these responsibilities.  
However, he still had “doubt[s] if anything drastic will be done,” and indicated that 
FDR was reluctant to act before the 1936 presidential election.  His most pressing 
frustration with the status quo was that it left “the execution of policy in so many 
different hands that failure often results.”  This journal entry was the first one to 
clearly indicate his specific administrative desires, and his deep belief that the only 
way to clearly oversee American land-use was to concentrate the policy process within 
a single agency.117 
 The following month, December 1934, Tugwell met with Wallace and Harold 
Ickles, Secretary of the Interior, and the issue arose about trading land-use bureaus 
between the two departments.  Tugwell suggested the possibility of establishing an 
“individual conservation department,”  and Ickes responds that the he had an 
‘undersecretaryship provided in his budget,” and that he believed Tugwell well suited 
for the task.  Tugwell’s response was, perhaps, the most revealing of his mindset, and 
his general lack of appreciation for the complexities of administration and bureaucratic 
politics.  After Ickes asked him if he would be interested in such a position, Tugwell 
responded that “of course it would be attractive to be head of a conservation set-up but 
that there were many questions to be considered besides the simple one of creating a 
conservation set-up and that I might be available in any case.” For Tugwell, the 
difficulty was not in establishing the department itself, but finding the right person to 
run it.  He appeared to underestimate the intricacies of establishing a new agency, 
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even one that was already under the umbrella of another, pre-existing department.  
Although he acknowledged that he was not known to be an expert in conservation, he 
expressed his interest in the position, despite being in the presence of his current boss, 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace.  Unsurprisingly, Wallace approached Tugwell after 
the meeting, concerned about his interest in leading a new conservation program.  
Although he was not confronted directly on the issue of leaving Agriculture, Tugwell 
appeared to sense that this was also a source of concern.118   
The larger issue that arose from the Ickles-Wallace-Tugwell December 1934 
meeting was Tugwell’s acknowledgment of his divisive position within the 
department, which stemmed from his role in participating in the drafting of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA).   The AAA was one of the first major initiatives 
of the New Deal, authorized by the President during his first hundred days in office, 
and tackled the pressing issue of agricultural surpluses.  Many farmers were paid to 
not produce crops as part of a plan to lower production levels and raise the prices of 
agricultural products, thus initiating the era of farm subsidies.119   
Tugwell’s first administrative position was in assisting with the 
implementation the AAA within the Department of Agriculture.  Personality conflicts 
with the AAA Administrator, George Peek, soon arose and an ideological tug-of-war 
quickly escalated within the USDA.  Peeks resigned in late 1933, and for much of 
1934 his replacement, Chester Davis, worked comparatively well with Tugwell.120  
Relations between the two men, however, disintegrated towards the end of the year.  
In a follow-up conversation with Wallace after their meeting with Ickes, Tugwell 
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stated “that the present Administrator of Agricultural Adjustment and his assistants 
took very little trouble to conceal the fact that they would feel better if I were not 
Under Secretary; that I was not having the contact with and influence on A.A.A. 
policy that an under secretary ought to have and that naturally I felt sensitive about the 
situation…”  Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to understand Tugwell’s 
desire to transfer to a different position, but the manner by which the issue was raised 
with his supervisor indicated the depth of his ongoing political immaturity.121   
Before ever accepting a public position, Tugwell confessed in his journal that 
his deepest interest was in “the long-range planning of land utilization.”122  By the end 
of 1934, Tugwell, by his own accounts, appeared to be considered the go-to advisor on 
land-use regulation, a confidant to both Secretaries Wallace and Ickes.  More 
importantly, he seemed to be privy to FDR’s own interest in a comprehensive 
departmental organization, but gave no indication of whether or not the President was 
still committed to his November policy of waiting until after the 1936 election.  
Tugwell was not completely naïve about the attention he is attracting from two 
powerful men: “The Secretaries are, of course, trying to maneuver so that they can get 
all the land agencies into their own departments.”123 Although his eventual promotion 
to the head of the Resettlement Administration suggested that he legitimately held the 
endorsement of FDR, the events within the USDA in early 1935 suggested that, in 
fact, he was a relatively ostracized figure, and challenged the legitimacy of the self-
aggrandizement recorded in his diary.  
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In January 1935, Tugwell’s relationship with Davis deteriorated past the point 
of resuscitation when a human resource conflict that stemmed from liberals in the 
Legal Division deliberately misusing AAA stipulations to force Southern landlords to 
reemploy the same tenant farmers for a second year.   Outraged, Davis received 
permission from Secretary Wallace to purge the liberal members of the program, 
which drew intense ire from Tugwell.1  Such political infighting exacerbated 
Tugwell’s own insecurities throughout the early months of 1935, culminating in a 
press conference, where Secretary Wallace announced that Tugwell was entirely 
unconnected with AAA policy, and that a separate council was being convened to 
oversee it.  Tugwell’s responded in his journal, “How could I stay as Under Secretary 
of the Department with the Secretary deliberately removing me from authority?”2  
Within three days, he met with the President to express his own frustrations, and his 
willingness to resign if, he implied, the situation did not improve significantly.  
Tugwell noted that the President called him a “distinct political asset” and that “he had 
no intention of letting me go at all.”3  Although this statement cannot be corroborated, 
it is realistic to assume that Roosevelt did value Tugwell’s service, given his 
subsequent promotion to head the Resettlement Administration, and later appointment 
as the Governor of Puerto Rico during FDR’s final administration.4  If his journal is to 
be believed, it appeared that Tugwell refrained from resigning as a personal favor to 
the President.  It is likely, however, that personal vanity and ambition also contributed 
to his decision, for in the same meeting Tugwell openly expressing his interest in 
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acquiring a position overseeing “land and land-uses, conservation, forests and parks, 
etc.”  The President responded that he was not yet prepared to address the 
reorganization of land responsibility.  However, he asked Tugwell to “simply sit tight 
and wait until he could work the situation out,” to which Tugwell agreed.5 
Although there was no clear indication in Tugwell’s paper about when he met 
with FDR to discuss going forward with the creation of the Resettlement 
Administration, by late February, mere weeks after FDR indicated that he was not 
ready to more forward with a land policy and conservation program, Tugwell was well 
underway in planning the “Resettlement set-up.” 6  Sometime during the same period, 
Tugwell met with Wallace about his future in the USDA, and was informed that he 
was welcome to maintain his position as Under Secretary provided that he 
relinquished all ties to the AAA.7  Roosevelt’s willingness to proceed with the new 
agency decision may have been due to this further deterioration of relations between 
Tugwell and his USDA colleagues. 
 In early March, the President reentered the discussion with Tugwell about the 
formation of the Resettlement Administration, and generally endorsed Tugwell’s 
ideas.  Indeed, he even indicated amusement over Tugwell’s unwillingness to accept 
responsibility for city housing.8  The very notion that such a program would fall under 
the scope of a land-use bureau is a reflection of the pending diversity of programs and 
issues Tugwell would become engaged in as the head of the Resettlement 
Administration.  Nevertheless, the implication of such activity was clear: by early 
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March 1935, less than a month after Tugwell expressed a willingness to resign, the 
mechanisms for the creation of the Resettlement Administration were already in 
motion.9  
 Although Tugwell was unable to act formally on the creation of a separate 
land-use agency until March, journal entries in the proceeding months reflected his 
opinions and perspectives regarding appropriate land-use strategies.  Two specific 
issues would greatly impact the Resettlement Administration agenda regarding a 
submarginal lands program and the establishment of the greenbelt cities:  his views on 
farmers rights regarding their land, and his belief in the decline of cities.   
Tugwell consistently favored the rights of the government over those of the 
people, trusting the former to be better able to make long-term decisions for the 
betterment of all citizens, instead of placing supremacy on individual rights to self-
determination.  In a January 1935 journal entry, Tugwell extended these views 
towards the rights of farmers to own and operate their land as they say fit, stating, 
I personally have long been convinced that the outright ownership of farms 
ought greatly to be restricted.  My observation has been that where a farm is 
held on long-term lease it belongs to the user of the land much more than if he 
actually owns it because if he owns it there is constant temptation to build up 
mortgage responsibilities and quite a likelihood that in the first depression of 
farm prices that comes along he will lose his land.10 
His sympathy was not with the farmer who lost his land under such circumstances, but 
with the larger agricultural system, and the nation as a whole.  As previous discussed, 
his academic writing indicated his strong belief that the individual farmer, affected by 
the inelasticity of the selling of agricultural products, was a significant contributor to 
the depression of the 1930s.  As the farmer cannot be trusted to independently make 
decisions that benefit the entire nation, and self-regulation of the system seems 
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impossible, Tugwell concluded that the only acceptable method was to place the land 
under federal control and jurisdiction.  A discussion of states rights in this process was 
consistently absent in his writings.  The journal entry showed that Tugwell’s opinions 
remained firm throughout his tenure in the Department of Agriculture, and it was these 
views that contributed to the establishment of goals of the Resettlement 
Administration.11  
 Additionally, the January 1935 entry showed Tugwell’s belief that only a small 
sector of the farming community was capable of self-government and ownership.  
Expanding upon his previous statements regarding the notion of backwards farming,12 
Tugwell went on to express his disapproval of the agricultural practices of poor 
Southern tenant farmers.  “I also feel that for such of the farm population as is 
represented, for instance, in the South by the negro tenants or even by the poor whites, 
the bettering of farm practices and the raising of living standards requires some 
supervision of farm practice.”13  Taken out of context, this statement might suggest 
that Tugwell favored education as the best means to correct inefficient farming 
practices.  However, it followed a specific assertion that the average farmer was 
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incapable of engaging in the best agricultural techniques.  As such, the repercussions 
for the nation were significant enough to warrant removing the land from individual 
control, and placing it under the control of a governing agency.  It is also worth noting 
that Tugwell specifically identified tenant farmers, specifically Southern ones, as 
guilty of mismanagement. 
 The second issue illuminated in the months preceding the establishment of the 
Resettlement Administration was Tugwell’s reluctance to take over the responsibility 
for city housing.  This was not an indication of his disinterest in the topic generally.  
Instead, it showed his staunchly held belief that the cities were in a permanent and 
irreversible state of decline, and that he believed he could be far more effective on 
their outskirts.  His first private discussion of the methods by which to create a 
federally designed suburban community appeared as he justified to FDR his reluctance 
to accept city housing.  Tugwell wrote, “I talked to him about satellite cities as an 
alternative …My idea is to go just outside centers of population, pick up cheap land, 
build a whole community and entice people into it. Then go back into cities and tear 
down slums and make parks of them. I could do this with good heart and he now 
wants me to.”14  Through the Resettlement Administration, Tugwell was empowered 
to put these ideas into concrete fruition with the design and construction of the 
Greenbelt communities outside Washington, DC; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.   
 By mid-April, Joint Resolution 117 passed through Congress, which 
authorized the reorganization of submarginal land-use.  Tugwell remained unsatisfied 
with the effort, and Congressional opposition was significant despite its passage.15  
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Although he did not address the specific modifications and amendments to the bill, the 
depth of Tugwell’s defensiveness about them in future public statements suggests that 
there was considerable lingering mistrust on the part of both Congress and the general 
public about empowering the executive branch in such a bold fashion.16 
 Under the emergency provisions of AAA, submarginal land could be acquired 
without first establishing that it would be used for a specific purpose.17  Under the new 
bill, the administration was required to prove that each acquisition would be put to a 
specific use.  However, Tugwell was satisfied with his acquisition of management 
over the Soil Erosion Service, and concurrently established a land policy committee 
within the Department of Agriculture “to coordinate land purchases and policies with 
respect to all our land treatment which promises to be useful.”18   
 In late April, FDR publicly announced the creation of the Resettlement 
Administration, one of  approximately sixty programs that constituted the work relief 
projects.19  The executive order officially establishing the Resettlement Administration 
was signed on May 1.  Although Tugwell must have undoubtedly been pleased to see 
his strategizing come to fruition, he entered his new post as administrator of the 
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Resettlement Administration with some trepidation about the nature and diversity of 
his new assortment of programmatic responsibilities.    
Nothing was touched directly on the two problems which are bothering me 
most. The first of these problems has to do with whether or not the Rural 
Rehabilitation work is being carried forward as a project or whether it is to be 
given funds which are to be as flexible as they are in the Relief Administration. 
I do not see how this Rural Rehabilitation work, which apparently I am 
expected to take over, can be carried on by the project method altogether. The 
other problem which concerns me most is the extent to which the President 
expect us to develop our housing projects. I have never got clearly in mind just 
how much emphasis he expects to put on them…20 
In the early days of the Resettlement Administration, Tugwell harbored insecurities 
about which direction in which the President wished to proceed, and the agency 
appeared to have been established too hastily, as its relationship to its umbrella 
organization was under dispute.  On the same day that he noted that FDR signed the 
executive order, Tugwell lamented that problems over jurisdiction and responsibility 
between the Department of Agriculture and the Resettlement Administration had 
already arisen, which could have only been exacerbated by unclear goals and policy 
agendas.21    
Before discussing the specifics of the new organization in Chapter 3, it is 
worth briefly examining Tugwell’s expectations of the public reaction to his programs 
prior to their broad introduction.  As subsequent diary entries and speeches will 
indicate, the public outcry was significant, and the personal attacks on Tugwell were 
difficult to divorce from criticisms over the Resettlement Administration’s actions.  
Although the opposition would ultimately focus its energies on the argument that the 
agency’s land-use policies were economically infeasible, and Tugwell himself was 
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forced to confront charges of socialism, his prediction of the opposition’s main 
arguments was quite striking.   
As a matter of fact it seems to me that the work we are supposed to do is bound 
to be unpopular in the long run. What we shall have to do is to help out the 
poorest class of citizens and to do this we shall always be helping the shiftless 
and unfortunate in all local communities.”  He goes on to contend that, “I am 
afraid that what might be called a good citizen will always be against these 
efforts we are making.  It must be one of our first considerations to try always 
to conciliate public opinion so that we may go ahead in the effort to lift the 
level of living of these people.22   
It is interesting to note that Tugwell believed that in the long term his agencies would 
be unpopular, which reflected his lack of understanding regarding the immediate 
implications and consequences of public distaste for political policy.   
Conclusion  
The frustrations that Tugwell expressed throughout his journal prior to the 
creation of the Resettlement Administration foreshadowed his struggle to implement 
concise and uniform land-use regulations, while his academic writings provide a basis 
for interpreting his subsequent policy decisions.  His tenure as the Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture, the Under Secretary of Agriculture, and administrator of the 
Resettlement Administration was characterized by a tension between his own 
ideological beliefs, honed during an academic career at Columbia University and 
elaborated upon in numerous articles, and the practicalities of bureaucratic 
negotiating, infighting, and shifting responsibilities.  Due to the unavailability of 
journal entries during the majority of Tugwell’s time with the Resettlement 
Administration, his previous writings offer the best opportunity to explain the 
philosophical impetus for the establishment of the agency, and the motivations behind 
its mission, goals, and priorities.  Woven through his agricultural works were four 
important themes: the failure of American policies to provide crop price stability; the 
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need for farmers to increase their use of modern technologies; the establishment of a 
permanent agricultural system; and the elimination of subsistence level farming.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 1935-1936 
 
Introduction 
In April 1935, Congress sent the Federal Emergency Appropriation Act, 
popularly called the “work relief bill,” to President Roosevelt, who signed it into law 
on April 8th.  The bill was the largest single appropriation in American history to that 
time, totaling $4,880,000,000 for work relief programs.   The passage of the bill was a 
long, arduous process, due to political infighting among the Senators.  By the time it 
was finally delivered to the President, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
(FERA) had exhausted its own resources, and was forced to borrow from other 
programs.  As of April 8th, an estimated 21,000,000 individuals were at risk of losing 
their FERA jobs.23  Described in The New York Times as “the greatest effort to date to 
spur private industry through public spending,” the bill offered considerable latitude in 
the establishment of new programs and relief goals, as well as the amount of money to 
be spent during the first phase of intervention.24   
 The ‘work relief bill’ greatly enhanced the power the executive branch.  In 
addition to determining overall funding levels and the allocations to specific programs, 
President Roosevelt was charged with the responsibility of establishing interest rates 
on public-works projects and determining how much of the allocation to actually 
use.25  By April 24, he announced the funding of a total of sixty government agencies, 
including the establishing of the Resettlement Administration.26   
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Although President Roosevelt confirmed to reporters on April 24 that Rexford 
Tugwell would be overseeing the operations of the Resettlement Administration, the 
official creation of the agency occurred on May 1, 1935 with the signing of Executive 
Order No. 7027.  Citing the authority of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 
1935 to establish such a bureau, President Roosevelt formally appointed Tugwell to 
head it, and designated $25,000 for initial operating expenses.27 
 The Resettlement Administration experiment was short-lived.  By the end of 
1936, Tugwell resigned from both his positions as the Under Secretary of Agriculture 
and administrator of the Resettlement Administration, and Secretary Wallace oversaw 
the absorption of the agency into the Department of Agriculture.  The Resettlement 
Administration had operated quasi-independently for little more than 18 months, 
before disappearing and morphing into the Farm Securities Administration.  Many 
factors can be cited for its temporary existence and questionable success, and few 
appeared to mourn its passage. 
 Ultimately, the Resettlement Administration contributed two important 
concepts on-going debates over American land-use strategies.  First, it declared that 
that land was a finite commodity and should be treated as a national resource.  Second, 
the agency asserted the argument that planning oversight was critical to preventing 
rural and urban communities from spiraling into poverty, and that it was the 
responsibility of the government agencies to create new ways of living that established 
a balance between rural and urban elements.  In retrospect, such ideas might seem 
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overly simplistic.  These opinions, which were advanced by Tugwell throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, were met with considerable public and private opposition. These 
themes were not simply the direct manifestations of the goals of the Resettlement 
Administration, but the consequences of the agency’s actions, politics within 
Roosevelt’s administration, and external pressures and obstacles.  Although the short-
lived agency was dismissed by Congress and New Deal critics as an inappropriate 
response to the crisis of the era, it is an excellent vehicle by which to examine 
developments in American land-use policies during the mid-1930s.  
1935, The Year of Possibilities - Reason for its Creation: Official Goals and 
Objectives 
 In 1937, Roosevelt reflected on his personal justification for establishing the 
Resettlement Administration.  He wrote that the decision was, 
…founded on the realization that the lowest-income third of our farm 
population were themselves growing steadily poorer and were causing a great 
waste of the nation’s land and economic resources by their unprofitable 
farming operations….This starting situation was made more clear by the 
presence of more than one million farm families on relief roles during the 
depression—families who lived on the land…[but] could make so little from 
the land that they had to be supported by outside sources. 
The President partially attributed the national economic crisis with the widespread 
misuse of the land, and starting in 1934, the focus in the Land Policy Sections of both 
AAA and The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) shifted from 
reducing crop surplus to the retirement of submarginal lands.28   
 Executive Order No. 7027 stated the broad goals and responsibilities of the 
Resettlement Administration, including: 
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(1) To administer approved projects involving resettlement of destitute or low-
income families from rural and urban areas, including the establishment, 
maintenance, and operation, in connection, of communities in rural and 
suburban areas. 
 
(2) To initiate and administer a program of approved projects with respect to soil 
erosion, stream pollution, seacoast erosion, reforestation, forestation, and flood 
control. 
 
(3) To make loans as authorized under the said Emergency Relief Appropriation 
Act of 1935, to finance, in whole or in part, the purchase of farm lands and 
necessary equipment by farmers, farm tenants, croppers or farm laborers.29  
Immediately after establishing the Resettlement Administration, FDR signed 
Executive Order No. 7028, which transferred FERA’s submarginal land acquisition 
and repurposing program to the RA.30  The Chopawamsic Recreational Demonstration 
Project, which will be discussed in Chapter 4, was initiated under the FERA program. 
In addition to personally delivering the executive orders to the President for his 
signature, Tugwell also likely played a significant role in the crafting their language. 
Although there is no specific documentation to prove that the numerical listing of the 
agency’s responsibilities corresponds to Tugwell’s own preferences policy priorities, 
the fact that the most far-reaching item—the legal justification for the creation of the 
Greenbelt communities—is listed first is highly suggestive of Tugwell’s participation.  
Although unquestionably interested in conservation issues, his passion was 
community planning, namely finding new ways for Americans to live that balances 
rural and industrial needs and advantages. 31  
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1935, The Year of Possibilities - Obstacles and Challenges 
Despite the clarity of the mission statements in Executive Order No. 7027, 
numerous conflicting and overlapping ideological goals and administrative 
assignments quickly emerged that impaired the Resettlement Administration’s 
functional ability.  By July 1935, Tugwell lamented the “hastiness” that drove the 
establishment of the agency and contributed to a frustrating summer.32  The young 
agency was plagued with ideological and programmatic conflicts within the executive 
branch.  Three important examples highlighted differences of opinion between FDR 
and Tugwell, as well as mixed messages and contradictory statements issued by or in 
connection with the Resettlement Administration.  Ultimately, the dearth of 
philosophical cohesiveness within the administration would be a factor in the inability 
of the to maintain its administrative independence.  
 In his initial public statements about the goals and intended activities of the 
Resettlement Administration, President Roosevelt made sweeping proclamations that 
urban residents “who want to try out something new and get away from city life” or 
who want to return to farming would find assistance through the new agency.33  
Eventually, this issue would intersect with a programmatic question that would haunt 
the Resettlement Administration throughout its short life, namely uncertainty over 
which populations were being targeted for assistance.  At the time, however, 
Roosevelt’s statement reflects a variation of a “back to the land” mentality of the late 
19th and early 20th-century.  FDR never waded into the specifics of such a process 
and, ultimately, the Resettlement Administration never recruited unemployed 
industrial workers for agricultural jobs, but given the context of the Great Depression, 
the President’s motivations for making such a statement might easily have been to a 
                                                
32 Ibid.  
 
33 “President Guides Rural Projects,” New York Times 21 June 1935, sec. A.  
  65 
simple way to sooth anxieties.  Nevertheless, the incident should not be casually 
dismissed, because in addition to signaling a potential ideological rift between FDR 
and Tugwell, it additionally contributed to a sense of ambiguousness regarding the 
purpose of the Resettlement Administration.  
Tugwell was highly critical of FDR’s encouragement of urban residents to 
return to rural life because he believed that it advanced a gross oversimplification of 
agricultural practices, and the skills necessary to encourage success.  His assertion that 
agricultural practices could be classified into different stages of progress showed his 
belief that the idea of the age of the independent farmer was largely past.34  Tugwell 
recognized that process would result in the disruption of tradition, most importantly 
the “close-knit cooperative family,”35 but did not believe sentimentality to be a 
sufficient justification for delaying, in his mind, an inevitable process.  Nevertheless, 
relief for farmers and providing avenues for them to retain control of their land was an 
important component of the Roosevelt’s Agricultural Adjustment Act, to which 
Tugwell greatly contributed.36  Tugwell’s writings subtly suggest that the 
abandonment of farms, a polite euphemism for farmers being forced out of their 
occupation, should be interpreted as a healthy, natural result of advancing agricultural 
progress.  Instead of activity working to prevent the development, thereby delaying the 
advancement of agriculture, the role of the government such be to accept the situation 
as inevitable, and encourage the process by providing failed farmers with new 
economic opportunities.37 
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Tugwell was also dismissive of the romantic agrarianism mentality because he 
identified it as a significant factor in the development of the Great Depression. In 
December 1935, Tugwell took to the airwaves to defend the Resettlement 
Administration and explain to the public the rational for national resettlement.  His 
argument rested on the premise that speculative land deals, ignorant buyers, and 
irresponsible lenders resulted in a new segment of farmers stuck on submarginal land 
without the knowledge or skill set to be successful.  The severity of the situation and 
the consequences for all Americans, Tugwell argued, demanded the resettlement of 
these populations through a federally managed program.  He asserted, “Long before 
the Federal Government stepped in, many of those who stuck it out were being 
supported by charity.  Many still are.”38  The efforts of the AAA and other land-use 
programs during the first years of Roosevelt’s administration, however, were geared 
towards emergency relief efforts insufficient to provide long-term readjustment, and 
prevent such a situation from reoccurring. Tugwell stated that the only solution is for 
the land to be taken out of production, and that widespread rural suffering demanded 
such bold action. Most importantly, in Tugwell’s opinion, “the land is being changed 
from a public liability into a public asset.”39  The idea of Americans leaving industry 
for a rural farm career, as suggested by Roosevelt, implied a sense of individuality that 
Tugwell never embraced.  His priority was to produce a profound shift in the way 
Americans viewed their land: not as simply the possession of the holder of the deed, 
but as a national resource that should be regulated for the benefit of all citizens.  In 
addition to undermining the ideological cohesiveness of the Resettlement 
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Administration within the larger arena of New Deal programs, tension between the 
rights of the individual and the rights of the collective contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of Resettlement Administration programs, as it served as an easy target 
for criticism by New Deal opponents.   
The second example reflects the mixed messages being issued about the 
Resettlement Administration soon after its creation, indicative of the fact that the 
Roosevelt Administration was unclear on the purpose of the agency and its function 
under the New Deal umbrella.  On June 20, 1935, Roosevelt met with the State 
Resettlement Administrators, a group organized through the agency, and stated that 
the agency was distinct among all of the other work relief programs because it was 
geared towards planning for the future and “social reform,” instead of addressing 
immediate needs.  The New York Times reported that FDR went on to delineate the 
“twin objectives” of the Resettlement Administration, namely the “creation of work on 
community projects and the provision of funds for rehabilitation and resettlement.”40  
There is a clear disparity between these two messages.  Although Roosevelt asserted 
that planning for the future was the highest priority of the new agency, as opposed to 
the Works Progress Administration that was predominantly focused on employing 
large numbers of Americans, the ‘twin objectives’ indicate that job creation was also a 
key element. However, the implication of the statement was that the Resettlement 
Administration should equally prioritize putting the unemployed to work with 
planning for the future.  Tugwell, as it became increasingly obvious by late 1935, did 
not share this employment priority.41 
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The discrepancy between FDR’s stated goals of the Resettlement 
Administration cannot be solely attributed to ideological confusion within the 
administration.  It exposed a profound schism between Roosevelt and Tugwell over 
the nature of the New Deal’s work-relief philosophy, the third ideological 
consideration.  In March 1935, Tugwell recorded a conversation with FDR about the 
use of man verses the machine.  Tugwell objected to the government paying more 
workers than necessary to complete a specific task that could be done with fewer men 
appropriately applying technological innovations.  He dismisses the President’s 
assertion that “we ought to do a lot of this public work by hand methods,” through the 
deliberate reduction of machinery.  Tugwell prioritized the use of machinery over the 
employment of workers because he perceives it as necessary for the nation to accept 
that certain by-hand methods are obsolete and resistance to change would only further 
erode its ability to increase general standards of living and function efficiently.  
Roosevelt, in comparison, put supremacy on employing as many Americans as 
possible in order to rebuild the economy.42  
FDR’s conversation with the State Resettlement Administrators underscored 
his political pragmatism.  A significant increase in employment figures since 1932 
would become his primary campaign assertion in the 1936 presidential election.43  His 
effort to link the Resettlement Administration to work-relief initiatives indicated his 
understanding that continuing to raise employment levels was of great concern to 
Congress, as the holders of the federal purse strings, and the voting public.  
Additionally, he recognized that the funding of the Resettlement Administration came 
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through the Work Relief Bill, and that despite a personal desire to make the agency a 
vehicle for significant social reform, its existence was dependent on appearing to 
belong under the work relief appropriations umbrella.  Unfortunately, while Tugwell 
had strong convictions that the Resettlement Administration’s efforts should be 
directed towards securing social transformation, he lacked his president’s grasp of 
public relations.  FDR embraced work relief as a means to an end for the agency, a 
way of ensuring that it has the resources to fund projects with far-reaching, long-term 
objectives.  Tugwell was an opponent of emergency work-relief efforts in general, and 
specifically questioned their practicality for farmers. In 1936, this issue comes to a 
head when a reduction in overall work relief funding results in a total absence of new 
funds dedicated specifically to the Resettlement Administration.44 
The bureaucratic obstacles alone in establishing the Resettlement 
Administration during the summer of 1935 cannot be underestimated.  Far from a 
gradual process of building an effective, streamlined agency, the Resettlement 
Administration was a cumbersome, hastily organized, discombobulated entity from its 
conception.  Almost immediately after Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 7028, 
Tugwell was inundated with administrative problems.  Addressing a huge surplus of 
employees, inherited as a result of acquiring the projects of numerous federal 
agencies, was a considerable obstacle.  Staffing figures provide the easiest and clearest 
means to comprehend the enormous scope of the administrative challenges created as 
a result of a massive reorganization undertaking.    
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In addition to hiring 1,500 new employees by the end of July, the agency also 
inherited the staffs of all of the incomplete land-use projects it absorbed from the 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior.  A total of 
approximately 15,000 individuals transferred from AAA, the subsistence homestead 
division of the Interior Department, and the rural rehabilitation division of FERA 
combined, with nearly 12,500 from FERA alone.  On July 31, the New York Times 
reported that Tugwell sought to eliminate between 7,000 and 8,000 positions by the 
early fall, the majority from the FERA projects.  Thus, in addition to being focused on 
initiating new suburban resettlement programs and reworking policy objectives in the 
first few months of the agency’s existence, Tugwell was forced to contend with 
reducing employee redundancies and consolidating pre-existing programs.45 
The efficiency of Tugwell’s employee reduction and usage policies remained 
in question near the end of the 1935, when Harry L. Hopkins, administrator of the 
Works Progress Administration, announced that it was unlikely to meet its work-relief 
employment goals by approximately 1,000,000 jobs.  Delays in Resettlement 
Administration work projects were deemed responsible for this shortfall, resulting in 
an examination of its employment figures.  By the end of November, unspecified 
Resettlement Administration officials reported that the number of its administrative 
employees was almost twice as large as the number of workers engaged in direct relief 
positions.  Tugwell was specifically cited as retaining 12,089 permanent, 
administrative employees—the people who oversee and implement projects and 
programs—and only 5,072 relief workers.  In regards to salaries, these employees 
consumed $1,750,000, while the relief workers received only $300,000 total.  In 
comparison, the WPA employed the greatest number of relief workers at the end of 
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1935, with only 2,240 based out of Washington, DC.  The most damning element of 
this assessment was the title of the article: “Tugwell Has Staff of 12,089 to Create 
5,012 Jobs.”46  The question of the efficiency of the Resettlement Administration and 
the use of funds was the predominant focus of the news report, and was reflective of 
growing public interest in political accountability within the New Deal projects 
generally, and the Resettlement Administration specifically.   
In addition to adjusting employment figures, the Resettlement Administration 
struggled throughout 1935 with the relatively last-minute inclusion of a subsistence 
homesteads division, its degree of its administrative independence, and a massive 
internal reorganization.  Originally, the Resettlement Administration was subdivided 
into the four divisions of rural resettlement, land utilization, suburban resettlement, 
and management/administration. 47  The agency was tasked with finishing incomplete 
land projects initiated by various departments, and creating new rural and suburban 
American communities48 equipped to face the economic and social challenges of the 
20th-century.  Tugwell noted in his diary as early as April 29, 1935 that the President 
expected him to take over the Subsistence Homesteads division from the Department 
of the Interior,49 but politics within the administration, especially related to Secretary 
Ickes, seemed to delay its inclusion.50  The division was deliberately excluded from 
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the strategic plan that Tugwell designed with Hopkins.51  Its inclusion at Roosevelt’s 
insistence and subsequent attention in the press undoubtedly contributed to a reduction 
in Resettlement Administration efficiency because it diverted attention and resources 
from the projects that Tugwell was actually interested in implementing.  Although 
initially ambivalent on the matter,52 when it becomes clear in May that the 
Resettlement Administration would absorb the subsistence homestead projects 
initiated by the PWA, he made clear his intention to liquidate the entire program.53  In 
September, the President allocated $7 million to finish incomplete homestead 
projects.54  Yet by January 1936, the majority of them were shifted to an inactive list.55  
Although the subsistence homestead component of the Resettlement Administration 
did not have a great deal of impact on the larger agency, it serves as an example of the 
types of programmatic issues that Tugwell faced that detracted from his organization 
mission, reinforced the argument that the Resettlement Administration served as a way 
station for incomplete and potentially unfeasible projects. 
The status of the Resettlement Administration among the programs funded 
through the ‘work relief bill’ was a contentious subject throughout both 1935 and 
1936, but it was the policies established prior to its official creation that ultimately 
placed it in a tenuous funding situation in 1936.  One of Tugwell’s conditions for 
leading the Resettlement Administration was that would be allowed to function 
independently of the established departments, namely the Department of Agriculture 
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and the Department of the Interior.  Specifically, Tugwell wanted to report directly to 
the President, making himself, in effect, a pseudo-department head.56  Even after it 
was clear that all of the funding allocations from the work relief bill would be 
funneled through an allotment committee chaired by Hopkins,57 Tugwell expressed his 
resentment of being subjected to external review in order to receive administrative 
operating funds.  “My contention is that my agency should be thought of as an 
independent agency just like any department of the government and that I should not 
have to go to an allotment board or anything of the sort for administrative funds.”58  
Tugwell went on to emphasize the significance of this issue for him personally, 
foreshadowing the circumstances that would eventually contribute to his resignation.  
He emphatically stated, “How this matter may be settled I do not know but unless I 
can operate independently so far as the control of my administration is concerned I am 
not interested in going on.”59 
As a result of a three-week tour of the field sites, Tugwell initiated a massive 
reorganization of the Resettlement Administration in November, an effort to meld his 
cumbersome agency into a functional group.  The four original divisions were 
consolidated into two central departments, construction and resettlement, in order to 
eliminate redundant planning groups.60  However, divided among the different 
departments and agencies, superfluous projects and personnel were not nearly as 
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visible as when they were packed into a single agency.  With time, Tugwell might 
have been able to mold the Resettlement Administration into a highly functional and 
efficient organization.  However, this remains only speculation, because his 
honeymoon period with Congress, the press, and Republican political strategists 
expired at the conclusion of 1935.   
1935, The Year of Possibilities -Projects and Activities 
 Between May and December 1935, the Resettlement Administration was 
actively engaged in the acquisition and reuse of submarginal land through the Land 
Utilization Division, and the creation of the greenbelt communities under the guidance 
of the Suburban Division.  The retirement of exhausted farm land and the development 
of suburban planned communities were the programs most resonant with Tugwell’s 
personal values and goals, and formed the foundation of his efforts to initiate a 
revolution in the way that Americans viewed and engaged their land.  Despite the 
obvious programmatic differences between reuse projects on submarginal land and the 
creation of suburban communities, both initiatives functioned as educational tools to 
demonstrate Tugwell’s theories regarding “best practices.”  
 Tugwell frequently cited the optioning and purchase nearly 10,000,000 acres 
of submarginal land as one of the main accomplishments of the Resettlement 
Administration in 1935.61  (See Illustration 3.1)  According to Tugwell, by December,  
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Illustration 3.1. Traveling Land Program exhibit promoting the Resettlement 
Administration, 1936. From the Farm Security Administration – Office of War 
Information Photograph Collection. 
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approximately 22,000 families received the chance to sell their land to the federal 
government and relocate, half with no additional need of relocation relief assistance.62 
Following the transfer of titles, approximately 208 projects across 43 states were 
established to effectively utilize the land for public benefit.63   
 The Land Program, the first version of what would eventually evolve into the 
submarginal land division in the Resettlement Administration, was formed under 
FERA.  In February 1934, it received its first allocation, $25,000,000, from the 
Surplus Relief Board of Public Works.  An advisory committee was established to 
oversee its efforts. It included Secretary Ickes (Interior), Secretary Wallace 
(Agriculture), and Under Secretary Tugwell (Agriculture) among its members.64 
According to John S. Lansill, the first director of FERA’s Land Program, the program 
had three objectives:  
(1) The purchase of poor land.  
 
(2)  The conversion of that poor land to a use beneficial to the people of the 
U.S. 
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(3) The relocation and permanent rehabilitation of the people living on that 
poor land.65 
Immediately after establishing the Resettlement Administration, Roosevelt signed, 
“Transfer of Land Program of F.E.R.A. to the Resettlement Administration. Executive 
Order No. 7028, May 1, 1935.”  The Chopawamsic Recreation Demonstration Project, 
which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, was one of the projects 
transferred to the Resettlement Administration.66  As a result of taking control of the 
Land Program, the Resettlement Administration changed the program’s name to the 
Land Utilization Division and identified three targets:  
(1) The wasteful loss and destruction of land and its resources; 
 
(2) Low living standards in areas where families are dependent upon the 
cultivation of poor land;  
 
(3) Excessive costs to [the] Government for roads, schools and relief in poor 
land regions where tax income furnishes only a minor portion of the 
necessary community expenditures.67 
The Resettlement Administration charged that the land was being misused by its 
owners, to the detriment of the individual, the regional community, and the nation as a 
whole.  Through the Land Utilization Division, the Resettlement Administration 
directed its efforts to acquiring land that was both inappropriate for farming—either 
due to mismanagement or its natural attributes—and appropriate for a public purpose.  
It recognized, however, the infeasibility of being able to purchase all of the nation’s 
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submarginal land.  Instead, the division directed its efforts towards the establishment 
of projects that would demonstrate appropriate land-use practices, in the hopes of 
inspiring local and state agencies to engage in similar activities.68  The primary uses 
for reclaimed land included the establishment of forests, recreational areas, and 
environmental protection zones.69   
 To oversee the day-to-day operations of the projects initiated on federally 
purchased submarginal land, the Resettlement Administration entered into an 
agreement with the National Parks Service (NPS), which operated under the oversight 
of the Department of the Interior.  On December 18, 1935, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed by Tugwell, L.C. Gray, Assistant Administrator of the 
Resettlement Administration and Director of the Land Utilization Division, and 
Conrad Wirth, Assistant Director of the NPS.  It established the NPS as the “technical 
agency” for the Resettlement Administration, and made it responsible for “the detailed 
planning and carrying to completion, in so far as funds will permit, the development of 
the conservation land development projects,” otherwise known as the Recreational 
Demonstration Projects. 70  The details of the designation of responsibilities between 
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the two agencies is worth mentioning, albeit briefly, because it established a basis for 
understanding the involvement of the Resettlement Administration and NPS in the 
Chopawamsic Recreation Demonstration Project.  It delineates the hierarchy of 
personnel between Tugwell, as administrator of the Resettlement Administration, and 
the people in Hickory Ridge and Batestown, VA who sold their land, either willingly 
or reluctantly, to the Resettlement Administration.  This process, and the large degree 
of disconnect between Tugwell and the land purchased through the Land Utilization 
Division, and Tugwell’s personal involvement in the establishment of the greenbelt 
communities, Greenbelt, MD in particular, serves as an excellent point of comparison.  
 An initiative to establish four, planned suburban communities for low-income 
residents became Tugwell’s flagship effort in 1935, and the creation of the greenbelt 
communities was the most lasting visual reminder of the Resettlement Administration.  
After shelving the initial idea of relocating farmers from unproductive lands on to 
healthier, more viable ones due to administrative complications, the Resettlement 
Administration turned its attention to the creation of four “satellite” communities 
outside major metropolises.  This stemmed from Tugwell’s belief that people must 
relocate to areas with current and future employment opportunities,71 an idea that 
appeared to be widely held within the Department of Agriculture.   
In a memorandum to Secretary Wallace, Mordecai Ezekiel, Wallace’s 
economic advisor, described the results of a study of population movement that were 
presented by Dr. Goodrich to the Population Association on May 3, 1935.  Dr. 
Goodrich examined American migration patterns from 1920-1929 and 1929-1933, and 
came to two important conclusions.  First, during economic downturns, people were 
more likely to vacate the cities in favor of rural communities, which, on average, had 
lower standards of living during periods of both prosperity and depression.   Second, 
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industries were far more likely to remain in their original geographical location than to 
relocate.  Third, when industrial movement did occur, it was generally to the areas on 
the periphery of its established city of origin.  In making suggestions regarding the 
encouragement of industrial growth and development, Dr. Goodrich encouraged the 
establishment of new centers for industrial activities, and allowed established 
industries to remain in their original geographical region.  People, as a result, should 
be encouraged to move these areas, instead of expecting the jobs to trickle down to 
rural regions.  Ezekiel closes his letter with the acknowledgment that “these 
conclusions are certainly not a surprise…[and] they provide interesting detailed 
verification of general conditions which we would have expected.”  The general theme 
of the missive was that Dr. Goodrich’s observations and conclusions reinforced the 
idea that the role of federal government in the mid-1930s was to encourage Americans 
to leave the farms and rural sectors of the nation and relocate to new suburban areas 
centered around industrial complexes.72 
 In keeping with Dr. Goodrich’s suburban assertions, the Resettlement 
Administration announced on October 14 its intention to build a community for 
workers in Berwyn, MD.  This immediately instigated scathing criticism in local 
papers.  Although regional leaders, such as Lansdale G. Sasscer, president of the 
Maryland State Senate, lambasted the project for being unnecessary for the area, 
Tugwell believed that its proximity to the nation’s capitol would increase its visibility 
and make it an educational tourist spot.73  Additionally, the Resettlement 
Administration believed in the supremacy of federal rights over states rights, and 
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asserted that the new towns would become “models for future planning, as the country 
needs to correct the present intolerable situation in which one-third of American 
families live in homes rated as substandard.”  
The Berwyn project was slated to be the first of four, all situated outside of 
major metropolitan areas with industrial centers in order to “relieve the deplorable 
housing conditions of low-income workers in cities.”  $5,500,000 was allocated for 
land, construction, and labor costs for Berwyn alone, with $31,000,000 for all four 
projects combined.  The Resettlement Administration estimated that approximately 
6,000 regional skilled and unskilled laborers from the Washington, DC area would be 
employed in the construction of 1,000 four and six-room apartments, and other 
community facilities.  The idea was to construct an entirely self-contained town, a 
residential center to provide rental housing for low-income, working families.  The 
press quickly coined the proposal “Tugwell Town.”74  
 The second planned community was planned in Franklin, N.J., located outside 
New York City, but unlike the Berwyn project, opposition in New Jersey quickly 
manifested itself as a lawsuit and a legal injunction against construction in December 
1935.  The plaintiffs charged that the project would remove considerable tax dollars 
from the township’s coffers with the transfer of the land to federal ownership, and that 
the federal government seized ownership without first gaining Franklin’s consent.  
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the Resettlement Administration was in 
constitutional violation for seizing land without due process, and because “it affected 
an unlawful delegation of legislative powers by Congress [and] violated States 
rights.”75  This case was resolved in 1936 in favor of the plaintiffs, and most likely 
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played a significant role in the termination the program after the completion of 
Greenhills, Ohio outside of Cincinnati, and Greendale, Wisconsin on the outskirts of 
Milwaukee.  
 In addition to legal challenges, Tugwell and the Resettlement Administration 
faced a host of unresolved issues at the end of 1935, ones that would be carried into 
the following year and which would, in some cases, adversely affect the effectiveness 
and productivity of the agency.  The first related to the relationship between rural 
poverty and urban poverty, and the question over who was being targeted for relief.  
For instance, the Resettlement Administration spent most of the year bogged down in 
completing projects previously started by other federal agencies.  The greenbelt cities 
movement, however, reflected a large-scale program completely unique to the 
Resettlement Administration.  Tugwell strongly resisted being saddled with the 
responsibly for creating new city housing,76 but the Berwyn project specifically 
targeted the urban poor.  By the end of October, proposed subsistence homestead 
projects had largely been scrapped,77 so the only efforts by the Resettlement 
Administration to address establishing new ways for Americans to live on and with the 
land were centered in the greenbelt town projects.  Yet despite maintaining vocal 
advocacy for improving agricultural standards and the fact that substandard land was 
purchased from poor farmers, Tugwell was unable to reconcile tensions between his 
impoverished urban and rural constituencies.  The most striking reflection of this issue 
was the failure of the Resettlement Administration to propose and implement a lasting 
educational model for improved rural living. 
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 The second issue is a subcategory of the first, namely the type of poor rural 
resident being targeted by Resettlement Administration relief activities.  In his 
December defense of the Resettlement Administration, Tugwell justifies federal 
intervention into land ownership and the use of public funds by stating, “Resettlement 
attacks what might be classed the chronic rural-relief problem.  The present situation, 
in which families are trying to live on land that will not support them is costing the 
taxpayers money.”78  The bulk of his writing, however, focused on the newly poor, 
those individuals who were economically comfortable prior to the Great Depression. 
This variation exposed a tension within the Resettlement Administration, and perhaps 
Tugwell himself, over the appropriate course of action to achieve substantive reform.  
 At the end of 1935, the Resettlement Administration stood at a precipice, with 
the first inklings of a storm of opposition on the horizon.  In many ways, it was the 
right organization, with the appropriate aims, at the wrong time.  American agriculture 
was unquestionably in crisis; the consequences of rural poverty was captured by Roy 
Styker’s photographers.   Yet being able to identify the causes contributing to the 
development of such a horrifying situation was not sufficient.  The activities of the 
Resettlement Administration in 1935 reflected insecurities and inconsistencies about 
the best way to proceed.  It was generally unclear about what the relationship of the 
federal government in regulating land usage should be: Tugwell was in favor of 
massive federal control, while FDR took a more moderate, politically acceptable 
stance. This issue touched at the heart of the problem of the Resettlement 
Administration, namely administrative uncertainly over who exactly they were aiming 
to help and the nature of their mission.  These insecurities made it difficult for the 
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organization to function in a cohesive manner, and were eventually exacerbated by 
Tugwell’s dogmatic opinions clashing with the political realities of 1936.  
1936, A Year of Strife 
 Widespread and intense criticism of the Resettlement Administration did not 
gain momentum until 1936.  Although the agency encountered legal challenges as 
early as December 1935, efforts by Republicans to torpedo Tugwell and the 
Resettlement Administration dramatically intensified the following year, and Tugwell 
resigned his post just after Roosevelt’s reelection in November 1936.  Four distinct 
elements contributed to the dismantling of the Resettlement Administration and its 
eventual absorption into the Department of Agriculture.  
First, the agency suffered from Congressional backlash due to the massive 
empowerment of the executive branch through the Work Relief Bill of 1935.  The bill 
contained allocations for $4.8 billion dollars in programmatic and administrative 
funding, leaving the bulk of the designations to Roosevelt himself.79  The 
administration faced a far different reception by Congress in 1936 when it submitted 
its work relief budget for the fiscal year 1937, which commenced on July 1, 1936.  
The Secondary Deficiency Appropriation Bill passed out of the House Appropriations 
Committee on May 6, 1936,80 providing $1,425,000,000 for relief efforts, a total of 
$75,000.000 less than originally requested by the White House.  Expenditure 
designations written into the bill required Hopkins, head of the WPA, to not exceed 
certain percentages on a per-program basis.  Rural rehabilitation and relief was granted 
a combined total of $85,500,000.  Hopkins testimony before the Appropriations 
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Subcommittee was released to the public on May 7, and the transcript indicated his 
preference to transfer some of those funds to the Resettlement Administration.  It also 
documented the desire of the subcommittee members to keep the money almost 
entirely within the WPA.81 
Unsuccessful in the House, Tugwell took his case directly to the Senate the 
following week, asking for $167,500,000 to continue the Resettlement 
Administration’s relief efforts.  He acknowledged that without new allocations the 
agency would exhaust all of its resources by June 30, the last day of the 1936 fiscal 
year. The subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, however, was 
disinclined to grant such a request, citing both the absence of a similar designation 
within the House version of the Deficiency Bill and the fact that President Roosevelt 
did not ask for a specific allocation for the Resettlement Administration within his 
budget request document.  Therefore, the $85,500,000 designated to “rural 
rehabilitation and relief for farmers” remained under WPA funding package, 
designations that Hopkins defended as appropriate, and the Resettlement 
Administration remained excluded from work relief appropriations.82   
The unwillingness of both the House and Senate Appropriation Committees to 
include the Resettlement Administration in the 1937 funding cycle reflected a growing 
legislative desire to assert a limited form of independence from the executive branch, 
and have a more significant role in defining the nature of federally funded relief 
efforts.  Because the Resettlement Administration was established through an 
executive order and Roosevelt had a largely free hand with work relief appropriations 
to fund the new agency as he saw fit, Congress had little opportunity in 1935 to 
influence it.  In 1936, however, it specifically controlled the purse strings, although it 
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is unclear why the President assisted their efforts by failing to grant the Resettlement 
Administration a specific line item in the budget proposal.  The result, however, 
significantly reduced the ability of the Resettlement Administration to function 
independently from the WPA and the other established departments.  
Frustration within Congress about the nature of the Resettlement 
Administration programs and administrative functions were not limited to House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees.  On April 30, the New York Times exposed a 
secret bill crafted in the House Agricultural Committee to replace the Resettlement 
Administration, an executive branch creation, with a Congressionally designed 
version.  The bill outlined the establishment of the Farmers’ Home Corporation, which 
would be managed by three presidential appointments in the Department of 
Agriculture, and proposed that all activities of the Resettlement Administration would 
be transferred to the new agency.  Most significantly, the Corporation could be 
dissolved by Congress at any time, a clear, but ultimately unsuccessful attempt, to 
wrest agricultural relief activities away from the White House.83 
The Senate provided Tugwell with the same reception as the House.  Senator 
William Warren Barbour of New Jersey called for a senatorial inquiry into the 
activities and expenditures of the Resettlement Administration, inspired by the legal 
obstacles it encountered in trying to establish a greenbelt community outside New 
York.  He charged that it was impossible to ascertain the amount of money that had 
been spent on the pending project.84  On May 8th, the Senate approved Barbour’s 
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resolution, asking for a report from Tugwell on the “advisability of continuing.”85  
Four days later, Tugwell submitted a report to the Senate, and appeared before the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, asking for the aforementioned $167,500,000 for 
the 1937 fiscal year to be added to the Deficiency Bill.86  The results of this endeavor 
have already been discussed; the Committee refused Tugwell’s request.  The nature of 
the summons, centered around the “advisability of continuing” with the Resettlement 
Administration, and the unwillingness of the Committee to even consider a partial 
funding amendment, indicated that it had determined that the Resettlement 
Administration should not be allowed to continue into 1937.   
  Internal politics within Roosevelt’s administration also played a notable role 
in the decline of the Resettlement Administration.  It remained unclear as to why the 
President did not include a specific Resettlement Administration reference and 
allocation request in his 1937 budget.  Based on reductions in Congressional funding, 
it is suggestive that there was increased tension between the executive and legislative 
branches over relief spending in early 1936.  It is merely speculation to suggest that 
the House used the secret bill that would have replaced with the Farmers’ Home 
Corporation as leverage in budgetary negotiations with the President,87 or that 
economic resources dictated that the President had to accept reducing or eliminating 
specific programs.  Either way, the President provided Congress with a clear 
justification to exclude the Resettlement Administration from the allocation process.  
Additionally, the situation was complicated by the emergence of Hopkins as 
the favorite son of the New Deal.  In addition to actively defending rural relief 
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appropriations to the WPA,88 he asserted that if Congress wanted to make job creation 
a priority in fiscal year 1937, the total of the work relief funds would need to be 
appropriated for the WPA.  Of the three programs—the WPA, PWA, and the 
Resettlement Administration—the WPA had the administrative and programmatic 
mechanisms established to provide the highest number of jobs at the most efficient 
rates.  Essentially, by reducing expenditures and valuing employment figures over 
efficiency, the WPA model directed a higher percentage of its allocations to new jobs 
than either the PWA or the RA.89 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt did not entirely abandon the Resettlement 
Administration in May.  The reorganization of the federal relief efforts began that 
month, making Harry Hopkins responsible for managing relief efforts between the 
WPA, the PWA, and the Resettlement Administration.  The new hierarchy reflected 
the distribution of relief funds under the Deficiency Bill to the WPA.  Roosevelt 
indicated that he would continue to fund PWA and Resettlement Administration 
activities, albeit on a reduced basis, through grants and specific allocations from the 
WPA.  During the press conference, the President defended accusations that the 
Resettlement Administration had squandered its resources in 1936, asserting that it 
had made considerable strides and additional WPA funding would further its efforts.  
He emphasized that between 100,000 and 200,000 families had been assisted off of 
public support permanently, and announced that very little additional money would be 
spent on purchasing submarginal land.90  The reorganization of the relief programs, 
however, reflected the executive branch’s awareness that the WPA possessed the most 
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efficient, cheapest model for creating employment.  Again, the issue of job creation, 
which always existed on the periphery of Tugwell’s focus on building sustained social 
change in America, asserted its importance.  Quite simply, the Deficiency Bill 
contained a clear message:  jobs creation equaled cash from Congress.  Although the 
President established a funding mechanism for the Resettlement Administration, it 
significantly reduced Tugwell’s much-valued independence, and placed him at the 
mercy of Harry Hopkins for all funding requests, both administrative and 
programmatic.  Additionally, as only 20% of the WPA relief funds could be allocated 
by the President to the PWA and RA,91 a significant portion of rural relief and 
rehabilitation funds would remain within the WPA.  One of the original intentions of 
the Resettlement Administration was to consolidate land-use and rural rehabilitation 
efforts within a single federal entity to avoid unnecessary overlap and redundancy. 
Clearly, changes to both the funding and cooperation mechanisms between the WPA 
and the Resettlement Administration contributed to an increase in power and prestige 
for the former, and a reduction in both for the latter.  
May 1936 was a trying month for the Resettlement Administration.  First 
Tugwell confronted hostile Congressional appropriations committees, followed by the 
reorganization of the federal relief efforts that left him begging for assistance from the 
WPA.  Next, the legal challenges regarding the proposed greenbelt community in the 
Township of Franklin, NJ erupted, dealing the Resettlement Administration a highly 
damaging blow.  First, the Chief Justice of the District Supreme Court dismissed the 
suit, a decision that the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals in the 
District of Columbia in January.92  On May 18, the Court of Appeals issued a divided 
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opinion, ruling that the funding of the Resettlement Administration through the 
Federal Emergency Appropriations Act of 1935 was unconstitutional.  Therefore, 
federal town planning activities associated with the Bound Brook greenbelt project in 
NJ had to be immediately and permanently halted.  The only recourse for the 
government in such an situation would be to challenge the decision in the Supreme 
Court.  If the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision, the Resettlement 
Administration would have to be dismantled until Congress saw fit to reestablish it.  
The lower court decision, however, only established a precedent for legally 
challenging Resettlement Administration activities and halted activities in NJ; it had 
no similar effect on the rest of the agency’s projects.93  Plaintiffs would have to file 
similar suits through their own geographically determined legal channels in order to 
possibly achieve the same results.  It appears that Roosevelt’s administration opted to 
avoid appealing the case to the Supreme Court,94 and the reasoning behind such a 
decision is quite obvious.  By maintaining the status quo, the Resettlement 
Administration had to abandon its NJ greenbelt project, but could proceed with the 
rest of its activities in various locales, provided that new plaintiffs did not achieve 
injunctions under the NJ model.  Taking its case to the Supreme Court would be risky, 
and given the concurrent funding refusal by Congress, altogether unwise.  
The best way to describe the 1936 presidential election, and to understand the 
differences between contemporary and historical interpretations, is to borrow the 
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words of a preeminent American History scholar, William E. Leuchtenburg: “The 
historian who writes about the campaign of 1936 has one big advantage over the 
people who lived at the time—he knows how it all turned out.”95  A simple 
observation, perhaps, but also keenly astute.  Although Roosevelt would ultimately 
trounce the opposition and win all but eight electoral votes,96 such an outcome was not 
guaranteed in the spring and early summer of 1936.97  
 The 1936 campaign match-up pitted the incumbent, President Franklin 
Roosevelt (D), against a Washington, DC outsider, Kansas Governor Alf Landon (R).  
However, the full machinery of the Republican Party did not back Landon until his 
election at the June GOP convention, where he was nominated and elected as the 
Republican presidential candidate.98  This process, however, should by no means 
suggest the absence of strife between the two major parties prior to June.  On the 
contrary, Republican hopefuls waged war against Roosevelt and the New Deal early in 
the year, and both the Resettlement Administration and Tugwell became easy targets 
for their political outrage.    
 Several candidate possibilities emerged in the spring of 1936, and Col. Frank 
Knox was one of the first to publicly describe the aim of the New Deal programs as a 
the establishment of a ‘dictatorship.”  A Chicago publisher and the Chairman of the 
Credentials Committee at the Bull Moose Convention,99 Knox, who would eventually 
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be selected as Landon’s running mate, took his criticisms of Roosevelt and his New 
Deal programs direct to American business leaders.  Speaking before the 
Manufacturing and Bankers Club on February 10, Knox compared the administration 
to the dictatorships of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin.  “New Dealers are determined to 
gain possession for themselves of the system of free enterprise that has been built up 
in the country.”100  Nor were such sentiments limited to Republicans.  New Deal 
policies had an incredibly divisive effect within the Democratic Party itself.101  On the 
same that Knox spoke in Philadelphia, the chairman of Georgia’s State Democratic 
executive committee, Hugh Howell, responded to a request by Marion Allen, 
Roosevelt’s Georgia campaign manager, to hold a state primary in a manner that 
underscored the socialist undertones of Knox’s remarks.  Hugh replied, “You and 
those you represent today should come back to the Democratic Party…come back to 
good, old-fashioned honesty in government and repudiate, as will be done in 
November, the New Deal theorists, crack-pots, Socialists and Communists, as 
represented by Wallace, Tugwell…and others of their kind.”102 
 In the build-up to the May appropriations conflicts, accusations of socialism 
and communism for his economic policies were directed at Tugwell specifically.  
Back in June 1934, Tugwell defended his opinions before the Senate Agricultural 
Committee, clarifying that while he believed in a national planning movement, he had 
no wish to defy the Constitution or impose a model in the manner of the Soviet 
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Union.103  Accepting the leadership of the Resettlement Administration, however, 
thrust Tugwell into a new, more visible role, making him a whipping boy for critics of 
the New Deal agenda.  Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. emerged as a vocal opponent 
of both the Roosevelt Administration broadly and Tugwell in particular.  In a rebuttal 
to a broadcast by the secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl 
Browder, Fish declared, “…I am inclined to the belief that open attacks of 
Communists against our industrial, social and political institutions are far less 
dangerous than the subtle and insidious attacks of New Deal spokesmen, such as 
Under Secretary of Agriculture Rexford Guy Tugwell.”104  Although Senator Barbour 
did not employ such pointed language, and generally limited himself to attacking the 
projects and expenditures of the Resettlement Administration,105 the message in early 
1936 was clear: the Resettlement Administration was under assault from Republicans 
and Democrats alike.   
Projects and Activities - May 1936  
 The conclusion of the House and Senate appropriations process and the verdict 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals case bookmarked the approximate end of the first year of 
the Resettlement Administration.  The accomplishments of the agency throughout that 
period were divided into four basic categories: rural rehabilitation, rural resettlement, 
submarginal land acquisition, and suburban construction resettlement. The first, rural 
rehabilitation, absorbed the largest portion of the RA’s resources.  Approximately 
$140,000,000 was spent on loans and grants to 600,000 farmers to keep them on their 
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land and help avoid foreclosure by May 1.  Rural resettlement, in comparison, only 
assisted 3,000 families in relocating to more productive farmland, at an average cost of 
$4,800 per family.106   
For the purposes of this investigation, the two final categories, submarginal 
land acquisition and suburban resettlement, are the most significant. By the beginning 
of May, the Resettlement Administration had optioned or purchased outright almost 
10,000,000 acres of land, involving 207 projects in 43 states. These numbers were 
virtually identical to those previously mentioned in the end-of-year discussion of 
1935.  In total, Tugwell estimated that approximately 600,000,000 acres of American 
land in production at the start of the depression, was entirely unsuitable for farming, 
but home to approximately 650,000 families.107 
 Roosevelt initially earmarked approximately $31,000,000 for the creation of 
four suburban communities, but the aforementioned legal battle resulted in the 
elimination of the New Jersey project.  As of May 1936, construction had only begun 
on the project in Berwyn, MD, although the administration indicated that it was 
prepared to proceed with the creation of ones outside both Cincinnati and Milwaukee.  
In total, approximately 2,700 families would be housed in the three communities, with 
land available for the construction of more than 5,000 more residences.108 
Projects and Activities - June through December 1936 
 After the dual blows by both the legislative and judicial branches, the 
Resettlement Administration quietly began a dissolution process, while it faced 
increasingly outlandish accusations by the Republicans, part of a last-ditch effort to 
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swing the election in their favor.   In August, the Republican National Committee 
(RNC) issued a statement, followed by a report, asserting that the Resettlement 
Administration irresponsibly stored the notes that covered the loans under the rural 
rehabilitation program in buildings prone to fire damage and theft.109  In late October, 
just days before the election, the RNC questioned the treatment of taxpayer dollars in 
the Resettlement Administration, alleging that $661 was spent on a spotted cow, 
$821.30 on two black mares and three pigs.110  Records from the period indicate that 
the White House generally ignored such baseless attacks.111   
 By September, the consequences of having the Resettlement Administration 
report directly to Harry Hopkins for funding requests was reflected in a total cessation 
of new projects.  Tugwell was again forced to reduce his staff, this time by 1,888, 
bringing the total number of positions down to 13,815.  Throughout the summer, he 
gradually eliminated employees, which had peaked at 19,444 on June 1.112  
The inaccessibility, and perhaps nonexistence, of journal entries throughout 
1936 limits one’s ability to understand the situation behind-the-scenes and Tugwell’s 
own evolving perspectives and opinions during his last days serving as the 
Resettlement Administration administrator.  The depth of his frustrations over losing 
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his independence to Hopkins and the WPA through Congressional funding can only be 
imagined.  It is clear, however, that in the final months of the year, Tugwell worked to 
tie up loose ends and find a permanent home for his agency.   
Immediately after Roosevelt was reelected by a staggering margin, a proposal 
by Tugwell to the President to move the Resettlement Administration into the 
Department of Agriculture was leaked to the press.  Chester C. Davis, a member of the 
Federal Reserve Board and Tugwell’s former adversary at the AAA, staunchly 
opposed such an action. Davis’s objection was not to the Resettlement Administration 
as a program, but to Tugwell personally.  He blamed the Under Secretary for 
contributing to the tensions between right and left-wing New Deal Democrats within 
the Department of Agriculture.  Although Tugwell maintained his title as Under 
Secretary of Agriculture after the establishment of the Resettlement Administration, he 
was essentially absent from department issues.  By bringing the Resettlement 
Administration into Agriculture, however, Davis feared that Tugwell would ignite new 
hostilities.  Sources within the administration indicated that while Secretary Wallace 
has resisted making a decision, he expressed a general reluctance to include the 
Resettlement Administration, despite Roosevelt’s belief that at least some of the 
programs and departments should be transferred.113 
In addition to advocating the transfer of the Resettlement Administration to 
Agriculture, Tugwell also issued a massive 40-year farm-relief proposal geared 
towards eradicating the farm ownership issues that exacerbated conditions during the 
Great Depression.  In his characteristic fashion of arguing for the expansion of the 
government, the plan generally provided a way to advance federal take-over of much 
of American farmland, which would in turn be leased to farm families on the provision 
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that they would be eventually able to own them outright.114  This proposal was 
Tugwell’s last major policy suggestion and revealed that he remained true to his belief 
that large-scale land reform was the responsibility of the federal government, and that 
America needed to regulate land usage based on an acceptance that the management 
decisions did not simply fall under the purview of the holder of the deed, but should be 
treated as a resource of the nation.  
The President’s apparent willingness to accept even part of Tugwell’s push to 
transfer the Resettlement Administration reflect his pleasure over the almost 
completed community of Greenbelt, MD.  On November 13, Tugwell gave Roosevelt 
a personal tour of the town, and the President remarked to accompanying reporters 
that “The actual sight far exceeds anything I ever dreamed of.  I wish every one in the 
country could see it.  It is good to get people out into the country.  It is an experiment 
that ought to be copied in every community in the United States.”115  (See Illustration 
3.2 and Illustration 3.3)  Immediately after showing off Greenbelt to Roosevelt, 
Tugwell embarked on a tour of the RA’s rural resettlement projects with Secretary 
Wallace.  The purpose of the trip was described in the papers as an “open secret,” 
namely to convince Wallace of the value of the Resettlement Administration projects, 
in order to get him to accept a transfer of the agency into his department.  Tugwell was 
on a leg of this trip when news of his resignation became public knowledge.116 
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Illustration 3.2. President Roosevelt and Rexford Tugwell greet the press at Greenbelt, 
MD, November 1936. From the Farm Security Administration – Office of War 
Information Photograph Collection. 
 
 
Illustration 3.3. President Roosevelt and Rexford Tugwell tour Greenbelt, MD, 
November 1936. From the Farm Security Administration – Office of War Information 
Photograph Collection. 
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Conclusion 
 I full understand the reasons that make you feel you should, for a while at least,  
return to private life within the next few months.  You have given generously 
and efficiently of your services to the Government for these past four years, 
and I want you to know that later on I fully expect to ask you to come back to 
render additional service.117  
 
The warmth of Roosevelt’s letter accepting Tugwell’s resignation, followed in 1940 
by Tugwell’s appointment as the Governor of Puerto Rico in 1940, reflected that the 
parting was amicable.  Both men accepted that the time for New Deal visionaries was 
largely past, and with Tugwell’s resignation the era of the Brain Trust came to a close. 
Although he initially intended to resume his post to Columbia University, the 
institution declined to welcome him back in light of his tumultuous career in 
government and the storm of negative press that swirled around him throughout 1936 
in particular.  His resignation from Roosevelt’s Administration was interpreted as a 
sign of Professionally homeless, Tugwell left the Department of Agriculture to 
become an executive of the American Molasses Company. 118  
 A practical analysis of the functions of the Resettlement Administration ends 
with Tugwell’s resignation and the transfer of the agency in a reduced form to the 
Department of Agriculture on January 1, 1937.119  In later years, Tugwell would 
maintain his core beliefs, but describe the Resettlement Administration as a “failure,” 
largely due to the unwillingness of Congress and the capitalist activists, and by 
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extension the American public, to accept the need for substantial land-use reform 
measures.120  Numerous other reasons have been raised in this chapter in an attempt to 
explain the conclusion, and Tugwell himself deserves much of the blame.  Throughout 
his short tenure with the Resettlement Administration, Tugwell never embraced the 
need to link his agency to the work relief efforts of the WPA, which is most clearly 
evident in his employment statistics.  His efficiency as an administrator, and, by 
extension, the success of the entire Resettlement Administration, began to be 
questioned as early as November 1935.  Ultimately, the Resettlement Administration 
slipped into obscurity within the Department of Agriculture because it could not 
garner sufficient legislative support and the necessary fiscal appropriations to 
independently sustain its objectives, and because Tugwell did not direct his efforts to 
achieving his all-important work relief quotas.  However, this situation was also 
precipitated by numerous ideological and administrative conflicts, unresolved 
programmatic goals, and the political context itself.  
Although the agency failed to perform as Tugwell expected, it nevertheless 
provides an intriguing opportunity to examine a federal effort to address an incredibly 
acute crisis in American agricultural and rural living conditions. The results of this 
initiative, examined through two programmatic examples in Chapter Four, would be 
the displacement of individuals from submarginal land, and the establishment of the 
first federally sponsored suburban community.  The idea behind such projects was 
Tugwell’s belief that the economic circumstances and nature of American society 
required new solutions, and that the role of the government was to experiment and 
create examples that could be emulated by local and state governments, other federal 
agencies, and, in some cases, the business community.   As the following chapter 
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reveals, these ideas fell squarely within Roosevelt’s New Deal tradition.  By 
evaluating the activities, successes, and failures of the Resettlement Administration, 
one is able to grasp a more complex and nuanced understanding of how the federal 
government sought innovative, fresh solutions, and how this environment eventually 
contributed to the belief that suburbanization was the bridge between the poverty of 
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CHAPTER 4 




The prior examination of Roosevelt administration’s rational for establishing 
the Resettlement Administration and the agency’s subsequent goals and initiatives 
revealed three important themes.  First, the idea that land is finite, and, therefore, must 
be considered a national resource.  Second, solely rural or urban populations without 
oversight and supervision by regulatory agency could disintegrate into poverty.  
Finally, the role of government should be to demonstrate appropriate coping 
mechanism for integrating urban and rural life, as it is incapable of independently 
solving all of society’s ills.  Tugwell believed that the hybridization of urban and rural 
was the ideal form for living for the working class, but recognized the implausibility 
of the relocating all downtrodden Americans to such neighborhoods or communities.  
Recreational Demonstration Projects such as Chopawamsic were meant to provide a 
rural component to an otherwise city-bound lifestyle.   
The creation of the greenbelt towns and the establishment of the Recreational 
Demonstration Projects were the clearest physical manifestations of Tugwell’s 
philosophy.  Greenbelt, Maryland and the Chopawamsic Recreational Demonstration 
Project were two of the flagship programs for these Resettlement Administration, 
although neither was fully operational before Tugwell resigned in November 1936.  
The following chapter emphasizes the philosophical and political motivations, the 
historical influences, and intentions of the participants in establishing, constructing, 
and implementing the projects.   
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Greenbelt, Maryland - Historical Precedents  
In Towards New Towns for America, Clarence S. Stein credited the ‘Greenbelt 
Towns,’ of which Greenbelt, MD was the first, as the site of where the “seed of future 
city development was planted.”1  The depth and degree of Greenbelt’s influence upon 
future city planners will be left to another author.  Instead, Greenbelt, in Stein’s 
perspective, provided an innovative, fresh answer to the question of community 
development in the 1930s.  While the government had previously engaged in public 
housing programs, the Greenbelt Towns were the first federal initiative of such 
magnitude.2  However, despite the novel quality that Stein attributed to the project, 
suggesting that it provided a launching pad for subsequent city planning efforts, the 
initiative owes much to 19th-century social and technological developments, and early 
20th-century federal activities in the housing sector.  
 The notion that architecture can affect society in such a way as to produce, 
enhance, or exacerbate certain wholesome or vile characteristics was not the 
brainchild of 19th-century writers, but such concepts were first succinctly proposed 
and implemented during that period.  Although Pugin was by no means the only writer 
to embrace this notion, his Contrasts, which staunchly articulated that the Gothic style 
was the most appropriate style for England in the 1830s, compares nicely to Nikolaus 
Pevsner’s Pioneers of the Modern Movement  of 1936.  Pevsner embraced the idea that 
the adoption of an architectural style should be based on its ability to respond to 
society’s needs.  Instead of emphasizing style for its own artistic sake, it became a 
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cogent vehicle by which to reply to the challenges of the age, and influence social 
responses to a new set of obstacles. 3  The former looked to previous traditions for 
inspiration and the latter embraced a new stylistic expression, but each perceived of 
their respective styles as “a rational way of building evolved inevitable in response too 
the needs of what society really is or ought to be.”4  Although Pevsner wrote in the 
early 20th-century, Pioneers of the Modern Movement serves as a bookend to a 
century-long tradition of applying architecture as a bandage to the wounds of society.  
From John Haviland’s The Tombs, a prison-court complex in New York City that was 
begun in 1838 and emphasized solitary reflection through a single-cell arrangement, to 
the amphitheater design of mid-19th-century Methodist churches to enhance the audio 
and visual experience of the audience, even the lower-income members relegated to 
the balcony, the practical application of architecture influencing social behavior was 
evident throughout the century.5   
Three months after resigning from office, Tugwell penned “The Meaning of 
the Greenbelt Towns” for The New Republic.  The article downplayed the degree to 
which Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities influenced the creation of the Greenbelt 
Towns, instead emphasizing population studies as the motivating rational for the 
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project.6  Nevertheless, it is impossible to assess Greenbelt, MD’s contributions to 
town planning without a brief mention of Howard’s ideas because of the conceptual 
overlap between the two initiatives.7  
Industrialization first drew rural Americans into the cities, and then 
technological developments in the late 19th-century—in the form of streetcars, 
omnibuses, and subways—enabled urban residents to relocate to neighborhoods and 
communities far-removed from the city center.  By the early 20th-century, the 
automobile entered the market and dramatically affected the development of suburbia, 
as people could choose to move farther and farther away from the congested cities.8  
This phenomenon was not limited to the United States.  In England, Ebenezer 
Howard, part of the nascent movement interested in quality of life standards, proposed 
the idea of the Garden City in his 1898 To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, 
which was republished in 1902 as Garden Cities for To-Morrow.9  Howard identified 
the best and worst attributes of city and rural life, and perceived that the best recourse 
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to reconcile the needs of industrialization with those of civilization was through 
community planning that incorporating the best of both forms of living.10  
There are in reality not only, as is so constantly assumed, two alternatives---
town life and country life---but a third alternative, in which all the advantages 
of the most energetic and active town life, with all the beauty and delight of the 
country, may be secured in perfect combination; and the certainty of being able 
to life this life will be the magnet which will produce the effect for which we 
are all striving---the spontaneous movement of the people from our crowded 
cities to the bosom of our kindly mother earth, at once the source of life, of 
happiness, of wealth, and of power.11 
 
Howard went on to found the Garden Cities Association, and organize two 
conferences that provided credibility and advertisement for his city planning 
proposals, and the First Garden City, Ltd was incorporated in 1903. Letchworth 
became the first product of this initiative.12 
 American federal involvement in the housing industry did not develop out of 
the Franklin Roosevelt administration.  Nearly two decades earlier, President 
Woodrow Wilson first established new, federally constructed housing projects in 
response to a shortage of housing stock in industrial areas, and pressing wartime 
demands.13  President Hoover, a Republican, transformed the efforts started by 
Wilson, a Democrat, into a way to boost the private sector by establishing the Division 
of Building and Housing in the Department of Commerce in 1921.  The purpose of the 
new department was to intervene in the private housing industry by creating standards 
for construction materials, as well as codes for development issues such as sanitation 
and setbacks.  The overarching purpose of this initiative was to stimulate public 
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1965), 46. 
 
11 Ibid, 45-46.  
 
12 Purdom, v-vi, 17-36.  
 
13 Louis Mumford, “Introduction,” in Towards New Towns for America, 12.  
 
  107 
consumption and bolster the private housing industry. 14  Like his successor, Hoover 
believed in the power of education to advance American society.  The same year that 
he established the Division of Building and Housing, Hoover helped found Better 
Homes in America, Inc.15  The new organization, which became a national campaign 
overseen by the federal government in 1924, erected the National Better Home in 
Washington, DC in order to educate, through demonstration, the appropriate way to 
live in the modern age.16 
 The developing themes of the 19th and early 20th centuries were not distinct, 
separate movements, but, instead, overlapping responses to the question of the 
appropriate way for the working classes to live in the industrialized world.  Tugwell’s 
impulse to create the Greenbelt Towns should be viewed in a similar vein, as well as a 
reaction and reinterpretation of preceding responses.   
Suburban Division Organization 
The Suburban Division was the only department in the Resettlement 
Administration to be tasked with an entirely new project, without the burden of 
inheriting previous initiatives by other land-use agencies.  Its official purposes 
included: 
(1) To give useful work to men on unemployment relief.  
 
(2) To demonstrate in practice the soundness of planning and operating towns 
according to certain garden city principles.  
 
(3) To provide low-rent housing in healthful surrounding, both physical and 
social, for families that are in the low-income bracket.17 
                                                
14 Hayden, 121. 
 
15 Ibid, 122.  
 
16 Janet Hutchison, “The Cure for Domestic Neglect: Better Homes in America, 1922-
1935,” Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture 2 (1986): 168-169. (168-178). 
 
17 Stein, 119. 
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Tugwell was impressed by John Lansill’s success with submarginal land purchases in 
1934.18  Tugwell and Lansill’s relationship dated back to their days as students at the 
University of Pennsylvania.19  He formally tapped him to serve as the Director of the 
Suburban Division after the agency was created in May 1935, but Tugwell’s diary 
notes that Lansill was already engaged in developing plans for the Maryland site the 
previous March.20  
The initial planning efforts by the Suburban Division engineers were 
cumbersome and implausible.  Lansill played an important role in helping Tugwell 
conceptualize the new communities.  He initially envisioned a town along the lines of 
Le Corbusier’s Ville Contemporaine, a model planned community that involved high-
density residential skyscrapers surrounded by greenbelts that was showcased at the 
1922 Paris Exhibition.  Lansill helped Tugwell reevaluate the practicalities of such a 
scenario in the United States and advocated single and multi-family units.21 
Although Tugwell originally rejected the notion of including professional town 
planners in the design process, he acquiesced after reviewing the dismal products of a 
summer’s worth of activity.  First, the Resettlement Administration sought the expert 
opinion of Tracy Augur, the chief town planner for the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), and then reached out to the private sector.  Clarence Stein, an early American 
urban planner, became an influential consultant on the Greenbelt project at the bequest 
of Lansill.  Henry Wright and Sir Raymond Unwin also gave their opinions upon 
                                                
18 Tugwell, The Diary of Rexford G. Tugwell: The New Deal, 1932-1935, 115.  
 
19 Donald A. Krueckeberg. American Planners: Biographies and Recollections, (New 
York: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 239.  
 
20 Ibid, 115, 228.  
 
21 Krueckeberg, 238-239.  
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solicitation. The first concrete results of these meetings included a reorganization of 
the staff, a rejection of the first community design, a largely grid-style proposal, and 
the separation of the suburban planning division from the subsistence homestead 
division.22 
Stein’s writings offer the clearest perspective on the internal organization and 
operations of the Suburban Division after the staff reorganization.  The planning 
portion was divided into separate teams, consisting of architects, planners, engineers, 
and technicians, each group working independently on their respective sites under the 
guidelines of the project.  Frederick Bigger, the Chief of the Planning Staff, oversaw 
the efforts of each team, and the rational for separating them stemmed from a desire to 
maximize the experimental value of the initiative, and encourage the members to think 
creatively and take risks.23  The absence of Tugwell from Stein’s discussion, as well as 
the general nature of the head of the Resettlement Administration that can be gleaned 
from previous chapters, suggests that he was uninvolved with the design component of 
the Greenbelt Towns, beyond defining the broad perimeters of the project.  
Greenbelt, Maryland - Satellite City Philosophy 
The Suburban Division was tasked with an enormous responsibility—namely, 
to conceive of a new, healthy, economical way for working-class Americans to live in 
the industrial world—on a relatively tight timeframe.  Although they would eventually 
become known as the Greenbelt Towns, Tugwell initially conceived of them as 
“satellite cities.”24  As previously discussed, the administration strongly believed that 
                                                
22 Joseph L. Arnold, The New Deal in the Suburbs: A History of the Greenbelt Town 
Program, 1935-1954 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 47.  
 
23 Stein, 120. 
 
24 This is the term that Tugwell employs throughout his example. His diary entry of 
March 14, 1935, is but one example. Tugwell, The Diary of Rexford G. Tugwell: The 
New Deal, 1932-1935, XXX.  
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industry would never relocate from the general area in which they were established to 
new population centers, and, therefore, that it was imperative for people to move to 
accommodate industry.25  However, relocation to the urban centers in the previous 
century had proven to be unhealthy, and these satellite towns, located on the outskirts 
of industrial cities, were meant to provide an affordable alternative to the slums.  On 
the issue of site selection, Tugwell wrote, “These peripheral areas offer the best 
chance we have ever had in this country for affecting our living and working 
environment favorably.”26   
While Tugwell and Stein appeared to have little personal interaction between 
1935 and 1936, the two shared an important city planning philosophy.  There was an 
ongoing debate within the Suburban Division about how much could reasonably be 
spent on each individual dwelling, how much could be recouped through rent, and 
how much should be totally absorbed by the agency itself.  In a letter to Lansill in 
November 1935, Stein weighted in on the matter, writing about the importance of 
working within the budget limitations.  “Even if capital cost is not charged to tenant, it 
must be kept to a minimum so as to…set standards of planning and building that will 
be sufficiently economical to serve as a guide to others for building in the near 
future.”27  In this manner, he strongly shared Tugwell’s crusading impulse. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
25 Mordecai Ezekiel, “Memorandum for the Secretary,” 4 May 1935. Rexford G. 
Tugwell Papers FDR Library, Box “Tugwell Papers, D-E,” Container 7, Folder 
“Ezekiel, Mordecai, 1933-1939.” Accessed November 12, 2008. 
 
26 Tugwell, “The Meaning of the Greenbelt Towns,” 44.  
 
27 “Appraisal of Plans” from Clarence Stein to John S. Lansill, 19 November 1935. 
Clarence S. Stein Papers, Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 10, Cornell University.  
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Greenbelt, Maryland - Site Selection 
Prior to his appointment to Administrator of the Resettlement Administration, 
Tugwell expressed an interest in the land around the Beltsville National Agricultural 
Research Center.  In March 1934, he and a few assistants examined the property for 
the possibility of creating a wildlife refuge.28  A year later, he broached the issue of 
creating satellite towns with FDR, and gives him a tour of the area as the site for the 
first potential project.29  An on-going problem for the Roosevelt administration in 
solving the urban slum crisis was the difficulty of obtaining large, congruent tracks of 
city land for reasonable prices.  Resettlement Administration officials believed that 
relocating these efforts to the perimeters of these communities would offer the best 
opportunity to make significant reform.30  Approximately 13 miles north of 
Washington, DC, Berwyn, the area around the Beltsville National Agricultural 
Research Center, became the future site.  
 Greenbelt received considerable attention in regional newspapers, much of it 
unfavorable.  As noted earlier, the press soon bequeathed the suburban Maryland 
project the dubious title of “Tugwelltown.”31  That appellation’s similarity to the 
“Hoovervilles,” a popular name for Depression-induced shantytowns, cannot be 
overstated.  Politicians such as Lansdale G. Sasscer, President of the Maryland State 
Senate, weighed in, charging that the project should be halted based on the objection 
that the new residents would not be from the area and would have to be added to local 
                                                
28 Tugwell, The Diary of Rexford G. Tugwell: The New Deal, 1932-1935, 105.  
 
29 Ibid, 226.  
 
30 Arnold, 37-38.  
 
31 “Tugwelltown in Berwyn,” Washington Star 12 October 1935, sec. A.  
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and possibly state relief rolls.32  Other critics argued that private suburban projects and 
PWA initiatives already in development were sufficient to address the regional 
shortage of low-cost housing, and that the Resettlement Administration project was an 
expensive misuse of funds.33 
   “The Claim Jumper,” an editorial cartoon that ran in the October 13, 1935 
edition of the Washington Post clearly surmised the opposition’s sentiments regarding 
the proposal (See Illustration 4.1).  A dapper, aristocratic Tugwell leans against a sign, 
a play on the notion of staking a claim, which contrasts the idea of a “low cost housing 
project” with a $5.5 million price tag.  Representatives from the PWA, the private 
sector, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) are all depicted as workers returning to 
the site and being shocked by Tugwell’s claim to the land.  In comparison to Tugwell, 
the representatives of pre-established building organizations are dressed for work, and 
accompanied by the tools and supplies fit for construction.34  The message conveyed is 
that Tugwell is out-of-touch with the situation, and asserting himself in an 
environment in which he clearly does not belong, to the detriment of taxpayers, private 






                                                
32 “Defends Rearing of Tugwell Town,” New York Times 17 October 1935, sec. A.  
Also reported regionally in “State Officials Join in Protesting Berwyn Project,” 
Washington Star 15 October 1935, sec. A.  
 
33 “Tugwell’s Folly,” Washington Post 13 October 1935, sec. B. 
 
34 “Editorial Cartoon 1 – No Title,” Washington Post 13 October 1935, sec. B. 
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Illustration 4.1 “Editorial Cartoon 1 – No Title.” Published in the Washington Post, 13 
October 1935, section B. 
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Greenbelt, Maryland - ‘Best Practices’ Research 
 In addition to reviewing plans and proposals, Clarence Stein was also involved 
in aiding the Research Section of the Suburban Division, which was led by Warren Jay 
Vinton.  Communications throughout the fall of 1935 indicate that one of the major 
hurdles to community creation was determining the ‘best practices’ that should be 
employed by the agency.35  As this was the first undertaking federal undertaking of 
such magnitude, the planners had to consider issues that were here-to-date excluded 
from government housing projects for low-income residents, such as shopping centers, 
schools, and other community amenities.  Stein’s previous planning experience made 
him especially capable of advising on the policies that influenced the type of design 
that was feasible in the space itself.36  
 Stein wrote that the research phase of the project was abruptly curtailed as a 
result of political pressure to respond to the “Hoovervilles” established along the 
National Mall by the ‘Bonus Army.”37  The documents reviewed for this paper neither 
directly support nor refute such a claim, but the pressure to act was unquestionably 
influential in Resettlement Administration decisions in the last months of the 1935.  
                                                
35 Letter from Clarence Radley (Executive Director of the International City 
Managers’ Association) to Warren Jay Vinton (Chief of Research, Division of 
Suburban Resettlement, RA), 10 October 1935. Clarence S. Stein Papers. Collection 
3600, Box 7, Folder 11. Cornell University.  Although a contemporary term and not 
found in specifically in the papers of either Tugwell or Stein, “best practices” is a 
succinct term for describing their goals.  
 
36 Several letters between Stein and the Resettlement Administration in the fall 
indicate this trend, including: “Letter from Stein to Warren Jay Vinton, Resettlement 
Administration,” 30 September 1935. Clarence S. Stein Papers. Collection 3600, Box 
7, Folder 11. Cornell University; and, “Letter from William H. Ludlow (Research 
Section, Division of Suburban Resettlement, RA) to Stein,” 12 October 1935. 
Clarence S. Stein Papers. Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 11. Cornell University.  
 
37 Stein, 121.  
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Additionally, the WPA’s failure to meet its employment goals in late 1935 because 
weather conditions adversely affected its construction efforts.38  The flow of public 
dialogue of the period suggests that the impetus to rush the Greenbelt project was a 
reflection of work relief considerations more than anything else. 
Greenbelt, Maryland - General Plan 
Although Tugwell gave a personal tour of the Greenbelt project to President 
Roosevelt in November 1936,39 just days before submitting his resignation, the new 
community was not officially completed until 1938.  However, he visited the site 
numerous times, and the final project was ultimately a physical manifestation of 
Tugwell’s main priorities, with one important exception.  (See Illustration 4.2)  
Although he initially desired to incorporate a small amount of agricultural production 
into the Greenbelt design, this element was ultimately eliminated from the final 
design, and no rationale was ever provided in Tugwell’s papers.40 Greenbelt was 
designed in a modified crescent pattern with a highly “organic quality” around the 
natural features of the landscape (See Illustration 4.3).  The interior land provided sites 




                                                
38 “Tugwell Has Staff of 12,089 to Create 5,012 Relief Jobs,” New York Times 17 
November 1935, sec. A.  
 
39 “President Views Resettlement Administration Model Town,” New York Times 14 
November 1936, sec. A. 
 
40 H. N. “Factual Summary on Greenbelt Towns,” 20 May 1948. Clarence S. Stein 
Papers, Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 14, Cornell University. The full name for H.N. 
is not listed in the papers. S/he was likely one of Stein’s employees. Unlike Greenbelt, 
Greendale, Ohio and Greenhills, Wisconsin both had agricultural space incorporated 
into their community design.  
 





Illustration 4.2. Rexford Tugwell and his aides touring Greenbelt, MD, July 1936. 








  117 
 
Illustration 4.3. Plan of Greenbelt, MD. The lower crescent was part of the 
design conceived under the Resettlement Administration, and the upper crescent was 
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buildings.  The five superblocks south of Northway were completed by the 
Resettlement Administration and its post-1936 successor, the Farm Security 
Administration.41  The five southern superblocks included 885 total units and 3,444 
rooms for residential, commercial, and community purposes, on a total of 3,200 acres.  
Within the buildings themselves, there were 1,885 dwelling units, including 306 
apartments, 574 duplexes and row houses, five freestanding houses, and 5 
‘farmhouses’ without any designated farmland.42   
Greenbelt, Maryland - Propaganda, Objections and Missed Opportunities 
Although Tugwell was under nearly constant criticism throughout the spring of 
1936, after the initial public outcry over the Greenbelt project, the program largely 
slipped out of sight in the press until the US Court of Appeals decision in the New 
Jersey housing case.  This created the opportunity for other municipalities to challenge 
the constitutional rights of the Resettlement Administration to create the Greenbelt 
Towns.43  Simultaneously, progress slowly continued in Maryland under the direction 
of the Construction Division, educational materials were prepared to advertise the 
general objectives of the Resettlement Administration and the purpose of the 
Greenbelt Towns.  A pamphlet entitled, “The Work of Resettlement,” announced that 
the towns would have all the amenities necessary for vibrant community life, 
including municipal services, small businesses, and playgrounds, all circled by a 
“greenbelt” to provide a rural atmosphere.    
                                                
41 Stein, 119, 127-129.  
 
42 “Factual Summary on Greenbelt Towns.” Although listed as “farmhouses,” these 
buildings were not associated with any agricultural pursuits, and simply functioned as 
five additional dwellings.  
 
43 “Berwyn Heights Favors Resettlement Administration Project,” Washington Post 19 
May 1936, sec. X.  
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Located near industrial centers, these towns will provide good housing and a 
healthy environment, at a minimum cost, to families who now can afford only 
sub-standard homes and will make available convenient markets for the 
farmers living outside the town proper. By encircling these towns with areas of 
farm and wood land, the best values of both city and country living will be 
combined.44 
Despite the assertions of “minimum cost,” the main criticism of the Suburban Division 
was its consumption of money.  Not content with providing simply adequate 
accommodations for lower-income workers, Tugwell wanted to demonstrate what 
America was capable of achieving through comprehensive planning.  The new 
community abounded with recreational opportunities: meadows and wooded areas, a 
lake stocked with fish, playgrounds and sports fields. Underpasses were constructed to 
increase public safety, designated parking areas were designed to be functional and 
aesthetically pleasing, while Stein later compared the pedestrian paths that meandered 
throughout the superblocks to a “human nerve system.”  Shopping centers, educational 
facilities, and municipal buildings would be constructed to serve the needs of the new 
resident families.45  All of these amenities, however, came at a steep price: between 
$9,000 and $10,000 per residential unit.46 
 A memo buried in the Stein papers written by Carl H. Chatters, presumably a 
bureaucrat, concisely reveals the nature of the hostility towards Tugwell’s project.47  
In it, Chatters proclaims,  
                                                
44 Resettlement Administration, “The Work of Resettlement,” (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1936), FDR Library, Henry Morgenthau Papers, 
Correspondence: 1933-45, Resettlement Administration Rh-RN (1937), Box 238, 
Folder Resettlement Administration 35-37.  
 
45 Stein, 140-148. 
 
46 Tugwell, “The Meaning of the Greenbelt Towns,” 42.  
 
47 Research here-to-date has not revealed Chatter’s position, or that of his 
correspondent.  However, the authenticity of the memo is not in question, and 
regardless of his position, the sentiments expressed as well worth considering in this 
project.  
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It seems to me ridiculous to plan such facilities for places under jurisdiction of 
the Resettlement Administration. The type and scope of services discussed in 
this memorandum are far more ambitious than the services now received by 
cities generally. I doubt if 1% of our population enjoys the facilities in the 
aggregate comparable to those comprehended here. My opinion 
! If we are planning Utopia, this is fine. 
! If we are planning something practical for the type of persons 
concerned, it is fantastic.48 
As related in Chapter 3, Congress failed to designate funds to the Resettlement 
Administration in the 1937 fiscal budget, suggesting that it, too, shared Chatters’ 
concern over the role of the agency in the housing process, its goals, and its 
consumption of resources.  Although, ultimately, a great deal of money was spent on 
the construction of Greenbelt and it was publicly perceived as affecting an 
exceptionally small portion of the region’s inhabitants, Tugwell failed to emphasize 
how the project benefited Washington, DC. As previously discussed, providing 
employment opportunities was not Tugwell’s main concern.  He seems to have failed 
to understand, however, that this was the primary focus of the Congress, the President, 
and the public at large throughout 1936.  For instance, in each of the last few months 
of the 1936 campaign, FDR ratcheted up the number of work relief positions.  Landon 
himself believed his own campaign to be dead in the water as of June, in large 
measure due to the President’s strategy.49   
Since providing work relief jobs was not his personal mission, Tugwell missed 
an opportunity to advertise the Resettlement Administration’s contributions through 
the Greenbelt project. In October 1935, when construction began, roughly 1,500 
transient men were housed at public expense in six sites around Washington, DC.  
Conditions were deplorable, and the Suburban Division offered to help alleviate the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
48 “Memorandum” from CHC (Carl H. Chatters) to Ascher, 8 November 1935, 
Clarence S. Stein Papers, Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 14, Cornell University.  
 
49 Leuctenburg, 2838.  
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situation by taking responsibility for them.  Approximately 900 of the men were 
employed in the construction of Greenbelt for 136 hours per month, instead of the 
typical 88 hours per month of other WPA projects, as well as housed and fed at 
considerable expense to the Resettlement Administration.  These workers proved to be 
highly efficient, however, and the production rates of these former transients likely 
contributed to the Resettlement Administration’s rejection of a CCC proposal to take 
over the construction activities.50  
From October 1935 through February 1936, the workers were kept busy doing 
a variety of activities until the blue prints were completed.  Between March 1936 and 
November 1938, no fewer than 3,000 men were employed at any one time, and 
sometimes personnel figures reached over 8,000.  In fact, the construction of 
Greenbelt was one of the largest single New Deal projects, with over 13,000 
individuals hired over the course three years.51   
Unfortunately for Tugwell, he resigned before the full economic and social 
benefits of the project for the DC metro region could be fully realized.  He failed to 
personalize the project, to tell the story of the unemployed transient who escaped the 
bone-crushing depression of poverty through work opportunities at Greenbelt.  
Instead, he conversed in lofty tones more befitting an academic than a public 
administrator.   
Chopawamsic Recreation Demonstration Project - Setting 
Situated approximately 35 miles southwest of Washington, DC,52 the Prince 
William National Forest is a natural oasis nestled among the detritus of suburban 
                                                
50 Arnold, 111. 
 
51 Ibid, 112. 
 
52 “Recreational Demonstration Projects as Illustrated by Chopawamsic,” VA, 4.  
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sprawl, poorly planned commercial areas dominated by strip malls, and the Quantico 
Marine Corps Base.  (See Illustration 4.4 and Illustration 4.5) The forest’s 
approximately 15,000 acres are bounded by the Quantico Creek, a tributary of the 
Potomac River, and bisected by the North and South Forks of Quantico Creek, as well 
as the Chopawamsic Creek. Although a relatively small parcel of land, elevation 
changes range between about 50ft and 400ft, and rugged terrain is mixed with 
floodplains.53  The forest is the direct federal descendant of the Chopawamsic 
Recreational Demonstration Project, designated by Congress as the Prince William 
National Forest in 1946.  
 When National Park Service representatives first encountered the area between 
Dumfries and Joplin, VA that now comprises the Prince William National Forest, they 
discovered a region rich with natural resources.  A 1936 project report cited excellent 
specimens of white oak, red oak, black oak, chestnut oak, beech, walnut, sycamore, 
tulip, ironwood, birch, maple, white and black ash, pine, cedar, hemlocks, and 
dogwood, among others.  “Forest cover throughout the area is nearly ideal” for the 
needs of the project, the report indicated, despite the fact that logging activities 
produced clear-cut spaces in some sectors.  Noteworthy fauna in the mid-1930s 
included a respectable low levels of fish in the mid-1930s was due to high levels of 
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Illustration 4.4. Prince William Forest National Park boundaries. From “We Know 
that Such a Place Exists,” pg. 5. 
 












































Figure 4.5. Prince William Forest National Park in relationship to the surrounding 
counties in Virginia.  From “We Know that Such a Place Exists,” pg. 4.  
  125 
Chopawamsic Recreation Demonstration Project - Scope of the Project 
 By the 1920s and 1930s, Americans firmly believed that healthful benefits 
could be derived from interaction with the natural world.  Advertisements for vacation 
retreats in places such as the Adirondacks were commonly found in popular 
publications like Life Magazine. Some philanthropists strove to insure that these 
opportunities were not limited to the middle and upper classes, and established camps 
for less fortunate children.55  (See Illustration 4.6)  Such opinions and activities were 
not exclusive to the United States.  The idea for establishing the Recreational 
Demonstration Project program was the brainchild of Matthew Huppuch of the 
National Park Service (NPS), who witnessed the positive benefits Swiss children 
derived from nature camps experiences. 
The Chopawamsic Recreational Demonstration Area was initially established by 
FERA’s Land Program, one of 46 programs that were created between 1933 and 1942.  
Initially, the park was going to be contained within 8,081 acres that straddled Prince 
William and Stafford Counties, for an estimated cost of $86,000.56  Officials perceived 
the area to be ideally suited to serve the need for inner-city youth camping and outdoor 
recreation programs, such as the Twelfth Street YMCA and the Boys’ Clubs of 
Washington.  Sites for these programs were to be within 35 miles of a major 
metropolitan area, cost no more than ten dollars an acre, and contain natural features 
suitable for adaptation to camp facilities.57 
                                                
55 “Fresh Air Fund,” Life Magazine 99, no. 2568 (July 1932): 32.  The Fresh Air Fund, 
established as a philanthropic venture by Life Magazine was an excellent example of 
this phenomenon.  The project, which sent poor, urban youth to nature camps, ran for 
several decades. 
  
56 “Recreational Project to Total 8,081 Acres,” Washington Post 2 March 1935, sec. 
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57 National Park Service. “Chapter One: The Construction of Prince William Forest 
Park,” Prince William Forest Park; Administrative History 





Illustration 4.6. Fresh Air Fund Advertisement. From Life Magazine 99, no. 
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Roosevelt administration officials justified the establishment of the 
Chopawamsic on the basis that the capital city lacked “an adequate place where low-
income families might go to rest and play…[there are] no provisions for the simple 
pleasures and improved health of those who need them most and can afford them 
least.” Although Washington, DC was notable for its many parks and open green 
spaces, the implication was that lower-income families were not welcome in such 
venues.  Therefore, it became the responsibility of the federal government, as the 
‘landlord’ of the city, to provide such facilities.58 
As the land negotiation records show, the acquisition of land by the federal 
government in the vicinity of Joplin, Dumfries, Batestown, and Hickory Ridge was a 
gradual process that predated the creation of the Resettlement Administration, and 
continued on after it was absorbed into the Department of Agriculture. Land 
acquisition commenced in early 1935, and was transferred to the RA’s Submarginal 
Land Division the following May.  While there is little indication that Tugwell took an 
active role in the activities on the site, it was one of the more successful programs that 
the Resettlement Administration administered, and one that was accomplished with 
limited resources.  It is unclear why Tugwell failed to cite the cooperation established 
between the Resettlement Administration, NPS, and Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC) as an important accomplishment of his agency when petitioning Congress for 
additional resources.59  Additionally, since it was initially believed that the programs 
would be turned over to state management, Chopawamsic was established in 
                                                
58 Recreational Demonstration Projects as Illustrated by Chopawamsic, VA., 4.  
 
59 The retirement of submarginal land appeared to be pushed to the background of the 
Resettlement Administration activities, and the positive results it achieved received 
scant attention during negotiations for the 1937 fiscal year budget.  Instead, it became 
a target for the opposition of financial and administrative mismanagement.  
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cooperation with Virginia authorities.60  Tugwell’s focus appeared to be on the 
acquisition and retirement of exhausted land instead of on its adaptive reuse, and the 
absence of public dialogue about the situation suggests that he again missed an 
opportunity to claim the achievements of the Recreational Demonstration Project as a 
direct result of Resettlement Administration initiatives.  Nevertheless, the Recreational 
Demonstration Projects were in keeping with his philosophy that the federal 
government should function as a role model for state and local governments.  As the 
name implies, it was meant to “demonstrate” how the land could be effectively used to 
achieve the highest social benefits.  
 CCC Camp Sp-25 was a vital force in the creation of the camp facilities at 
Chopawamsic beginning in 1934.61  By the time the joint report on the nature of 
Recreational Demonstration Project activities was issued in 1936, three separate 
camps were completed, designated for girls, boys, and mothers with small children.  
The facilities were constructed from wood available on-site or in the vicinity, and 
stone quarried from the nearby pyrite mines was used in roadbeds.62  After the 
Resettlement Administration was absorbed into the Department of Agriculture, on-
going development of the camp facilities continued to be overseen by the NPS and 
constructed by CCC employees.  In total, five group cabin camps were finished, which 
                                                
60 National Park Service. “Chapter One: The Construction of  Prince William Forest 
Park,” Prince William Forest Park; Administrative History < 
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included facilities for sleeping, eating, recreation, and administrative and medical 
support.  Swimming spaces were built near each of the camps, and included the 
construction of dams on both the North and South Forks of Quantico Creek. The CCC 
was also responsible for building manager’s quarters, as well as miles of trails, roads, 
and bridges.63 
 The Chopawamsic initiative was a public-private collaboration.  Although the 
aforementioned land and facilities were paid for and constructed by the federal 
government, the responsibility for providing recreational activities for inner-city 
residents was relegated to the private sector.  In early 1936, the first groups, such as 
the Boys Club of Washington, DC, applied to lease the facilities for the following 
summer.64  In June, the Jewish Community Center inaugurated their first year of 
operation at Chopawamsic,65 and in August, the Family Service Association applied 
for a 1937 lease for facilities for Camp Good Will, geared towards lower-income 
mothers and children.66  Visitors to these camps might have encountered the remains 
of the Cabin Branch Pyrite Mine, small graveyards with hand-carved stones, or 
exposed foundations of demolished homes, providing them with some indication that 
the area had been previously occupied.  It would not be until the end of the 20th-
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century, however, that the history of the land and its residents prior to the 
establishment of Chopawamsic would be fully exposed or appreciated.  
Chopawamsic Recreation Demonstration Project - History 
 Prior to the submission of the joint Interior/RA/NPS/CCC report, the 
preparation of the history of the site was assigned to Dr. Charles W. Porter, Assistant 
Regional Historian of the Third Region.  His draft was submitted on December 28, 
1935.67  H.E. Weatherwax, Regional Officer for the Region, wrote a letter 
accompanying its submission to the head of the Recreational Demonstration Projects.  
“You will note that several gentleman of quite a great deal of prominence have owned 
land on this area, and we believe that Dr. Porter has given us a very good historical 
sketch concerning former owners of this particular land.”68  Although Dr. Porter was 
indeed able to track the ownership lineage of the land, his research ceased in the days 
prior to the American Revolutionary War.  He failed to include a single owner or fact 
about the land after the late 1700s, making only passing remarks about Native 
American settlement in the region prior to European incursion.69 
 The report produced on behalf of the Department of the Interior, the National 
Parks Service, the Resettlement Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps 
incorporated the historical documentation provided by Dr. Porter, with minimal 
indication of human habitation and activities on the land between 1789 and 1936.  
While neighboring communities such as Occoquan, Quantico, and Cochlester were 
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important in the years before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, agricultural 
production appeared to decline severely in the same period, although no explanation is 
provided for this phenomenon.  “Stone piles and head-stones in many small burial 
plots attest to population and use of the land for the period running from Colonial to 
Confederate War days.”  The only activities attributed to the post-‘Confederate War’ 
days were “sporadic recurring attempts of individuals” to engage in farming, and 
mining attempts that were abandoned in 1919.70 
 In 1999, the Louis Berger Group was commissioned to conduct a four-year 
archeological study on the Prince William National Forest, and their detailed findings 
dramatically contradict the narrowly focused history produced by Dr. Porter, which 
emphasized only the contributions of European settlers.  In contrast, the report 
produced by the Louis Berger Group, “We Know That Such a Place Exists:” Land 
and People in the Prince William Forest Park, reflects the fact that the region was 
alive with activity throughout the post-Civil War period, and home to both African 
Americans and Caucasian Americans. (See Illustration 4.7) 
 Farmland was gradually abandoned in the Dumfries district in the decades both 
before and after the conclusion of the Civil War, although in the area that would 
become part of Chopawamsic, the family farms that were formed between 1770 and 
1830 continued to function.  Throughout the latter half of the 19th-century, however, 
the economic basis for the region diversified.  Men began primarily working at places 
like the Marine Corps Base, the docks along the Potomac River, and the Cabin Branch 
Pyrite Mine, supplementing their wages with family farms, gardens, and logging.  By 
the time the Resettlement Administration purchased the land, the valuable, old timber  
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Illustration 4.7. Archaeological sites in Prince William Forest National Park. From 
“We Know that Such a Place Exists,” pg. 85. 
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had been completely exhausted.  The aforementioned forest cover could be attributed 
to the loggers rejecting young trees.71 
The Cabin Branch Pyrite Mine attracted new residents to the region when it 
opened in 1889.  Initially a small-scale enterprise of the Detrick and Bradley families, 
operations grew and the Cabin Branch Mining Company was incorporated in 1907.  
The Cabin Branch pyrite deposit ranged over more than 20 acres, up to 18ft thick in 
certain places. In the late 19th-and early 20th-centuries, pyrite was used to produce 
sulfuric acid, an important ingredient in the chemical and electrical industries, and an 
issue of national concern to the military complex during World War I.  In 1916, the 
company was purchased by the American Agricultural Chemical Company, which 
expanded the operation considerably.  After World War I, demand for pyrite declined 
precipitously, and a labor dispute in 1920 resulted in the mine being closed 
permanently.72  Acid runoff from the mining activities polluted the North Folk, 
causing the previously noted absence of fish in the streams.  A massive reclamation 
effort was undertaken in the 1990s.  Yet more than a decade later, the evidence of the 
devastation caused by the mine is evident in the landscape. 73 
 Two predominantly African American communities were absorbed, Batestown 
partially and Hickory Ridge completely, into the Chopawamsic Recreational 
Demonstration Project.  Little archeological evidence remains of Batestown, because 
the CCC workers lived on the site and appeared to have destroyed the architectural 
remnants of the community.  Historical research, however, tells us something about 
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the towns’ past.  Despite living in an era when slavery was a common practice, a black 
man named Henry Cole purchased 78 acres along Cabin Branch in 1842 and 
additional 77 more by 1855, becoming the second-largest African American 
landowner in Prince William Country.  Another black landowner, Thomas McKee, 
owned more than 100 acres in the vicinity of Cole’s property.  Some of the lands 
purchased by Cole came from another African American named Thornton Kendall, 
whose wife, Sarah Bates nee McKee, is credited in oral histories as one of the 
founders of Batestown.74  The familial connections between the major landowners 
showed the regional tradition of early landholdings being kept within African 
American families during the 19th-century.75   
In the early 1930s, Hickory Ridge was a small community situated on a parcel 
of land that would eventually be incorporated into the Chopawamsic Project.  
Archaeological and historical information suggest that there were approximately 16 
houses on the site, as well as a school and an Oddfellows Hall.  Although ownership 
of the land can be traced back to the 1700s, Hickory Ridge developed from 100 acres 
purchased by Zeal Williams from Edith Norville in 1869.  Williams, an African 
American, was listed in the 1860 agricultural census as a farm laborer.  One of his 
sons purchased an additional 25 acres in the 1870s, and these parcels of land formed 
the basis for a growing African American community.  The land was predominantly 
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divided and subdivided among the same families, and the holders of deeds to the land 
in the mid-1930s were likely the descendents of the original owners.76 
Chopawamsic Recreation Demonstration Project - RA Justifications for the 
‘Taking’ and Objections 
 In the 1936 report on the Recreational Demonstration Projects, the 
Chopawamsic initiative was chosen to “illustrate” the scope and nature of their work 
throughout the country.  The Resettlement Administration used three main 
justifications to support their right to acquire the Chopawamsic land previously held in 
private hands.  First, the quality of the soil was deemed too poor to for long-term 
agricultural pursuits.  It was easily exhausted through sustained farming because its 
material composition allowed plant nutrients to leach downwards.  The report also 
noted that the chemical conditions were unfavorable, with low levels of phosphoric 
acid, an important plant nutrient.  In a 1918 textbook, Liberty Hyde Bailey stated that 
“a liberal supply [of phosphoric acid]…is necessary to young plants to give them 
strength and vigor.”77  The report indicated that the area had been briefly successful at 
growing tobacco in the mid-18th century, but that the soil quickly proved unsuitable 
for long-term usage.  Additionally, inappropriate farming methods further exacerbated 
the land by contributing to erosion issues.78   
 Second, the joint report discussed widespread poverty among the region’s 
inhabitants. “About 150 families live in the project area.  The heads of about forty of 
them had steady employment or regular income; seventy had part-time employment 
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and forty had irregular, inconsequential or no employment or cash income during the 
last few years.”79  A noted priority of the Resettlement Administration was to reduce 
the number of rural people dependent on the government for relief, or shifting the 
burden on their poverty to their community.  In 1935, Tugwell wrote, “Resettlement 
attacks what might be called the chronic rural-relief problem.  The present situation, in 
which families are trying to live on land that will not support them, is costing the 
taxpayers money.”80  Although the report acknowledged that the inhabitants of the 
area affected by the project did not seek relief publicly, through work projects or the 
dole, a significant percentage owed back taxes.  Between 1929 and 1933, Cole and 
Dumfries Magisterial Districts, the ones most affected by the Chopawamsic Project, 
averaged delinquencies of 22%.81  
 The final justification used for the federal appropriation of land for the 
Recreational Demonstration Project program generally and Chopawamsic specifically, 
was the idea that the “land [was] not being put to its highest social use.”82  Simply, the 
land around Dumfries, Hickory Ridge, Batestown, and Joplin was deemed unsuitable 
for farming by the government, therefore negating the rights of the individuals to 
retain possession of their land.  Instead, the government asserted that it was in the 
public’s best interest for the land to be adapted, under federal management, for another 
social purpose. The report emphasizes tangible human issues, weighing the rights of 
poor DC urbanites to outdoor recreational facilities against the needs of poor farmers 
to use of their land.  It charges that enabling the former will benefit society by 
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exposing the city dwellers to the healthy benefits of the environment, while 
simultaneously relieving Prince William County from a perpetual cycle of tax 
delinquency.83 
 An analysis of the Chopawamsic project provides an excellent opportunity to 
challenge the Resettlement Administration’s blanket justifications regarding their right 
to remove land from private ownership and placing it under federal control.  Quite 
simply, their arguments for acquiring the land to form Chopawamsic were full of 
discrepancies and inaccuracies.  First, the agency asserted that the land was unsuitable 
for sustaining agriculture, and, therefore, farming should be abolished and the land 
adapted for recreational use.  The Berger archeological report supported the fact that 
the land had been historically inappropriate for wide-scale farming, but that was never 
its predominant use.  Instead, small-scale agriculture, such as kitchen gardens and a 
few livestock, was maintained as a way for families to supplement their incomes and 
meet their nutritional needs.  The land, in fact, was suitable for such tasks.  The 
archeological report further concluded that the only areas of severe erosion were in 
sloped areas, and probably dated prior to the Civil War.84  Essentially, by the early 
20th-century, farmers in the region had developed a symbiotic relationship with the 
land, and were not guilty of overtaxing it as the Resettlement Administration 
suggested. 
 Second, the Resettlement Administration report emphasized that the 
inhabitants of the region were placing an undue financial burden on their fellow 
citizens by failing to pay their taxes.  This, in fact, might have very well been the case.  
However, the Resettlement Administration report did not specify that it is the owners 
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of the land within Chopawamsic who are responsible for the 22% delinquency, simply 
that 22% of all tax payers in the Cole and Dumfries Magisterial Districts were behind 
in their payments.  Therefore, without wading through the tax records of 
approximately 150 families, it is impossible to determine whether or not the 
government’s claim that the landowners were the ones in default was accurate.  The 
fact that they did not seek public relief is not in question, but suggests that the small 
communities found alternative ways, non-cash ways to make ends meet.85 
Third, the right of the federal government to appropriate and repurpose the 
land under the Recreational Demonstration Project program was rooted in the 
assertion that the land was a national resource, under the purview of the government, 
and that it should be used in a manner beneficial to society.  This begs the question, 
however, of determining who constitutes the “society.”  In the process of creating 
Chopawamsic, a lower-income rural population was displaced to provide recreational 
facilities for a lower-income urban population.86  Although the report stipulates that 
land was taken from individuals who “found” it to be unfavorable for farming—
placing agency with the owner—the history of ownership and use of the site tells a far 
different story.  In short, the rights of urban residents to have access to recreational 
facilities was given priority over the historical connections of the owners to their 
parcels of land, and, in the process, the history of the recent past or of the African 
American communities in the area was completely ignored. 
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Racial Consideration at Greenbelt, MD and Chopawamsic 
 An examination of Greenbelt, MD and Chopawamsic Recreational 
Demonstration project is incomplete without a brief discussion of the implications of 
racial segregation between Caucasian Americans and African Americans.  In 
Resettlement Administration literature and internal documentation, the question of 
race is conspicuous in its absence.  Even Tugwell, a man of bold dreams and broad 
visions, shied away from the issue in his writings.  Such evasive tactics, however, did 
not mean that the agency could entirely avoid racial issues.   
 By the time tenancy became an issue at Greenbelt, Tugwell was far removed 
from public office.  Yet the high application rates for the Greenbelt homes reflected 
the depth of the housing crisis in Washington, DC, and partially confirmed his 
justification for choosing a site on the periphery of the nation’s capital.  More than 
5,700 families applied for 885 homes,87 and the first five superblocks were soon filled 
with 2,831 new residents88 with an average income of $1,250 per year.89 Although the 
residents embraced a diverse mix of political views and Judeo-Christian religious 
traditions, on the whole they were a fairly homogeneous group.90  At least 70% of the 
original residents were government employees with families, the majority of the 
parents were under thirty, 91 and a mere fourteen were African American.92  While 
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African Americans accounted for approximately 27% of the Washington, DC 
population in 1930,93 they comprised less than half of 1% of the Greenbelt residents.  
 Although Tugwell cannot be held directly responsible for the exact racial 
composition of Greenbelt, the actions of the agency during his tenure significantly 
contributed to the situation.  In the summer of 1935, the Suburban Division appeared 
to briefly consider the possibility of creating a separate community for African 
Americans in the same general location as Greenbelt, but ultimately the project was 
tabled in a nascent stage. 94  A second proposal for a housing development at Newport 
News received Tugwell’s attention in December 1935, but it appeared to never be 
pursued actively.95  While racial segregation was rather common in government 
housing programs of the era, there was no rule mandating it, and some exceptions 
could be found.  Instead, the agency left the decision to the discretion of local and 
regional politicians, who strongly favored excluding African Americans from the 
community.96  
Even before the first mothers and children arrived for outdoor adventures in 
the summer of 1936, the question of racial separation was a long-standing point of 
concern for Chopawamsic planners. In contrast to the Greenbelt project, Tugwell was 
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in office during the arrival of the first wave of campers, but he completely delegated 
the question of race to the NPS, which was responsible for the implementation 
process.  Because it was initially believed that the project would be eventually turned 
over to Virginia, state NPS officers were allowed to weigh into the discussion with 
their own opinions.  M.R. Tillson, the head of Region One office of the NPS, located 
in Richmond, VA, took a firm stance on the necessity of maintaining local segregation 
policies.  He wrote, the “long-standing attitudes and customs of the people, which 
require, as a fundamental, that recreational areas and facilities for the two races be 
kept entirely separated.”  Tillson went further, asserting that “Such a policy should not 
be considered discriminatory, since it represents the general desires of both races.”97   
Initially, the NPS refused to make the decision itself.  As previously discussed, 
separate camps were constructed in order to be leased to private agencies.  In doing so, 
the NPS transferred the responsibility for racial segregation to the agencies 
themselves.  For instance, the Family Service Association who traditionally operated 
Camp Good Will in Rock Creek Park, transferred its programs for “white mothers and 
children” to Chopawamsic.98  Finally, in 1939, a master plan was designed that clearly 
delineated separate camps and facilities for African American and Caucasian 
campers.99  
Conclusion 
 Construction activities and programmatic developments continued at Greenbelt 
and Chopawamsic long after Tugwell resigned from Roosevelt’s administration.  
Many of the immediate implications of the two projects were still invisible when the 
                                                
97 National Park Service, “Cabin Camp Segregation (1937).” 
 
98 “Chest Agencies Apply for Use of New Camp,” Washington Post  29 March 1936, 
sec. X. 
 
99 National Park Service, “Cabin Camp Segregation (1937).” 
  142 
Resettlement Administration was officially absorbed into the Department of 
Agriculture in January 1937.  However, the ideas connected Greenbelt and 
Chopawamsic to the ideas and goals of the Resettlement Administration clearly 
developed during Tugwell’s tenure, and reflected his beliefs.   
 Tugwell’s staunch and unrepentant stance that an appropriate role of 
government was demonstrating the best ways to live and function in the modern age is 
the foremost connection between Greenbelt and Chopawamsic.  He believed that 
would provide an opportunity for federal, state, and local officials and bureaucrats, as 
well as the general public, to learn about how to design provide affordable, healthy, 
enjoyable housing for the lower-class Americans.  For Chopawamsic, the educational 
component of the project was explicit in the name.  In a 1936 report describing the 
numerous projects initiated by the Resettlement Administration through cooperation 
with the NPS, Chopawamsic was the example.  In either case, the importance of the 
proximity of Washington, DC cannot be underestimated.  These were not projects 
simply imposed upon other locales, but efforts undertaken in the backyard of the 
nation’s capital.  Their accessibility to Tugwell and other Resettlement Administration 
officials no doubt influenced their progress and oversight.  Although two additional 
satellite cities were eventually completed, Greenbelt was the first priority.  
 The second and third areas of consideration are interrelated, namely the kind of 
person targeted by the Resettlement Administration to benefit from each project, and 
the type of lifestyle which was being advocated in the process.  Despite Tugwell’s 
repeated assertions that the Resettlement Administration was designed to assist rural, 
chronically poor citizens, the precedents established at both Greenbelt and 
Chopawamsic undermine this argument.  At Greenbelt, the average resident was 
white, employed by the federal government, poor without being destitute, spending 
25% or less of their total income on housing, physically healthy, relatively debt-free, 
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and a member of a small nuclear family.  Families with less means, who would have 
to spend more than 25% of their income on housing and, therefore, receive additional 
subsidization by the government, were unwelcome. New residents did not come off of 
the relief roles.100 Therefore, in fact, the most needy were excluded, and acceptance 
became a reward for wholesome living.  Again, Tugwell cannot be directly blamed for 
these admittance standards, but the design elements of the project sought to define the 
way people should live.  The idea of creating a wholesome society through carefully 
planned communities was intrinsic to the project, which can be directly tied to the 
Resettlement Administration under Tugwell’s leadership. 
 At Chopawamsic, the value judgments regarding acceptable standards of living 
was concentrated in the purchasing of land, and the type of history deemed worthy of 
acknowledgment.  Many of the owners of the tracts of land that were purchased to 
form the demonstration area appeared to be in a low economic sphere, but were still 
capable of resisting the need to go on public relief.  For the better part of a century, the 
land that became the park was independently owned by African Americans, but the 
only historical information that the Resettlement Administration was interested in 
concerned the period prior to the Revolutionary War.  Simply, the African Americans 
in and around Hickory Ridge and Batestown were forced to sell their property because 
they were declared to be inappropriately using it by the Resettlement Administration.  
Instead, the agency believed the land would produce far greater benefits to society at 
large if it was used as an educational ground to expose low-income urbanites to the 
healthful benefits of nature.  Although facilities were constructed for both Caucasians 
and African Americans, the emphasis was decidedly on servicing the former. 
 Ultimately, both projects were physical responses to the desire of the 
Resettlement Administration to provide new ways for Americans to live and function 
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within the modern world.  The Chopawamsic and Greenbelt undertakings reflected the 
tensions of the age between rural and urban considerations, and exposed the weakness 
and contradictions within the Resettlement Administration and its partner agencies, 
racial issues being one of them.  Despite the emphasis placed on the rural resident in 
the early writings by Tugwell on the Resettlement Administration, the resounding 
conclusion that the primary beneficiaries of both projects were urbanites, and that low-
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CONCLUSION 
 
With Rexford Tugwell’s resignation, the era of the influential liberal Brain 
Trust drew to a close, and January 1937 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the 
history of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency.  Tugwell’s largest initiative, the 
Resettlement Administration, was a brief federal experiment to respond to the 
economic and social challenges of the era, the most innovative of the sixty programs 
funded by the work relief bill.  Dissatisfied with the experience, Tugwell would later 
refer to the entire endeavor as a failure.  
In short, in just two years, the Resettlement Administration dramatically 
contributed to the development of federal housing programs, foreshadowed the future 
evolution of American housing conceptions, and contributed to the reorientation of 
citizenship from an agricultural basis to an urban/suburban, industrial one.  On a much 
smaller, but no less noteworthy, it altered the lives of hundreds of families from the 
Hickory Ridge and Batestown communities.  Only in recent years has the history of 
those families has been uncovered and appreciated.  
In contrast to the unplanned development and perceived poverty of Hickory 
Ridge and Batestown region, the planned Greenbelt Towns, designed to provide 
affordable, healthy, enjoyable housing, appealed to the Resettlement Administration as 
a viable alternative.  As a result of the absorption of the agency into the Farm Security 
Administration, only three were completed, although Tugwell had hoped to spread the 
initiative throughout the nation.  
Like Greenbelt, MD and Chopawamsic, many of the ideological goals of the 
Resettlement Administration remained unfinished at the conclusion of 1936, and 
constituency tensions were never resolved.  Although initially established to address 
America’s agricultural and rural life inadequacies, the primary beneficiaries of the 
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Greenbelt and Chopawamsic projects were urban residents.  The agency tried to pass 
responsibility for racial segregation of facilities to local officials, overtly prioritizing 
the standard of living of Caucasian Americans over that of African Americans.  
If historical memory is any judge of value, the largely forgotten Resettlement 
Administration deserves Tugwell’s dismal assessment.  Indeed, the agency failed on 
numerous scores: Greenbelt, MD was criticized for its expensive price tag, Congress 
refused to appropriate money for it, a federal court declared it unconstitutional, and its 
administrator was tried for socialist tendencies in the court of public opinion.  
Tugwell’s own failings as an administrator contributed to the situation.  Yet, the 
Resettlement Administration is worthy of examination because it was a manifestation 
of a dream that both Roosevelt and Tugwell shared: that the government was capable 
of significantly improving the lives and livelihoods of the American working class 
through the coordination of land practices.  The severity of the situation, the depth of 
the economic crisis demanded federal action, and the Resettlement Administration 
offered the most radical, creative approach.  Economic and social trends of the 19th 
and early 20th-century, as well as Tugwell’s own academic positions, provided the 
philosophical and programmatic foundation for the new agency.  
Tugwell’s assessment of the Resettlement Administration was a failure 
requires a brief reevaluation of the criteria for identifying it as such, and short 
discussion on the status of its two flagship programs at the beginning of the 21st-
century.  First, on the basis of administrative longevity, treatment of minority property 
owners, and political opinions of the era, the Resettlement Administration could not be 
considered a success.  It was a short-lived, land-absorbing bully, who acquired land 
around in the Chopawamsic area with little sensitivity to the history of its inhabitants 
and the impact the project would have on them.  Congress, the press, officials within 
the Roosevelt administration and even Columbia University were disinclined to view 
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Tugwell favorably at the end of 1936.  In short, it is understandable that Tugwell felt 
disenchanted by the experience, and he contributed to this firestorm of criticism.  He 
did not appreciate the political temperament of the day and the paramount importance 
work relief job creation, and failed to adequately promote his successes, such as the 
efficiency of his former Bonus Army work force and functional recreation projects 
such as Chopawamsic.  
On the basis of a different set of standards, however, the Resettlement 
Administration could easily be considered a successful venture.  First, Greenbelt 
became a vibrant and active community, although the industry that Tugwell hoped 
would engage its residents never fully emerged.  Nevertheless, the community easily 
transitioned from federal to private ownership, and provided lasting, affordable, 
practical housing, without succumbing to the unfortunate fate of numerous urban 
housing projects. Chopawamsic, lamentably, was created by destroying several 
African-American communities, but that did not prevent it from functioning 
successfully as a federal park.  It remains the closest federal environmental playground 
outside of Washington, DC, land that would have undoubtedly been swallowed up 
otherwise through suburban Virginia sprawl.  
Limitations and Future Work 
 Ideally, this examination of the Resettlement Administration would have 
included a longer discussion of all four of the working divisions, evaluating them 
based on their relationship to Tugwell’s philosophies and goals, and involved more of 
the personalities involved in the agency.  The depth and breadth of the agricultural 
crisis in America prior to the formation of the Resettlement Administration is its own 
thesis topic, and one cannot help but be frustrated by attempting to summarize it in a 
few short pages.   
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As is frequently the case in scholarly pursuits, there is a fine line between 
inundating the reader with too much background information and providing enough to 
establish a reasonable context for understanding the themes involved.  Future scholars 
should engage agricultural census materials to provided statistical information as to 
the scale of the Great Depression in rural life.  Additionally, the involvement of the 
development of the automobile and its influence in feasibility of suburbanization is not 
discussed in this thesis, but would be a critical element in a more in-depth analysis of 
the design of Greenbelt.  It was excluded from this project because Tugwell, as the 
lens through which the Resettlement Administration is examined, paid scant little 
attention to this particular technological phenomenon.   
Finally, subsequent academics should consider the relationships between 
federal and states governments during the New Deal era, and whether Tugwell’s 
emphasis on demonstrating new approaches to land-use planning influenced state 
projects.   To succeed in this endeavor, one would be best served by first examining 
the evolution of both the Greenbelt and Chopawamsic programs over time, starting 
with the World War II era, to understand modifications and changes to Tugwell’s 
original plans.  
In many ways, the Resettlement Administration was ahead of it time.  
Suburbanization, in fact, would become the wave of the future in American residential 
development.  Land that might otherwise have been consumed by urban and suburban 
sprawl became retreats and playgrounds for the public.  By studying the Resettlement 
Administration---the historical background of US land-use patterns, the obstacles it 
faced, and the vision of its founder---one’s understanding of complexities of the 
American political environment during Roosevelt’s first administration is greatly 
enhanced.  
 




Articles and Periodicals 
“8 in Senate Demand Fund for Tugwell.” New York Times 14 May 1936, sec. A.  
 
150 Youngsters are Examined Preparatory to Camp Opening.” Washington Post 8  
June 1936, sec. A.  
 
“228 Projects Voted For Resettlement.” New York Times 7 January 1936, sec. A. 
 
“Barbour Demands Inquiry on Tugwell.” New York Times 29 April 1936, sec. A. 
 
“Berwyn Heights Favors Resettlement Administration Project.” Washington Post 19  
May 1936, sec. X.  
 
“Board at Berwyn unanimous in accepting Tugwelltown.” Washington Star 17  
October 1935, sec. A. 
 
“Calls ‘Fire Traps’ Peril to Resettlement Administration Loans.” New York Times 30  
August 1936, sec. A.   
 
“Chest Agencies Apply for Use of New Camp.” Washington Post 29 March 1936, sec.  
X.  
 
“Confiscation Seen in Rural Aid Plan,” New York Times 11 December 1935.  
 
“Country Life the Subject of Roosevelt’s Special Message.” Wall Street Journal, 10  
February 1909, sec. A.  
 
“Defender Rearing of ‘Tugwell Town.’” New York Times 17 October 1935, sec. A.  
 
“’Dictatorship’ New Deal Aim, Knox Declared.”  New York Times 11 February 1936,  
sec. A. 
 
“Editorial Cartoon 1 – No Title.” Washington Post 13 October 1935, sec. B. 
 
“Farm Board Soon to Act.” Washington Post, 14 September 1908, sec A.   
 
“Farm Loan Laxity Again is Charged.” New York Times 31 August 1936, sec. A.  
 
  150 
“Fish Sees Tugwell ‘Worse than Reds.’” New York Times 7 March 1936, sec. A. 
 
Hutchison, Janet.  “The Cure for Domestic Neglect: Better Homes in America, 1922- 
1935.” Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture 2 (1986): 168-178. 
 
Hurd, Charles W.  “Roosevelt Signs Work Relief Bill; Begins Allocating.” New York  
Times, 9 April 1935, sec. A.  
 
“Jersey Housing Halted.” New York Times 19 May 1936, sec. A.  
 
“New Storm Rises Around Tugwell.” New York Times 14 November 1936, sec. A. 
 
“President Guides Rural Projects,” New York Times 21 June 1935, sec. A. 
 
“President Sets Up Federal Network to Spend Billions.” New York Times 25 April  
1935, sec. A.  
 
“President to Keep PWA.” New York Times 16 May 1936, sec. A.  
 
“President Views Resettlement Administration Model Town.” New York Times 14  
November 1936, sec. A.  
 
“Recreational Project to Total 8,081 Acres.” Washington Post 2 March 1935, sec. A. 
 
“Relief Bill Starts a Battle in the House.” New York Times 8 May 1936, sec. A. 
 
“Relief Set-Up Due with the President.” New York Times, 8 April 1935, sec. A. 
 
“Reorganization by Tugwell.” New York Times, 15 November 1935, sec. A.  
 
“Resettlement Facing Cut.” New York Times 24 May 1936, sec. E. 
 
“Roosevelt Total for Relief is Cut.” New York Times 7 May 1936, sec. A. 
 
“Says Tugwell Aids Lent $661 on One Cow.” New York Times 26 October 1936, sec.  
A. 
 
“Social Planners Advise Tugwell.” New York Times 1 July 1935, sec. A.  
 
“State Officials Join in Protesting Berwyn Project.” Washington Star 15 October  
1935, sec. A.  
 
“To Absorb Forces of Resettlement.” New York Times 22 December 1936, sec. A.  
“Tugwell A Center of Endless Strife.” New York Times 18 November 1936, sec. A. 
  151 
“Tugwell Decides Negro Housing.” Washington Post 25 December 1935, sec. A.  
 
“Tugwell Figures Asked by Senate.” New York Times 9 May 1936, sec. A.   
 
“Tugwell Force Cut 1,888 More.” New York Times 12 September 1936, sec. A.  
 
“Tugwell Has Staff of 12,089 to Create 5,012 Relief Jobs.” New York Times 17  
November 1935. 
 
“Tugwell is Seeking 500 Million to Help Tenants Buy Farms.” New York Times 14  
November 1936, sec. A.  
 
“Tugwell Resigns His Post; Acceptance Today Likely; Plans Return to Columbia.”  
New York Times 18 November 1936, sec. A. 
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Design for Government.” Political Science Quarterly 48, no. 3  
(Sept. 1933): 321-332.  
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “The Economic Basis for Business Regulation.” The American  
Economic Review 11, no. 4 (Dec. 1921): 643-658. 
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Economics as the Science of Experience.” The Journal of  
Philosophy 25, no. 2 (Jan. 1928): 37. 
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture.” Annals of the  
American Academy of Political and Social Science 142, (Mar. 1929): 271-2. 
 
Tugwell, Rexford Tugwell.  “The Meaning of the Greenbelt Towns.” The New  
Republic 90, no. 1159 (February 17, 1937): 43. (42-43).  
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Our Lands in Order.” (Aug. 1933), 1. FDR Presidential  
Library, Hyde Park, NY. Rexford G. Tugwell Papers, Box 55, Folder “Our  
Lands in Order.” 
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Our Philosophy of Despair.” The University Journal of  
Business 2, no. 4 (Sept. 1924): 430.  
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “The Problem of Agriculture.” Political Science Quarterly 39,  
no. 4 (Dec. 1924): 549-591.  
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Problems—And Goal—of Rural Relief.” New York Times 15  
December 1935, sec. SM.  
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Reflections on Farm Relief.” Political Science Quarterly 43,  
no. 4 (Dec. 1928): 493.  
  152 
Tugwell, Rexford G. “The Resettlement Idea.” Agricultural History 33, no. 4 (Oct.,  
1959): 159. 
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “The Theory of Occupational Obsolescence.” Political Science  
Quarterly 46, no. 2 (June 1931): 181.  
 
“Tugwell’s Folly.” Washington Post 13 October 1935, sec. B. 
 
“Tugwell Strikes Legal Obstacle in Housing Suit.” Washington Post 11 January 1936,  
sec. A.  
 
“Tugwell Substitute in Doubt.” New York Times 1 May 1936, sec. A.  
 
“Tugwell to Drop 8,000 from Staff.” New York Times 31 July 1935, sec. A. 
 
“Tugwell to Help 425,000 Families.” New York Times 28 September 1935, sec. A.  
 
“Tugwelltown in Berwyn.” Washington Star 12 October 1935, sec. A.  
 
“Tugwell Upped.” Time Magazine, 25 June 1934. 
 
“Virginia Parks Fast Improve, Director Says.” Washington Post, 17 April 1935, sec.  
 A.  
 
“Welfare Unit Asks to Use New Park.” Washington Post 20 August 1936, sec. X. 
 




Bailey, Liberty Hyde.  The Country-Life Movement in the United States.  New York:  
The Macmillan Company, 1911.  
 
Bailey, Liberty Hyde.  The Principles of Agriculture: A Text-Book for Schools and  
Rural Societies.  New York: The MacMillan Company, 1918.  
 
Fish, Hamilton.  FDR: The Other Side of the Coin.  New York: Vantage Press, 1976. 
 
Gillette, John M.  Constructive Rural Sociology, 3rd ed.  New York: The MacMillan  
Company, 1921.  
 
Howard, Ebenezer. Garden Cities for To-Morrow.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,  
1965. 
 
Kelso, Robert W.  Poverty.  New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929. 
  153 
 
Nearing, Scott.  Poverty and Riches: A Study of the Industrial Regime.  Philadelphia:  
The John C. Winston Company, 1916. 
 
Purdom, C.B.  The Garden City: A Study in the Development of a Modern Town  
(London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd, 1913.  
 
Stein, Clarence S., Towards New Towns for America. Cambridge, MA: The MIT  
Press, 1978.  
 
 
Papers and Speeches 
Ezekiel, Mordecai.  “Memorandum for the Secretary,” 4 May 1935. FDR Presidential  
Library, Hyde Park, NY. Rexford G. Tugwell Papers. Box “Tugwell Papers,  
D-E,” Container 7, Folder “Ezekiel, Mordecai, 1933-1939.”  
 
“Factual Summary on Greenbelt Towns,” 20 May 1948. Clarence S. Stein Papers,  
Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 14, Cornell University.  
 
“Fresh Air Fund.” Life Magazine 99, no. 2568 (July 1932): 32.  
 
“Letter from Clarence Radley to Warren Jay Vinton.” 10 October 1935. Cornell  
University. Clarence S. Stein Papers. Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 11. 
 
“Letter from Stein to Warren Jay Vinton, Resettlement Administration,” 30 September  
1935. Cornell University. Clarence S. Stein Papers. Collection 3600, Box 7,  
Folder 11. 
 
“Letter from William H. Ludlow to Stein,” 12 October 1935. Cornell University.   
Clarence S. Stein Papers. Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 11. 
 
“Memorandum” from CHC (Carl H. Chatters) to Ascher.”  8 November 1935,  
Clarence S. Stein Papers, Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 14, Cornell 
University. 
 
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 2, Samuel I. Rosenman,  
ed.  New York: Random House, 1938.  
 
Roosevelt, Franklin D.  “Letter to Rexford G. Tugwell, 17 November 1936.”  FDR  
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. Rexford G. Tugwell Papers, Container 
23, Box Tugwell Papers, Ro-Sa, Folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1934-1946.    
 
Stein, Clarence “Appraisal of Plans.” 19 November 1935. Cornell University.  
Clarence S. Stein Papers, Collection 3600, Box 7, Folder 10.   
 
  154 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “Address of Rexford G. Tugwell, Under Secretary of  
Agriculture, Over the Columbia Broadcasting System, 10 PM, EST, July 31,  
1934.” FDR Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. Rexford G. Tugwell Papers,  
Box 50.  
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  The Diary of Rexford G. Tugwell: The New Deal, 1932-1935.   
Michael Vincent Namorato, ed.  New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. 
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  “The Reason for Resettlement.” Address on the National Radio  
Forum, and broadcast over the network of the National Broadcasting 
Company, December 1935.  FDR Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
Rexford G. Tugwell Papers, Box 57, Folder “The Reason For Resettlement,” 
NBC.   
 
Weatherfax, H.E. “Letter to M.C. Huppuch accompanying the ‘Preliminary Historical  




“A History of Recreational Demonstration Projects and Development of Policies,”  
WPA Files, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.  
 
National Park Service, “Cabin Camp Segregation (1937).” 
 
Porter, Charles W.  “Preliminary Historical Report on Chopawamsic, SP-22,  
Virginia.” 28 December 1935.  
 
Report of the Commission on Country Life. Senate Document No. 705, 60th Congress,  
2d Session.  New York: Sturgis and Walton, Co., 1911. 
 
Resettlement Administration.  “The Work of Resettlement.”  Washington, DC: US  
Government Printing Office, 1936.  FDR Presidential Library, Henry 
Morgenthau Papers, Correspondence: 1933-45, Resettlement Administration 
Rh-RN (1937), Box 238, Folder Resettlement Administration 35-37.  
 
U.S. Census Bureau. “Table 23. District of Columbia – Race and Hispanic Origin:  
1800 to 1990,” Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race,  
1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For the United States, 
Regions, Divisions, and States Working Paper Series No. 56, compiled by 
Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, September 2002. 
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/twps00 
56.html> (accessed 24 January 2009).  
 
 
  155 
U.S. Department of Commerce.  Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933 no. 55.   
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933.  
 
 
Secondary Sources  
 
Articles and Periodicals 
 
Danborn, David B.  “Romantic Agrarianism in Twentieth-Century America,”  
Agricultural History 65, no. 4 (Autumn, 1991): 1. 
 
Kilde, Jeanne Halgren.  When Church Became Theatre: The Transformation of  
Evangelical Architecture and Worship in Nineteenth-Century America.  New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.   
 
McGuire, Robert A.  “Economic Causes of Late-Nineteenth Century Agrarian Unrest:  
New Evidence.” The Journal of Economic History 41, no 4 (December 1981):  
837.  
 
Medford, Edna Greene.  “Land and Labor: The Quest for Black Economic  
Independence on Virginia’s Lower Peninsula, 1865-1880.” The Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 100, no. 4 (2002): 567-582. 
 
Righter, Robert W.  “National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the  
Antiquities Act of 1906.” The Western Historical Quarterly 20, no. 3 (August  
1989): 281-282. 
 
Rockman, Bert A.  “Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislation Oversight.”  
Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no 3 (Aug., 1984): 377-440. 
 
Slichter, Gertrude Almy.  “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Farm Policy as Governor of New  





Arnold, Joseph L.  The New Deal in the Suburbs: A History of the Greenbelt Town  
Program, 1935-1954.  Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971.  
 
Baldwin, Sidney.  Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security  
Administration.  Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968.  
 
DiLiberto, Gioia.  A Useful Woman: The Early Life of Jane Adams.  New York:  
Scribner, 1999. 
 
  156 
Greer, Thomas H.  American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865.   
Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1965. 
 
Hayden, Dolores.  Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820-2000.   
New York: Pantheon Books, 2003.  
 
Johnston, Norman B.  Forms of Constraint: A History of Prison Architecture.  Urbana:  
University of Illinois Press, 2000.  
 
Krueckeberg, Donald A. American Planners: Biographies and Recollections. New  
York: Taylor and Francis, 1983.  
 
Namorato, Michael V.  Rexford G. Tugwell: A Biography.  New York: Praeger, 1988.  
 
Nash, Roderick Frazier Nash.  Wilderness and the Great American Mind 4th ed.   New  
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.  
 
Photography in Print, edited by Vicky Goldberg.  New York: Simon and Schuster,  
1981. 
 
Shi, David E.  The Simple Life: Plain Living and High Thinking in American Culture.   
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
 
Tenement House Reform in New York, 1834-1900.  New York: Evening Post Job  
Printing House, 1900.  
 
Watkin, David.  Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in  
Architectural History and Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern  
Movement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.  
 
Watkins, T. H. Watkins.  The Great Depression: America in the 1930s.  Boston: Little,  





Library of Congress.  “America from the Great Depression to World War II: Black- 
and-White Photographs from the FSA-OWI, 1935-1945.”  
<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fsahtml/fsainfo.html> (accessed 29 January 
2009).  
 
Lisle, Forest Fletcher.  The Century of Progress Exposition.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell  
University, 1970.  
 
 
  157 
National Park Service. “Cabin Branch Pyrite Mine.” Prince William Forest Park <  
http://www.nps.gov/prwi/historyculture/cabin-branch-mine.htm>, (accessed  
November 16, 2008).  
 
National Park Service. “Chapter One: The Construction of Prince William Forest  
Park.” Prince William Forest Park; Administrative History  
<<http://www.nps.gov/archive/prwi/Admin_hstry/adhi1.htm >, accessed 16  
January 2009.  
 
National Park Service.  “Prince William Forest Park: Civilian Conservation Corps,”  
Prince William Forest Park <http://www.nps.gov/prwi/historycultur 
e/ccc.htm>, accessed 15 January 2009.  
 
 
 
